STRENGTH IN AIR

Evening Star, Issue 22816, 26 November 1937, Page 1

STRENGTH IN AIR

ADVANTAGE TO ITALY CONTROL OF MEDITERRANEAN The aeroplane has diminished the value of surface men-of-war, particularly in “closed seas,”_ and Italian aerial strength makes it possible for Italy to control the Mediterranean, General Guiseppe Valle, Italian Under-Secretary for Air, declared in an interview mailed to the New York ‘ Times ’ from Rome, writes Hanson Baldwin, in that journal. The writer, recently in Europe submitted a set of written questions to General Valle, administrative head of the Italian air forces, and second only to Premier Mussolini—who holds’the portfolios for the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy—in command of Italy’s formidable flying fleet. General Valle’s written answers, together with a considerable amount of factual material, on the achievements of Italian aviation to date, its present status, and its accomplishments in Ethiopia, have now been received. The general’s claim that Italy now controls the Mediterranean from the air—with the “close collaboration” of the navy, he explained—-was considered particularly significant in view of recent large-scale air, land, and sea manoeuvres around Sicily and in the light of a recent statement by General Valle in speaking on the Italian air estimates. At that time h© stressed the “radical change that has occurred in tho strategical field assigned to our air arm,” and said that the centre of gravity Lad “ clearly shifted from the Valley of the Po towards the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.” - This, he added, in explaining the air estimates, clarified the reasons for the strengthening of the air bases in Sicily, Sardinia, the Aegean Islands, Pantelleria—the little fortified dot of land between Sicily and Cape Bon—and Tobruk, the Italian air base in Libya. Air divisions are now “ able to pass" in a few hours from one part of the Mediterranean to another,” it was explained. BOMBING OF CITIES. In tho interview, received by mail, General Valle somewhat surprisingly _ deprecated ” the bombardment of cities as “ indefensible.” His opinion was regarded as particularly interesting in view of the late Italian General Douhet’s theory that a crushing and overwhelming bombardment from the air of enemy military and industrial centres and cities would probably prove decisive and insure a war of; abort duration.- Awc&Jf; -Mfri .-had •; Douhet’s theory of air warfare still motivated Italian air strategy and that the “ attaque brusque© ” was a foregone conclusion in the next war. But General Valle somewhat qualified his denunciation of the bombardment of cities by declaring that tf we must remember that in modern war it is very difficult to define the exact line between military objectives and civil objectives.” The efficacy of such air bombardment, ho wrote, _ “ depends upon the moral potentialities of the people made to suffer it-” General Valle, in amplifying his views on aerial warfare, seemed to depart further from the Douhet theory when he indicated that he did not consider that wars could be won by aviation alone, but that planes, although of the utmost importance in modern war, were secondary to ground troops. He declared that the “ effects of victory in the air—domination of the air—will be felt on the ground (or on the sea) in a real manner.” Material describing various Italian aerial manoeuvres that ho enclosed with his answers to this correspondent’s questions further explained that flying fleets, properly handled, would “ wear out the armed forces ” and would also tend to destroy the morale of military and civilian populations. Nevertheless, he said, wars are not likely to be won by aviation alone, but by the indirect aid of aviation to the land and sea forces. Such aid, however, he added, may be decisive, and it is inevitable that wars “ will bo settled more rapidly in favour of that nation with the best aviation.” MANY RECORDS HELD. The organisation and strength of Italian aviation were discussed in some of the material sent by General Valle. Ho declared that up until May, 1637, Italian aviators held 47 out of a total of 106 officially recognised world’s aviation records. Italy’s objective is 4,100 first-line planes operating in squadrons by 1941 (she has about 2,500 to-day), a total of 4,283 pilots on active duty by the same time (there are some 2,500 to 3.000 now), a total officer personnel, including ground forces, in the Air Corps of 7,646 by the year 1941, and an increase of non-commissioned officers to 12,647, Sixty now airports, most of them military, are now being constructed in Italy. Italian military aviation is divided into four general forces—the air fleet, “ consisting of 93 groups organised in a variable number of squadrons ” ; the army aviation service, “ consisting of five flights of 15 groups of observation squadrons ” ; the navy aviation service, “ made up of a variable number of observation squadrons arranged in four commands,” and the aviation for colonial defence. The material sent by General Valle included a comprehensive statistical summary of the activities of aviation in the Ethiopian war, which “ contributed materially to the decisive results.” It was stated that approximately 500 planes had operated in East Africa. General Valle declared that it was “ premature ” to discuss the lessons learned by aviation from the civil war in Spain, but said that the Ethiopian war “ demonstrates what I have said: Aviation possessed there—not having . any adversaries—the complete dominion of tho air, and consequently it enabled the development of formidable (and decisive) land operations.”-