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FATE OF THE THETIS

INQUIRY INTO DISASTER CONTINUED OVERCROWDING USED UP AIR QUICKLY TUG FAILED TO SEE MARKER BUOY IN TIME Press Association—By Telegraph—Cupynght LONDON, July 4. (Received July 5, at 8 a.m.) When the inquiry into the Thetis disaster was continued, Captain Oram, examined by Mr R. Paget, representing the relatives of a Cammel Laird apprentice, William Smith, suggested that the possibility of saving the submarine and the near certainty of saving the crew was lost by dilatoriness in sending ships to the scene. Captain Oram replied: I would not say “ dilatoriness.” Mr Paget emphasised that instead of every available ship rushing to the scene by 5.40 p.m. the first ship asked was the Brazen, which was 55 miles away at 6.45 p.m. “ I suggest,” he added, “ that the real cause of the disaster was dilatorincss in sending vessels to the rescue. Another cause was the excessive crew.”

Captain Oram agreed that the effect of overcrowding was that instead of having 48 hours’ air the crew had much less. He admitted that each time the Davis apparatus was used air escaped. Mr Paget asked whether if carbon dioxide poisoning came more quickly than expected it would account for the failure of any morb to escape. Captain Oram said ,t might have been a contributory cause, and added that the number of contractors and men was normal for the surface part of the trial. It was a fact that nobody disembarked prior to submerging, according to customary procedure. Captain Oram agreed that it was inexplicable that the tug did not see the marker buoy. It was always a matter of immediate attention if a submarine did not send a surface signal within a specified period. Ships ought to have been in the vicinity by 8.30 p.m., in which event Captain Oram had no doubt that men would have escaped throughout the night.

MANY TOO WEAK TO ESCAPE LONDON, July 4. (Received July 5, at 10 a.m.) At the inquiry into the Thetis disaster Lieutenant Woods, describing his escape in the Davis jacket, said Stoker Arnold, who followed, thought he saw sparks and smoke through the escape chamber scuttle, and when, no others followed witness suggested tapping the hull to let those imprisoned'know that help was at hand. This was at 10.15 a.m. There was no answer. Presumably the occupants were dead.

Lieutenant Woods added that when he escaped the distress of the others was very bad. Many of them were too ■weak to make escapes. The inquiry was ,adjourned. WINDS HAMPER WORK RUGBY, July 4. (Received July 5, at 11 a.m.) To-day’s Thetis report was that strong winds had prevented the placing of the lifting wires under the submarine.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19390705.2.71

Bibliographic details

Evening Star, Issue 23310, 5 July 1939, Page 9

Word Count
449

FATE OF THE THETIS Evening Star, Issue 23310, 5 July 1939, Page 9

FATE OF THE THETIS Evening Star, Issue 23310, 5 July 1939, Page 9

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