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A BRITISH VICTORY

KEYNES ON THE CRISIS RUSSIA AND ITALY DEFEATED Discussing the European crisis of last September in the. ‘ New Statesman and Nation,’ John Maynard Keynes, well-known economist, writes as follows: The public may misapprehend the motives and purposes lying behind the drama of the last weeks of the Czechoslovak crisis. It imagines that peace has been snatched from,' the cauldron of war by the skill, courage, and tenacity of a single man. It may well be that peace was in danger at the last moment through the Prime Minister’s reckless pursuit of his own aims, and his delay in taking the steps necessary to make clear the ultimate position of this country. But even this is unlikely, and the pacific impulses of the nation have been exploited to serve undisclosed aims, which, if they had been disclosed, would have been approved by some but repudiated by many. It can scarcely be questioned that at several stages in the negotiations an honourable settlement could have been secured without any risk to peace if an unambiguous stand had been taken by this country, Franco, and Russia speaking with one voice. Such a stand has been consistently refused. The Prime Minister was never preparing i'or_ the actuality of war. The total omission of any. reference- eyen to jthe

possibility of military action by this country in the correspondence published in the White Paper, the avoidance of conversations with Russia, the reluctance and extraordinary delay in ordering the mobilisation of the Fleet are not consistent with any other explanation. Neither the Prime Minister nor Herr Hitler ever intended for one moment that the play-acting should devolve into reality. OBJECTIVES THE SAME. For it would be a mistake to attribute extreme carelessness to the one or insanity to the other of these two astute politicians. The actual course of events has been dictated by the fact that the objectives of Herr Hitler and Mr Chamberlain were not, different, but the same; whilst Russian policy lias played into Mr Chamberlain’s hands by making it easy for him to ignore her. The course of events can be made intelligible by the following considerations;—Herr Hitler has explained that his ultimate objective is the Ukraine. The Balkans, Western Europe, the colonies might have been the desired sphere of his expansion. But he has openly decided otherwise, and in these matters he is a man of his word. _ Yet the position of Czechoslovakia, with a well-armed force of a million men, strongly entrenched, and in alliance with Russia, presented a danger to this flank which could not be overlooked and must be dealt with first. The inner diplomatic game has developed, therefore, as follows:—We have been bought off by Germany’s agreeing to forgo a fleet, and soft-pedalling on the colonics; France by her renunciation of western aims (perhaps including Spain,.so far as G.ermany js concerned).,

s Italy by her side-stepping the Bali kans; Poland by a sacrifice of the f Silesian Germans (for the time being) - and the hope of a share of - the llus- - sian spoils. Only Czechoslovakia had to b bo sacrificed. The next move, presum- . ably, is a German alliance with Poland r with a view to the seizure of the t Ukraine, simultaneously with a Siber- » ian venture by Japan (this move being, however, seriously endangered by Japan’s blunder in Central China). Mussolini, as he well knows, is left nowhere: but for the rest of the world ' that is only a detail; ’ ATTRACTION OF POLICY. Tlie attraction of this politik to ourI selves is obvious. Our sea power and ■ our overseas Umpire remain for the ' present unchallenged; our own peace > may be secured for a considerable 1 period; we are given time to complete our air defences: Mussolini’s Mediter- > ranean aims are left in the lurch; even ■ the Spanish Government may benefit; t and who knows but that in the end . Herr Hitler may be the second dictator i to retreat from Moscow. If, on the 1 other hand, it should happen that the 5 capitalist branch of the totalitarian 5 faith defeats its Socialist sister, how b many ■ Englishmen care ? It is Russia 1 and Italy which have suffered diplo- , matic defeat. We and France have 2 only sacrificed our honour and our en--3 gagenients to a civilised and faithful 1 nation, and fraternised with what is ? vile. This, at any rate, is the short- , run calculation. The Prime Minister i thinks it is a small price to pay and 3 can swallow with a good conscience a ? week’s play-acting, beginning with gas i masks and ending with bouquets, even r if it involved a brief moment of harsh ’ . plucking - at- Bothers’ • heart-strings^

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19390201.2.58

Bibliographic details

Evening Star, Issue 23180, 1 February 1939, Page 7

Word Count
780

A BRITISH VICTORY Evening Star, Issue 23180, 1 February 1939, Page 7

A BRITISH VICTORY Evening Star, Issue 23180, 1 February 1939, Page 7

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