GERMAN COLONIES

Evening Star, Issue 22988, 20 June 1938, Page 12

GERMAN COLONIES

fHE HERERO REBELLION HORRORS INDICATION OF PLEBISCITE RESULT The British Government has made it known several times that the question Whether Germany is to have her colonies back would not be settled without a plebiscite among the natives, and that at any rate the interests of the hative populations would be safeguarded <writes Erich Andermann, in ‘ Das iNeue Tagebuch,’ Amsterdam)., Whether something has been done in Ibis direction and how far it was done [we cannot-say. But we can easily [guess what the outcome of such a plebiscite would be if we recall to our blind certain, episodes of German co obial history. There are, for examp e, the Hereros, an African people, who Were once ruled by the Germans in South-west Africa. Their opinion would be a logical deduction from the gruesome experience of their uprising, which began in January, 1904. It will probably never be known just [what the ultimate cause of that rebellion had been. When the first news of it reached Europe the German colonial administration pretended great surprise. They couldn’t believe that the Hereros should have shown such lack of appreciation of the benefits and advantages of German culture. Further information revealed the 'startling fact that the Hereros, who had risen like one man and attacked farmers, merchants, soldiers, everybody. were discriminatin'; between the white people. Only Germans were looted and killed, while the English and the Boers settled in that territory were on the whole spared. We may add that the Hereros also spared white women and children regardless of their nationalities. This was later confirmed in the Reichstag by the Government representative, Dr Stubel, who explained the attitude of the Hereros as the civilising influence of German culture upon the savages. In other directions, however, this influence had failed to make itself felt; the Hereros had not learned Christian resignation, and were not willing to put up with the fate reserved for them by their German protectors. On that same occasion the Government spokesman quoted a missionary as stating that right from the outset there had been great dissatisfaction among the Hereros and resentment over the > occupation of their territory, but to this was later added their indignation at the bad treatment meted out to them by the German settlers. TERRIBLE HATRED. The leader of the Social Democrats, August Bebel, supplemented the missionary’s statement with his own information, and said that the insatiable greed of the German settlers, raping of Herero women, bad treatment and cruelty toward the natives had created a terrible hatred. More details are contained in a memorandum to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Reich. According to this document the entire colonial problem reduced itself, from the viewpoint of the natives, to the question of reservations to be set aside for them and not sold to white settlers. In some districts the German Government had provided for such reservations, while it refused to agree to it in principle and in a general way, for economic and political reasons. In two districts the German commission had _ traced the boundaries of the reservations, with the co-operation of the natives themselves. The document adds, however, that “ misunderstandings ” had occurred, on the part of the natives, the elimination of which was prevented by the outbreak of the rebellion.

The memorandum did not specify the nature of the msunderstandings, but they could have only one meaning—namely, that the_ Hereros’ trust had been betrayed. Either the colonial administration had not kept its promise or it had worded the agreement so enigmatically that the natives believed themselves cheated. In either case the were responsible. Moreover, the administration committed the unpardonable blunder of yielding to the greed of a few settlers and refusing to settle the question in principle, . although there was room for everybody, and very amply so. On top of it the Hereros had another reason for dissatisfaction with the German, protectorate. The memorandum speaks of their indebtedness toward the merchants, all of whom were Germans. In fact, this progressive indebtedness became so serious that the administration issued an order to the effect that all debts over a year old would be considered cancelled. But the creditors did not always comply with this order. All these factors together must be held responsible for the hostility of the - native tribes.

To complete this picture we must mention the fact that when these events took place the Germans had been in Hereroland only 20 years. This short period of time had _ been sufficient to ruin the population economically. There could hardly be a more striking instance of colonial mismanagement and incompetence, and one need not wonder that under these circumstances the natives, driven to despair, had conceived no better plan than violence for ridding themselves of their oppressors. MILITARISTS IDEAS But, while the German civil authorities admitted the existence of plausible economic reasons for the uprising, the militarists, who ruled Germany then as they rule her to-day, thought differently. They had different ideas as to how the matter should be dealt with, and it was their advice that was followed in the end. We can do no better than draw from their own sources. The history of the Herero rebellion was recorded by the Historical Department of the German General Staff and published in 1906 under the title ‘ The Struggle of the German Troops in South-west Africa.’

According to these writers, the principal reason of the rebellion was the “ bellicose and freedom-loving character of the natives,” before which all other reasons, big and small, disappeared. The great inevitable struggle had to happen sooner or later, unless Germany was willing to renounce the economic exploitation of the territory. The militarists deplored the “ folly ” of peaceful exploitation and rapid economic results advocated in Germany. They deplored the 11 lack of understanding ” of the civilian population for_ the necessity of a strong hand policy. It is true, of course, that the Germans Lad never pursued any proper policy in South-west Africa, so that when their inadequate measures had brought about the uprising, the militarists naturally felt justified in assuming control and imposing their own policy, based first and foremost upon the total subjection of the tribes. This drive lasted from January, 1904, until September, 1905, but the issue was practically decided in the battle of Waterberg on August 12, 1904. Numerically superior German coutiu-

gents forced the Hereros to flee. Their persecution started immediately, and is described in the above publication from letters by eye-witnesses. One of these, Lieutenant-colonel von Beaulieu, writes; —

“ The terrible scenes on that flight will forever remain impressed in my memory. Extending over miles along the Hamabari River were native villages which used to shelter thousands of people and enormous herds of cattle. As far as they could be reached by our shells, they were reduced to a heap of ruins and abandoned by the inhabitants, who fled, leaving behind the old people and the children. Wounded, sick and dying people were moaning in agony at every step. The fact that they had left behind the cattle, their most treasured possession, proves how precipitate their flight had been. . . . The entire national wealth of the Herero people lay scattered on the highways, so to speak, ready to be picked up by us. . . . The general issued an order forbidding us to kill women and children, while no man found in the possession of arms was to be spared. . . GERMAN CULTURE. But later in the course of the campaign this civilising influence of German culture no longer made itself felt. The surviving Hereros were forced back toward Omaheke, an immense sand desert without a drop of water. On the margin of the desert the Hereros stopped, but they were no longer able to offer resistance, and retreated into the desert at the advance of the first German cavalry detachments, although they knew that this meant certain death, and the Germans knew it, too.

At that, however, the campaign did not end. Voices were raised in favour of negotiations that might have induced the survivors to surrender. But the commander, General von Trotha, branded them as foolish. He argued that there was nobody to negotiate with, anyway, since most of the chieftains had been killed or had fled, and that they had, moreover, so compromised themselves that the German Government could not possibly . negotiate with them, and insisted that operations should continue until their last resistance was broken. And so the “ war ” -went on. General von Trotha ordered the blockade of the desert into which he had _ forced the Hereros to retreat. From time to time the troops staged small raids to chase back the isolated groups of natives that had ventured near the line. Real “ operations ” were impossible while the dry season lasted. When the rains began in February, 1905, there were no Hereros left.

Gruesome details are contained in a letter of Count Schweinitz, lieutenantcolonel in the colonial army:— “. . . . Beginning from Ondowu a trail of human bones and animal carcasses marked'the road on which the natives had fled. In the bush along the way were heaps of corpses and carcasses. Aparently they had sought refuge from the blazing sun. In many ,spots the soil was dug up, proving that they had been searching for water. Everything seemed to indicate that the retreat had been a death march. • . .”

When the rains began and the German troops advanced as far as Bechuanaland their eyes beheld a terrible spectacle: . . the moans of agony of the dying, the screams of those gone insane died away in the sublime stillness of the endless desert. ... Fate had taken its course. Punishment had been meted, out. The Hereros were no longer an independent people.” When these things happened, Germany was a democratic country compared with the Third Reich, and her rulers still held the principles of Christianity in respect, that are tabu to-day. In connection with the colonial controversy, Dr Schacht said recently that the colonial policy if imperial Germany suffered from “ inhibitions ” and had therefore failed to obtain appreciable economic results. The colonial policy of the Third Reich, he said, would be “ much more radical and energetic.” Imagine the judgment passed over the Hereros raised to the n-th degree and you shall have an approximate picture of what national socialist colonial policies might be expected to look like in practice.