BALTIC CRISIS

Evening Star, Issue 23423, 14 November 1939, Page 10

BALTIC CRISIS

RUSSIA'S VITAL INTERESTS POSITION OF FINLAND Russian generals have evidently not forgotten von Hindenburg’s famous reply, when, on the eve of his departure for the Brest-Litovsk conference in December, 1917, Baron von Kuhlmann asked why he particularly wanted the eastern border States for Germany, writes a special correspondent of the ‘ Sydney Morning Herald.’ “ I need them,” ho said, “ for the manoeuvring of my left wing in the next war.” That reply gives the clue to the swiftly moving events round tho Baltic in the past week or two. It has always been possible to visualise a situation in which, while not actually occupying one or more of the Baltic countries, Germany might, acquire such a strong influence over them, or from within, as to constitute a threat to Russia’s vital interests in the Baltic. These interests are largely strategic. From tho point of view, of naval warfare, any Great Power in control of tho Baltic ports of Tallin, Riga, Ventspils, and Liepaja, is well on the way to control the Baltic Sea; while the possession and fortification of Estonia’s Dagoe Islands at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga, or of Finland’s Aaland Islands-, would put Germany in an excellent position to blockade the lied fleet in the Gulf of Finland. As to a land attack, tho terrain of the Baltic States makes them suitable for military operations. Moscow is some 350 miles, as the crow flics, from the Latvian border, but Leningrad is less than 150 miles from tho Estonian border. RUSSIAN PRESSURE. Thus, the representatives of Latvia and Estonia have been to Moscow, and pacts of mutual assistance have been concluded under which Soviet forces will occupy naval bases and aerodromes in tho two countries. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister, M, Urbsys, has also been in Moscow. Now it is Finland’s turn. But Finland considers herself not a Baltic Stats proper, but as being mere in the Scandinavian bloc. Finland and Sweden are bound by old ties, and the basis of modern Finnish culture is Swedish. There may be harder bargaining in Moscow over Finland than was revealed over Latvia and Estonia. In the centre of Helsinki the Finnish, capital, too, there stands a simple monument to commemorate the German soldiers who fell in the struggle against the Russians and the Reds in tho days when Finland was lighting for independence. For a short time Finland flirted with the idea of getting a German Prince as her king, but had to abandon it as a result of Germany’s defeat. But Germany, who had helped Finland to clear the country of the Reds, immediately imposed such an onerous commercial treaty that even the pro-German Finns were constrained to realise that if Germany had remained there, they would have been reduced to the state of a vassal country. FINNISH SENTIMENT.

On the other hand, there is the traditional Finnish' hatred of Russia. This dates only from the closing years of the last century, and the Russification policy of the Pan-Slavs, but it was intensified by the behaviour of the Red Army in South Finland. But, apart from past experiences, the Finns are afraid that Russia has territorial designs on Finland, and. the average Finn sees in Russia the one enemy of the nation. For many years after Finland established her independence in 1917 relations with Soviet Russia were at best no more than polite, and often were strained to breaking point. In recent years, however, they have improved. While, therefore, the shadow of the swastika has been the dominating factor in Scandinavian and Baltic politics for several years, the Border States— Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland—have feared Russia as well as Germany, for they would all be as helpless against Russian invasion by land as against German invasion from the sea. Generally speaking, however, they have feared Germany more than Russia, for Russia has, until now, been passive in the Border States, ever since the abortive Communist insurrection of 1924 marked the end of her interference in the internal affairs of all those States. They have always feared two things, however—that Russian western imperialism might revive, and that Russia might again attempt to promote social revolution abroad. That is why the Border States did not want an alliance with Russia. They wanted an understanding that would leave them with a friendly Russian hinterland from which they could obtain supplies, but they did not want an alliance that would mean the presence of Russian troops on their soil.

POLITICAL MANOEUVRES,

Last year, Latvia and Estonia, which had been hoxn together during the disintegration of Russia, and which had

fought side by side for the right to live, declared their strict neutrality. They had never considered voluntarily siding with Germany, for that would have precipitated the forces of Russia towards the Baltic coast, and the Baltic countries would have become a battlefield and been destroyed. To have sided with Russia would have meant admitting Russian forces to help defend the coastline, with its valuable seaports and the risk of being absorbed in Russia. But when Germany this year proposed non-aggression pacts there was little or no hesitation. They might have some protective value, and could not reasonably do any harm, whereas to refuse would inevitably have provoked the charge of siding with Russia. Several pacts of similar character had already been concluded with Russia. When, however, in the ill-fated AngloFrench talks in Moscow, the Soviet proposed to guarantee assistance in case they were attacked, this was declined as inconsistent with the policy of neutrality, because it would have been interpreted by Germany as adhesion to the “ peace ” front. Now, with new thrust of power politics in the -Baltic, all their efforts for neutrality have gone. It may be that the Governments and ruling classes in these countries, with their genuine fear of Russia and of the infiltration of Communism, would have preferred German protection to the presence of Soviet troops on their sou. For even if Russian penetration does not end in a permanent and complete occupation, it may well result in the overthrow of the existing regimes.