EMPHASIS ON WEST

Evening Star, Issue 23565, 2 May 1940, Page 12

EMPHASIS ON WEST

GERMANY’S STRATEGICAL DILEMMA COMPLICATION OF HITLER'S TEMPERAMENTALISM Field-Marshal Goering, exasperated by the declaration of Allied intentions to stiffen the naval blockade and prevent evasions of neutrality, stoutly boasted that Germany would give battle “ when the right moment comes ” and would launch the onslaught in the west, for “it is here that the decisive blow must bo struck ” (writes the military correspondent of the ‘ Sydney Morning Herald ’). While this utterance should not be taken as a literal arrangement of an unalterable step to bo taken in the next few weeks, it, nevertheless, fits in with recent statements by Nazi leaders and publicists, and it corroborates Mr Churchill’s warning that Gorman armies lie poised on’their western border, awaiting the order to attack. It also harmonises with the developments that are now taking place in the wider strategical situation. Strategy, in its narrow literal sense, means what Clausewitz called “ the art of the , employment of battles as a means to gain the object of the war.” But Clausewitz himself admitted' that other factors than armies counted. “ The independent will-power of the opponent ” was, according to him, the most difficult element to deal with in a war; and this opened the way to the present emphasis on “ grand strategy ” or “ high strategy,” in which the entire life of the belligerents, and, indeed, of the outside world, has to be considered in addition to the purely military and economic warfare. _ <' Behind the apparent immobility at, present, the factors that go to make tip “ grand strategy ” are changing rapidly. While certain elements have been eliminated, others have gained accentuated importance. END OF WINTER. The first general transmuting factor is provided by the weather. The paralysis imposed by an exceptionally hard winter is being slowly remedied. Land and aerial warfare are becoming possible on the widest scale; and the shortness of the spring and summer seasons, in their- turn, means that large-scale operations, if they are to take place at all this year, must occur before next September. The end of th,e snow and the thaw does not necessarily mean an immediate offensive, because all the lengthy movements of troops and supplies must take place after the roads become open for heavy traffic, and an offensive does not depend solely on favourable weather conditions.’ Nevertheless, it remains true that a time limit is imposed at the other end of the summer. The second great change arises from drastic alterations in what may be called the general triangle of basic strategy in Europe. The elimination of Finland as a battlefield profoundly shifted the emphasis, for, so long as the Finnish armies were actively in the field, a correlation of the Finnish campaign with the wider European war was always a possibility. The collapse of Finland removed the immediate likelihood of an extension of the war to the .north; it narrowed the moves that might bo made on the strategical chess board, and thus logically meant a more direct emphasis on Western Europe. Simultaneously the south-eastern part of the triangle was changed. However much Germany might have felt tempted to use direct military action in forcing her will on Rumania and the Balkans in general, the successful mustering of the Allied force an the Middle East imposed a check. More than half a million Allied sqldiers are finely implanted on the strategical crossroads of the Near East, ready to be diverted to any zone where danger might threaten. Their role is thus not only punitive after the event, it is positively preventive. TURKEY’S STAND. To complete the strategical change in south-eastern Europe, Turkey has remained adamant in her attitude, and Germany realises full well what is impliedll in Turkey’s control of the entrances to the Black Sea. Moreover, Italy has remained quiescent, despite the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at Brennero, and Germany herself realises how difficult a Balkan excursion would be, from the technical military point of view. Communications would be long, tenuous, and inadequate, and German soldiers would bo operating far from their bases. All of these factors tell against the wisdom of German military actions in the southeast, and thus, as in tho ease of Finland, imply a turn to the western front, for there Germany would have all the power conferred by solid internal communications, by a network of strategical railways and anotor roads leading to the frontiers, by the defensive line of fortifications (now ' complete to the sea). and by the possibility of flank movements. This crystallisation towards one part of the European triangle is in general accord with the traditional lines of German military thought. However, much opinion may be moulded by changing circumstances, the Schlieffen Plan is never far from the minds of German military leaders. That plan rests on tli© two essentials of a war on a single front and that front to bo in the west, in order to paralyse France and to isolate England. This is the basic motif around which the symphony of Germany’s military effort is built up. Brauschitsch, Keitel, Raedcr, and even the more politically minded Jleichcmui all emphasise this interpretation of direct attack; and, when Goering speaks, it must be remembered that ho is more in real touch with the generals than is any other Nazi leader, for, in the eyes of tho military caste, Goering is a professional soldier and thus a gentleman. Further, it is a fixed German belief that the Allies do not relish the prospect of severe fighting on the western front, and would prefer “ diversions ” in other parts of Europe. It is felt, that, since tho fall of Finland, the emphasis on the western front places the Allies at a disadvantage. , This view has recently found repeated expression in the controlled German Press, especially in organs which usually give a lead to the other papers in military matters Dr Karl, Silex, for instance, expounded it in his powerful ‘ Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung ’ a little over a fortniglit ago, and his views are unusually important, because he is chairman of the largest Press association in Germany, and because his eight years in Loudon before 1933 were thought to have made him an infallible interpreter of British character. HITLER’S MIND. Wt. even if we admit the new stress Western Europe, what can Hitler do-' The German High Command un-

cloubtcdly wants to keep the beloved

“ Hour ” or armed force as intact as possible. The generals do nob want to go back to the wandering in tho wilderness in which they were lost between 1919 and 1933; and, at the moment, they do not seem to have made up their minds. If strictly military factors favour an attack they will attack, but they would not relish any suicidal venture merely in order to keep the Nazi regime afloat. But here enters the imponderable, unpredictable factor. Neither tho German nor the Allied High Commands can evaluate the position solely in military terms, for nobody can place logical values on Hitler’s thought processes, and still less can any reasonable forecast be made. For the German staff, this dependence on the vagai'ies of a cunning but unbalanced aaiind spells constant uncertainty; for the Allies it prevents a decision of policy on purely military grounds, and thus vastly increases the precautionary measures we have to take. Where the logic of events may seem to point inevitably in one direction, everything may bo transformed by the tortuous workings of Hitler’s mind.

The Germans are, in fact, confronted by a strategical dilemma, ajaart from the additional complications of Hitler’s tcmperamentalism. Their first alternative is to continue as at present, and this accounts for the many speculations that they will not strike until next year. By not undertaking an offensive Germany can husband her resources. If her war supplies are limited, and if she has no large-range prospects of augmenting them, it is obvious that, the more partial the kind of warfare she pursues, tho longer she can hold out. But, even if she continues her present tactics, there will be a steady drain on her resources, with the growing pressure of the blockade making replacements ever more difficult. THE SUPREME GAMBLE. On the other hand, if she strikes soon with all her force, she will be throwing her whole destiny to the hazard, staking everything on the chance that her laud forces will break through or outflank the Maginot Line, and that her aerial armadas will crush down British resistance. Should she fail in these objectives, she will have lost all her present strategical advantages, the flower of her army will have been destroyed, her air force will have lost its superiority, at a moment when Allied production would be nearing its maximum. Finally, Hitlerism itself would be discredited at home. Nevertheless, Germany cannot win the war by standing still. Even if she won the entire diplomatic struggle and arrayed all the neutrals of Europe behind her, she would have done nothing t:o bring the Allies to their knees. On the other baud, she has a larger army and a larger air force than the Allies at present, and the entire German military tradition is in favour of striking at a favourable moment. Moreover, if Hitler does not take the offensive in the next few months he has no guarantee that the Allies, once their armies and air fleets are sufficiently organised, will not do so. And endless stalemate is no part of the long-range Allied war policy. One may thus expect a continuation of the present stage of diplomatic and economic warfare, and then, when the time is ripe, a co-ordinated offensive in the west. This would be an offensive in the widest sense—by land and air on the Continent, accompanied by largescale raids on England, as a synchronised part of the wider scheme. The logic of strategical facts seems to be narrowing in this direction, unless the Allies themselves adopt a more aggressive strategy or unless striking political changes in some part of Europe once again alter tho general sti-ategical alignment and necessitate a reconsideration of the position in toto.