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COMPLETE SURPRISE

THAT RUSSO-GERMAN PACT " OF A VERY UNPLEASANT CHARACTER" REMOVING GERMANY'S DANGEROUS IMPRESSIONS (British Official Wireless.) RUGBY, August 24. (Received August 25, at noon.) With particular interest members heard Mr Chamberlain’s admission in the Commons that Monday's announcement of the Soviet-German non-aggres-sion pact came ns a complete surprise to Britain, and a “ surprise of a very unpleasant character.” The close attention with which his comments on this development, and his refusal meantime to pass final judgment on it, was followed by increased alertness as the Prime Minister passed on to speak of the false deductions that had been made in certain quarters as to its effect on British policy and the steps that had been taken to correct them and to reaffirm in very deliberate terms the fidelity of Britain to its pledges. “ In Berlin,” Mr Chamberlain continued, “ Monday night’s announcement was hailed with extraordinary cynicism as a great diplomatic victory which removed any danger of war, since Britain and Franco would no longer be Hkdly to fulfil their obligations to Poland. “We felt it,” declared the Prime Minister, “to be our first duty to remove any such dangerous impression, hence Tuesday’s Cabinet statement that our obligations to Poland remained’ unaffected. How, indeed, could Britain with honour have gone back upon an undertaking given before the negotiations with Russia opened—not in any way made dependent on the outcome of such negotiations—and so often and so plainly repeated?

“ These obligations rest upon the agreed statement made to the House of Commons to which effect is being given in the treaties which are at present in an advanced stage of negotiation. These treaties, when concluded, will formally define, without in any way altering, adding to, or subtracting from the obligations of mutual assistance which have already been accepted.” The Cabinet statement, said Mr Chamberlain, was followed by Sir Nevile Henderson’s visit to Herr Hitler. The object of the communication Sir Nevile Henderson delivered was to restate the British position and make quite sure that there was no misunderstanding. / “ His Majesty’s Government felt that this was all the more necessary having regard to the reports it had received of military movements taking place in Germany and of the projected German-Soviet agreement.”

The communication, after the declaration already cited of the Government’s resolve if necessary to employ without delay all the forces at its command, went on to inform the Chancellor of Britain’s view that there was nothing in the questions between Poland and Germany which could not, and should not, be resolved without the use of force if only confidence could be restored. In this connection Mr Chamberlain recalled his oft-stated conviction that war between Britain and Germany—admitted on all sides to be the greatest calamity which could occur—was not desired either by the British or German peoples. The Prime Minister also recalled how Britain had expressed her willingness to assist in creating conditions in which negotiations between Germany and Poland on the questions outstanding between them could take place. He added that such negotiations could obviously deal also with complaints made on either side about the treatment of minorities, GERMAN THESIS. Coming to Herr Hitler’s reply, he stated that it included “ what amounts to a restatement of the Nazi thesis that in Eastern Europe Germany should have a free hand. If we or any other country having less direct interest in this part of Europe choose to interfere the blame for the ensuing conflict will be ours. This thesis entirely misapprehends the British position. 1 ' “We do not seek to proclaim a special position for ourselves in Eastern Europe,” Mr Chamberlain continued, “ so we do not think of asking Germany to sacrifice her national interests. But we cannot agree that the national interests can only be secured by shedding blood or by the destruction of the independence of other States.”

Earlier the Prime Minister, having described the worsening situation in the last few weeks, and the violent German Press campaign in which it was declared that Danzig could not be subject to any conference or compromise, hut must join the Reich at once unconditionally, in which Danzig was linked with the Corridor, and iu which allegations were made of the illtreatment of Germans living in Poland, strongly resembling those made in respect to the Sudeten Germans last year, paid a tribute to the attitude maintained by Poland. “ It must, I think, be agreed that in the face of this campaign the declarations by the Polish statesmen, have shown great calm and self-restraint. The Polish leaders, while they seem lirm in their determination to resist an attack upon their independence, have been unprovocative. They have always

been ready, as I am sure they would be ready now, to discuss their differences with the German Government if they could be sure that those discussions would be carried on without threats of force, and could have confidence that if an agreement were reached its terms would be respected afterwards, both in letter and in spirit.” THE MISSION TO MOSCOW. In passages devoted to tho 11 unpleasant surprise ” of the Soviet-Ger-man pact, Mr Chamberlain referred to rumours of impending changes in the relations between the Nazi and Soviet Governments which had been in circulation for some time, and affirmed that no inkling of any change had been conveyed to either the British or the French Governments by the Soviet. “ The House may remember that on July 31 I remarked that wo had engaged upon a step that was almost unprecedented in character when we agreed to send our soldiers, sailors, and airmen to Russia to discuss military plans together before we had an assurance that we should be able to reach an agreement on political matters,” he said. “ Moved by M. Molotov’s observation that if we could come to a successful conclusion of our military discussions a political agreement should not present any insurmountable difficulty, wo sent a mission. It arrived on August 7, and was received in friendly fashion. The discussions »?■ »y« »t« »?«»*««% »% »t. >y>

were actually in progress and were proceeding on a basis of mutual trust when this bombshell was flung down. To say the least, it was highly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were proceeding on that basis the Soviet was secretly engaged with Germany in other conversations for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects of the Soviet’s foreign policy as we had understood it. I do not propose this afternoon, to pass any final judgment upon the incident. That, I think, would be premature until we have had an opportunity of consulting France as to the meaning and consequences of this agreement, the text of which was only published this morning.” SYMPATHY APPRECIATED. Towards the conclusion of his speech, Mr Chamberlain, after appreciative reference to King Leopold’s peace appeal and! solemnly-expressed hope that “ reason and sanity may find a way to reassert' themselves,” turned to the close and cordial relations maintained with France, and referred to the encouragement Britain was deriving from the sympathetic understanding displayed by Governments in every part of the British Commonwealth. In his final references to the fundamentals of British foreign policy, Mr Chamberlain cited as an authoritative manifesto the speech which Lord Halifax delivered at Chatham House on June 29. “ We want,” Mr Chamberlain said, “ to see established an international order based! upon mutual understanding and mutual confidence. We cannot build up such an order unless it conforms with certain principles which are essential to confidence and trust. Those principles must include the observance of international undertakings, andl the renunciation of force in the settlement of differences. “ If, despite all our efforts to find a way to peace—and I have done my best—we find ourselves forced to embark upon a struggle which is bound to be fraught with suffering and misery for all man- , kind, we shall be fighting for the preservation of those principles the destruction of which would involve * the destruction of all possibility of peace and security in the world.” PEACE OR WAR? WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES LONDON, August 24. (Received August 25, at 2 p.m.) Concluding his House of Commons speech, Mr Chamberlain said: “ Peace or war does not rest with us. I hope those on whom the responsibility rests will think of the millions of human beings whose fate depends on their actions. For ourselves, we have a united country behind us in this critical hour.”

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19390825.2.91.5

Bibliographic details

Evening Star, Issue 23354, 25 August 1939, Page 9

Word Count
1,404

COMPLETE SURPRISE Evening Star, Issue 23354, 25 August 1939, Page 9

COMPLETE SURPRISE Evening Star, Issue 23354, 25 August 1939, Page 9

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