ARMISTICE ONLY

Evening Star, Issue 23122, 23 November 1938, Page 3

ARMISTICE ONLY

EUROPEAN POSITION HUMILIATION OF ENTENTE DUE TO AIR WEAKNESS Britain and France are buying an armistice of Germany, the price of tho delivery being her power over Czechoslovakia (writes “ Augur ” from London to the ‘ New York Times ’). This is the inner meaning of present events, which represent a deep humiliation to the Anglo-French entente by a triumphant Germany'. Britain and France to-day are paying for the mistakes that originated in the Peace Treaty of Versailles. All over that document was inscribed the conviction that Gorman militarism had been humbled for over. Out of that belief was born a sentiment of security', which endured longer, unfortunately, than the situation warranted. After the artificial edifice of Europe had been created at Versailles peace began crumbling in many directions, but the British and French went on living secure in their feeling of irrevocable predominance. Their armaments were neglected to such an extent that the lag, compared with Germany, still exists, in spite of feverish efforts to make up for lost rime. Czechoslovakia is a victim of the Western Powers’ unipreparedness for war.” Neville Chamberlain, Britain's Prime Minister, has many defects, but in his make-up cowardice is not included. Witness the commitments he accepted during his Premiership for the security of France. They went much further than anything accepted by previous Governments. Indeed, it is not sure whether the British public would have approved their extent if they had been published. STOOD BEHIND PARIS. But Mr Chamberlain calls a spade a spade am) believes ugly looks cannot replace hard knocks. When the trouble over Czechoslovakia started, the Prime Minister made it absolutely plain that Britain stood not behind Prague but Paris, meaning that if war came and France as Czechoslovakia’s ally were involved, Britin must defend tho integrity of her French ally. In other words, in Mr Chamberlain s view. Britain marches in this case behind France. As Chancellor Adolf Hitler’s menace to Czechoslovakia grew and war began looming near the horizon, Mr Chamberlain began taking stock of the situation. Of the support of British public opinion he had no doubts. Indeed, it will be remembered that between September 3 and 10 the feeling m this country was extremely strong against the trouble-making and bullying of Germany. , , People all over the place were beginning to say it would be better to have the trouble over once and tor all. The (British Navy without the slightest hitch moved northwards, easily passing to a war footing. The air force, though not so large as desirable, was like a tensed spring awaiting release. Those were Britain’s contributions to common Anglo-French action because her army still remains ridiculously inadequate. Ministers can produce arms and munitions and create cadres of experts, but they cannot create a real army as long as democracy in this country resists the idea of compulsory service. Therefore the armed force's" of Britain are only complementary to toe French Army, which remains the principal actor *in a possible Fmropean drama, OFFENSIVE STRENGTH. Here Mr Chamberlain discovered a fact that brought the first doubt to his mind—namely, that the Maginot fortifications, while providing incomparable defensive cover, were useless from the viewpoint of offensive action against the fortified line feverishly built by the Germans opposite the Maginot line. The French Army, if it wished to drive into Germany, would need long preparation, and it would have to make heavy sacrifices of men and material. The Germans meanwhile could concentrate upon the destruction of tho gallant, but small, Czechoslovak force. If Britain and France were certain they would win a long-drawn struggle they were much less certain of preseivintr the Czechoslovak nation from obliteration by Nazi brutality. The only possible way to bring immediate relict to beleaguered Prague would have been overwhelming action by the air forces. Here consultations that unceasingly proceeded between London and Paris produced information of a startling nature. Faced with the direct question, the French Ministers confessed that their air force was at the present time in a state of weakness through mismanagement in the last two years. The number of heavy bombers able to stay in the air with a full cargo long enough to attack Berlin was limited; Also, a tragic fall in the production of French industrial plants would make it impossible to replace wastage in the first months of war in the air, which it was estimated would reach more than 100 per cent, of the effective planes. DECISIVE STEP TAKEN. Weakness in the air, coming on top of other defects, forced Mr Chamberlain to make a swift decision. Thus came about the historic meeting with Herr Hitler. The Prime Minister for some time had been saying it would be necessary to cut out noxious intermediaries and tackle directly the man who is master of the destinies of the Germans. The result of that momentous talk on Obersalzberg hilltop was that Herr Hitler for the first time put his cards on the table. A few days later Mr Chamberlain confronted Premier Edouard Daladier and Foreign Minister Georges Bonnot, of France, across a council table in the Cabinet room at 10 Downing Street. Said he; “The Fuhrei; (Hitler) told me he was ready to face a world war with Britain and France against him, blithe would not surrender his Claim to the Sudeten Germans. I am certain he means business. Are we ready to take the challenge immediately?” Tho French Ministers revealed themselves as not over-anxious to undertake the responsibility for challenging fate. M. Daladier and M. Bonnet are not unaware of the deficiency of their air force, which evidently is known to the Germans as well. Here is the inner reason for the present Anglo-French humiliation. Let it not be imagined for a moment that Mr Chamberlain enjoyed proceeding to Godesborg where Herr Hitler promenaded him before the eyes of the Nazi masses. The head of the Government of the British nation could not relish the visit.—carrying, figuratively, the head of President Edouard Bones of Czechoslovakia on a platter.