GERMANS AND RUSSIA

Evening Star, Issue 23377, 21 September 1939, Page 2

GERMANS AND RUSSIA

BACKGROUND TO PACT THE ALTERNATIVE POLICIES ECONOMIC LINKS The diplomatic world is reeling under flic shock of the announcement from Berlin that negotiations for a ißii->,o-Gerinau \uu-aggrcssion Pact arc in their final stages, wrote Professor S. 11. Roberts, in the ‘ Sydney Morning Herald ’ recently, if this is true it may mean a completely new alignment of. world forces; for the moment the bewildered repercussions in every country leave no doubt as to the importance of the development. The actual declaration came as a great surprise, although, for several years now, even during the height of Hitler’s anti-Soviet campaign, many observers have speculated on the possibility of a rapprochement between Germany and Russia. Certainly, if an understanding does come, it can be explained by certain tendencies in German policy for at least 20 years; and those tendencies, one must repeat, were not entirely eradicated when Hitler was building up his Anti-Comintern Pact. There have always been two groups of “ Easterners ” in Germany. While both were agreed that Germany’s longrange destiny lay in the sprawling lands of Eastern Europe, they differed as to what methods were to be employed. The moderates envisaged, a collaboration with Russia and an expansion, first to the Russian borderlands and then south towards the Black Sea; the extremists, on the other hand, followed that noisy disciple of the Third Reich. Alfred Rosenberg, in believing that Russia had to bo removed from the path of German expansion. Hitherto von Ribbeutrop has belonged to the latter camp, although apparently his rebuff in London led him to reconsider his estimate of Russia. GERMAN ARMY’S VIEWS, The main support for the moderates came from the {professional soldiers and the business men. The German army officer has always had a great regard for the Russian, far more so than for the Italian. Ironically enough, most of the praise that has been accorded the Soviet army has emanated from military circles in Germany, The older Relchswehr leaders look upon the Russian army as in some sense their own creation. After the war, when Germany suffered under the military sections of the Treaty of Versailles, German officers trained the new Russian leaders in the' art of modern warfare. The present Russian Staff College has been organised on German lines, and, conversely, many of Hitler’s present leaders gained their wider strategical experience in the wastes of postwar Russia. ■ We had reflections _of this during several of Stalin’s purges. He even quoted, as justification for his drastic “ clean-ups ” in the army, the fact that the higher-placed Soviet officers were so friendly with Germany as to be traitors to Russia. This was the specific allegation against Marshal Tukhachevsky and the seven other Soviet generals who were sentenced to death in June, 1937. The German officers invariably singled out Russian attaches for special courtesies, and, the more extreme Hitler’s' rantings against Bolshevism became, the more attentive grew his army leaders to those Soviet soldiers with-whom they came into contact. , WARNINGS TO HITLER. It is common knowledge that, from 1935 to 1937, the German general staff repeatedly warned Hitler about the strength and the technical efficiency of the Russian army. They knew that Russia had been spending milliards of roubles, tens of milliards in armaments during years when Germany’s expenditure was nominal, and they feared that Germany could never make up for the enormous start which the Russians had. Further, and here the soldiers joined the industrialists, the Reichswehr spokesman argued that Germany should aid the Russian Five-Year Plan in order to secure the raw materials and the munitions Germany would need so badly one day. General Eimannsbcrger, who wrote the standard work on tank warfare, argued that “ the river of oil ” which could come from Russia would alone justify a Russo-German rapprochement, and there have been many German strategists who have stated that, while it is problematical whether Rumanian supplies would suffice for Germany’s war-" time needs, there is no doubt at all that Russia, the largest oil producer in Europe, could easily produce enough. The Germans looked up to the Russians as the only people who had thoroughly grasped the implications of motorised and chemical warfare, and, further, they looked to the vast chemical and oil deposits of the black Russian earth to supply the raw materials which would allow Germany to adapt to tho rest of Europe the lessons she had learned from Russia, SUPPORT OF INDUSTRIALISTS. In this the German heavy industrialists supported them. Long before Hitler came to power, tho “ economic expansionists,” first under Hugo Stinnes and later under the Thyssens and tho Krupp von Bolden, maintained that a union of Russian resources and German managing ability would dominate the world. This was the stage reached in 1922, when the Treaty of Rapallo established good economic and political relationships between the two countries, and it was the stage consciously fostered during the whole of Chieherin’s .control of Soviet foreign policy up to 1929. During this period, a Russo-German neutrality treaty was signed in 1926, and was renewed by Hitler himself in 1933. By tho way, it was at this juncture that Hitler said that he could light Bolshevism abroad without prejudicing Germany’s diplomatic and economic relationships with Soviet Russia herself. Trade grew between the two countries . Liberal credits were given by Germany. 1 n 1935, for instance, at the height of Hitler’s anti-Comintern agitation, the Wolff group of German industrialists arranged a huge credit for Russia, and, be it noted, overcame the doctrinnaire objections of tho Rosenberg clique in Hitler’s entourage. Trade relations continued to bo most amicable, and Russia owed much of the success of her first FiveYear Plan to German machinery and German technicians. When friction came, it was not because of Hitler’s wishes, but only because Russia objected to the highly unfavourable balance of trade. Germany was Russia’s second-best customer, and wanted to continue so. CHANGE COMES THIS YEAR. In recent years, however, Stalin’s policy of restricting imports has told against Germany, and, although trade agreements were renewed as late as December 19 of last year, 1 he volume

. of trade between, the two countries was only one-fifteenth of what it was eight years ago. Another reason was that Germany was concentrating so greatly on her armaments programme that Russian importers could not obtain delivery of their goods. Conditions changed early this year. Soviet industry found itself in need of certain replacements, and the Germans, with their foreign exchange difficulties growing, badly wanted to send Russia machinery and receive back manganese and petroleum. In 1931, the Germans insisted on receiving a third of their payments in gold and silver; now, on the contrary, they were scrambling for raw materials. This explains the emphasis on Soviet-Ger-man trade negotiations all through July. Indeed, several Moscow correspondents reported, even then, that these trade talks were attracting more attention than the Anglo-French political negotiations—clearly a straw to show which way the wind was blowing. There was one other relevant fact. Since the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Hitler has markedly abated his anti-Russian propaganda. To one not accustomed to the artificial nature of Nazi propaganda, it seemed incredible when, almost overnight, Hitler suddenly shut off his torrent of antiBolshevist tirades. THE ALTERNATIVE POLICIES. Of course, 'there was always a distinction between Russia and the Comintern. AVheu the first Anti-Comin-tern agreement was signed on November 25, 1936, the Germans made it clear that they mainly objected to the extension of Communism in countries outside Russia. They were lighting the Seventh Communist International; Ribbontrop actually said that Germany was. only following the United States in this. liven, * Izvestia,’ at the time, drew a distinction between Germany s anti-Comintern feelings and her attitude towards Russia itself. To most Germans, however, this was a distinction without a difference, and it was Russian leaders and Russian bombers that they feared, until propaganda diverted their attention to the Roles and tho British. . There remains.the contradiction between Hitler’s repeated statements about Russia in ‘ Mein Kampf ’ and his present policy; but is it a contradiction P He repeatedly said that Germany must expand towards Russia and her subject border-States, but there was always one qualification. England was to be his ally. ‘ lor such a policy there was, of course, only a single possibly ally in England.” Again, ‘ only with England to cover our rear, would it have been possible to begin the new leutonic march.” France was always his mortal enemy, and, vhen England irretrievably joined Franco and when a “ peace front ” was formed against Germany, Hitler had no alternative than to alter hi§ policy. NO LONGER POSSIBLE. The necessary preliminary of an alliance with England was no longer possible; and thus, to nd Germany of the menace of “ encirclement and to neutralise any possible resistance of the Poles, he had to secure the immobility of Russia. This is apparently promised by the pending non-aggres-sion pact. Russia may redress the strategical balance against Germany aud may even yet save Oerman economically. . . . , Tho main query remaining is whether tho negative agreement now being arranged may prove the joieiuniier to a more positive agreement that would delimit “ a now Eastern Europe. Cerj tainly "there is nothing in. Hitler s aims or methods in the past to rule out such I a possibility..