The Evening Star FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1938. A GIGANTIC BLUFF?

Evening Star, Issue 23094, 21 October 1938, Page 8

The Evening Star FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1938. A GIGANTIC BLUFF?

Now that the peace which has been preserved in Europe may in some respects be described as “ uneasy,” it is inevitable that a new crop of wiseacres should arise who are ready and, in fact, eager to submit to the world their views on what should have been done during the height of the Czech crisis by Great Britain and France and by Mr Chamberlain in particular. As far as the news received recently in New Zealand is concerned, the ball was set on its rolling course by Captain von Rintelen, German ex-serviceman and author of 1 The Dark Invader,’ who, in a speech to a British audience, gave it as his opinion that Herr Hitler’s threat to invade Czechoslovakia unless his Godesberg demands were acceded to was 11 a gigantic fraud and bluff for which Britain and France fell.” He claimed possession of evidence to the effect that the crisis had never been a question of war, to which the German High Command was opposed, and added, “ If war had' occurred something would have happened in Germany of which you have not thought.” These opinions are, in the main, supported by a young Polishborn migrant from Sudetenland who has just arrived in New Zealand and who amplifies von Rintelen’s apparent hint of trouble inside Germany by stating that if Herr Hitler had gone

to war Germany would have been in danger of internal dissension. It is easy enough to believe that the deliberate plunging of Germany into armed conflict would have meant an undermining reaction agaiiust the Nazi regime. Messages concerning th% apprehension with which the German public regarded the menacing situation, together with hints that certain army officers were opposed to the prospect of war on more than one front, point to the truth of this. Yet three influential Nazi leaders—the Fuhrcr himself, the fire-eating Field-Marshal Goering, and Herr von Ribbentrop—were indisputodly of a mind to march. And the wishes of these three would have been sufficient to set the thirty German divisions surrounding Czechoslovakia on the move with‘ bayonets fixed. Hitler’s prestige and future career depended entirely on the carrying out of his promises to “ liberate ” Sudetenland. Had Great Britain and France advised the Czechs to defend their original frontiers and given a guarantee of , their support the world by now would have been in the throes of an appalling conflagration. Beyond all doubt Mr Chamberlain and his immediate advisers, including members of the British Secret Service, knew that Hitler would march, and the knowledge that sooner or later “ internal dissension ” would break out in Germany would have been small comfort. Great Britain, for her part, would have had a much graver situation to handle in the Near East than she has at present, while it is probable that long after Czechoslovakia had been laid waste the French army would still have been hammering at the Rhineland fortifications. Russia’s main strength as an ally of Czechoslovakia would have lain in her air force, for even the benefit of a corridor through Rumania for the passage of artillery and infantry could not in the time available have saved a little democracy almost totally surrounded by a powerful enemy. It is likely that Germany in the long run would have been subdued, but would not the cost to Czechoslovakia, in lives and destruction, have been more terrible than the territorial losses now suffered ? Air fighting, it should be apparent from the Spanish and Chinese lessons, (loes not end wars quickly. If conflict had broken out practically all that the Czechs’ allies could have done would have been to practise what they preach should not be done in Spain and China—carry out wholesale bombing of cities and towns. When all these factors are taken into consideration it will surely be realised more strongly than ever that Mr Chamberlain as the central figure in tho peace negotiations accomplished a miracle of humanitarianism that will give him a prominent place in world history. It may be argued that Armageddon has merely been postponed. If this opinion is proved to bo accurate it can at least be said that Great Britain and France, the two major European democracies, both of whom have learned much from the reoent; “ scare,” will ip. in an immeasurably better position to meet dire eventualities. Furthermore, tho cementing of Anglo-American accord should be viewed with optimism. The breathing space afforded through the British and French Prime Ministers’ diplomacy, which placed their respective countries “ on-side ” with most other nations whose opinions really matter, may supply the opportunity to build up a solid British, French, and American understanding w’hich possibly would causo even the iFuhrer to cry a halt. While there is peace there is hope of continued peace.