The Evening Star THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1938. BRITAIN’S MERCHANT NAVY.

Evening Star, Issue 23147, 22 December 1938, Page 10

The Evening Star THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1938. BRITAIN’S MERCHANT NAVY.

Britain’s merchant navy Is vital to the security of the Empire. That saying may bo trite, but if its truth is obvious its importance is apt to be overlooked. This subject has been much discussed lately, and efforts are being made to stir the British Government to decisive action in the face of the subsidised competition from other countries. In the House of Lords a few days ago Lord Lloyd complained of Ministerial inaction, in spite of the importance of the merchant navy to national defence. Subsidised American and Japanese competition, he declared, was driving British shipping off certain important routes. The report of the Shipowners’ Committee made the case that British shipping in every sea was fighting a losing battle against subsidised foreign competition, the pressure of which was greater than ever. This raises the problem of how long Britain would be able to hold out in a major war if the decline is allowed •to continue. In discussing the general situation, Lord Runciman said that if the shipbuilders and shipowners made out a convincing case it would bo found that the Government was ready to respond. The urgency of the matter has been pointed out by tbe naval correspondent of the ‘ Observer.’ Loss of trade, important as it is, is not the chief factor, which is the risk to the Empire in the event of a major conflict occuring. Powers that might bo arrayed against Britain have more than two hundred submarines among them, many being ocean-going craft with a very wide range of action. Comparisons that are made with 1914 are amply justified, for the Empire’s losses during the war amounted to 7,760,000 tons, and at that time the enemy’s under-water craft in numbers and efficiency were enormously inferior to those that could be concentrated at vital points to-day. At the outbreak of war Britain possessed 41.6,per cent, of the world’s tonnage. In 1933 it is 26.4 per cent. Translated into other figures, British ships capable of carrying food and materials are weaker to the extent of 3,500,000 tons. Between 1911 and 1936 the number of British seamen decreased by 59,000. When-the loss in fishermen is added to this total it is shown that Britain has over 100,000 fewer active seafarers than at the outbreak of the Great War. The people of Britain have an inherent dislike of control and regimentation, but, faced with so many dangers, they are now obliged to submit to unpalatable decrees. Britain, notwithstanding the shrinking figures, is still the premier maritime Power of the world, and has the most to lose if her sea communications are broken or seriously threatened. When the various aspects of the position are examined it certainly seems that the time has come for immediate aud decisive action. No matter how strong the naval and air services may be, they would be terribly hampered in war time if the merchant navy was not equal to the occasion. It is argued that if a Ministry of Shipping was necessary during the last great conflict, it is equally essential now when various defence services are being prepared for possible hostilities on a scale much wider than in 1914-18. The suggestion is made that under a Minister of Cabinet rank the Ministry should bo responsible for all the ships aud seamen of Britain, apart from those of the Royal Navy and the immediate naval reserves. Its main function would be to co-ordinate these ships, fishing craft, seamen, and fishermen into the general scheme of defence.