NEED OF AMERICA

Evening Star, Issue 23123, 24 November 1938, Page 7

NEED OF AMERICA

NEW FOREIGN POLICY PRESIDENT AND MUNICH With the compact of Munich the foreign policy of the present administration became obsolete, and presumably the President, Secretary Hull, and Under-Secretary Welles are searching for a' new one, writes Arthur Krock in the ‘ New York Times.’ Perhaps its outlines emerged in Mr Welles’s recent radio speech, in which, after dutifully seeking to prove that Mr Roosevelt rather than Mr Chamberlain and Premier Mussolini resolved the Czech crisis, he offered a world programme. In its outlined details this was not new at all; disarmament, no bombing or gassing of civilians and cities, the levelling of economic barriers, all to bo arranged at a world conference which this Government would bo happy to initiate if the prospect of agreement seemed hopeful. Since we have been urging conventions like these for years, since the same week Mr Chamberlain promised that Great Britain would now re-arm at a speedier rate, and since nationalism in Europe seems more acute than ever, an effective world conference appears to be distant still. EFFECT OF A PLEA. But something important happened after the Roosevelt Administration began to make these same proposals to the world, something that wrote “ finis ” on the foreign policy which was their base and called for a substitute. This Government through the President associated itself by inference with a settlement (that of Munich) which were founded on treaty-viola-tion. And this Government, through Mr Roosevelt’s direct appeals to Hitler and Mussolini, inferentially cancelled a long series of official attacks on the dictators by_ asking and receiving from them consideration of our plea to accept tho fruits of aggression instead of rudely plucking them. Mussolini, although he had interceded with Hitler before he received Mr Roosevelt’s fervent suggestion that he do so, at any rate proceeded as tho President asked. Hitler, whether or not the second American note was in any way responsible, did agree to wait a few days to get nine-tenths of his demands, and this is what Mr Roosevelt asked the Fuhrer to do. The Washington Administration is very proud of. and even inclined to exaggerate, the effects and circumstances of its efforts, and thus is in the position of approving the Compact of Munich.

NO MORE “QUARANTINE.” ■ Therefore I cannot conceivably resume its hints that Germany and Italy should be “quarantined”; and, in view of what at Munich the President estimated to Hitler would be “ an outstanding historic service to humanity,” might not impress Tokio as logical if it continued- to frown on Japan for seizing parts of China. Japanese statesmen might naturally reason that, if China will quit resisting and accept the conquest, that, too, would be “an outstanding historic service to humanity,” Viewed in this light, our intervention in Europe calls for a readjustment of previous foreign policy. On the official record the United States Government is under obligations to one dictator for receiving something on threat of force instead of taking it by force. And it is under obligations to another dictator for persuading the first one so to proceed. If this does not call for an end of official attacks on the treaty-breakers and the aggressors, and that does not imply a change of policy, it is most difficult to understand what else it does call for and imply. I REALISM OF THE FUTURE. During the barrage of Presidential and State Department utterances in 1937 and 1938 many hard words were spoken of the dictatorial Governments, and resentment in Berlin and Home was at least as great as it was in Tokio. In that same period Washington high officials denounced the cessation of possession of territory by force and unilateral revision or destruction of treaties. On October 5, 1937, the President said at Chicago that “ when an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.” The dictator States accepted this as a definite threat of action. About this same time a “ high official,” explained to the ‘ New York Times ’ that our policy meant that “ warthreatening countries cannot obtain their objectives by default because of the unwillingness of peace-loving nations to insist on respect for the rights and sanctity of international obligations.” OUT OF THE WINDOW. Those words and that policy were thrown out of the window of the Fuhrerhaus at Munich. In the belief of the Governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States they had to be ejected to avert a general war. Maybe Hitler was bluffing, but that is besido the point. The outcome is peace, though for how long no man knows. A realistic policy replaced the fine words of Washington, London, and Paris, with all three Governments assenting directly or tacitly, and British, French, and American statesmen publicly rejoicing over the result. The “ quarantine ” was not invoked by Mr Roosevelt. Quite the contrary. Tho “ war-threatening countries did obtain their objectives by default.” So be it. If a realistic foreign policy at Washington is the result, and pious preachments without intent to implement are abandoned for hard facts, thon_ possibly what hapjpened at Munich may not happen soon again.