NAVAL POLICY

Evening Star, Issue 22195, 25 November 1935, Page 6

NAVAL POLICY

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHANGED PLANS OF BRITAIN DUE TO AIR POWER For many years it lias been, the custom for the British to consider the naval problem in European waters as falling under two principal divisions; the North Sea and the Mediterranean. Recent events indicate that this separation cannot be maintained mucii longer (writes “ Augur,” from London to the ‘ New York Times ’). The Committee of Imperial Defence knows that the naval power of Groat Britain depends not only on the quality and tho quantity of the ships, but oven more on tho distribution of the principal naval bases. The building programme is a matter for tho Admiralty, but the question of placing tho Navy in key positions is a political one and as such it is for the Government to decide. The principle of British naval policy in protecting Imperial interests always has been to keep the main forces concentrated in vital points. The far flung possessions of the Empire make it practically impossible for the Navy to be present in all places at once. Thus it is felt that the important thing is to keep power concentrated and 'available to be projected at ,short notice towards a menaced point. ■ Joseph Chamberlain declared that it did not matter how weak Great Britain was on tho periphery of its dominion so long as it remains strong in the central position. Before the war the British Navy observed the rule rigidly, and it remains bound by it with equal force now. But, if the principle remains unchanged, the technical situation has undergone a radical change indeed. THE FAR EAST. In the Ear East the situation is entirely different from that which prevailed before the last war. Tho PanAsiatic aspirations of Japan, with which Great Britain has no intention of quarrelling at present, have obliged the Navy to withdraw in a large measure from the China Sea. Singapore to-day, and not Hongkong, represents tho limit of British Naval action in that part of tho world. This has been understood for some time and calls for no further comment It is the British position in the seas surrounding Europe that must bo con - sidered at present. The guiding principles of British Naval strategy is that the main forces must not be scattered but kept together within striking distance of possible points of danger. This presupposes that the centres of assembly must be set well back so that main forces do not risk being pinned down by an enemy in an isolated advance position. Tims at the outset of tho last war tho fleet steamed away from the narrows of the British Channel to the comparative freedom of •Scupa Elow in the north of Scotland. Freedom to manoeuvre is the essential

consideration. To this must be added the need of preserving the body of the fleet from submarine and aerial attack in the opening stages of warfare. For these reasons even Scapa Flow, under present conditions, does not offer the required freedom and security. The shipyards and docks, controlled by the Admiralty on the East Coast of England, are extremely vulnerable to an air attack. The result of experimental attacks on Portsmouth, for example, was a sad but not unexpected proof of this fact. STILL FURTHER AWAY.

Strategy demands that in case of war the fleet should be concentrated much further away from the Continental seaboard than was the case in 1914. when the strength of the submarine was unsuspected and the aeroplane was still in its infancy. Turning to the Mediterranean, where pass the principal lines of Imperial communications, the naval position of Great Britain was supreme beyond all possibility of being challenged. This was due to the strength of the fleet concentrated in these waters on one hand, and to lack of possible competitors on the other. The Italian navy was non-existent for practical 1 purposes, and, therefore, the two countries enjoyed a traditional friendship based upon the fact that it was in the power of the British Navy to blockade the entire Italian coast. Too, France was an ally. Malta and Gibraltar were Strongholds unassailable so long as the fleet commanded the sea, as it did. Egypt with the Suez Canal was in the sphere of absolute British influence. Indeed the Mediterranean, from the British point of view, represented a safe internal position. Its comparative proximity to India and l to the Far East gave it value. The first shock came when, in 1914, the German cruisers affronted the British white ensign by slipping past Malta to Constantinople. . Then came 'the disastrous attempt to force the Straits. Even more symptomatic was the fact that German submarines were able to hold up and destroy mercantile shipping on the Mediterranean route. They proved that in the narrow waters of the Mediterranean it is difficult to afford protection to lines of communication by guarding them with battleships and large cruisers. THE AEROPLANE. But the final change in the situation'was brought about by the development _of aerial warfare. For to-day it is possible for aeroplanes to hunt down a fleet far out in the open sea and to attack it with* an overwhelming force of bombers. The Straits of Gibraltar, for example, can be made impassable for shipping by aeroplanes flying over them from coastal aerodromes on the European and African shores. Even worse is the position of Malta, situated within reach of a score of Italian Hying fields. The immense growth of the Italian air force is too well known to I need to be described here.

The decline of Malta’s importance as the stronghold of British naval power in the Mediterranean became evident in 1930. when Italy, for the first time, worked out a comprehensive plan for the mastery of the sea. The characteristic detail of this plan was the cutting of the Mediterranean in two by

making all movement ,of ships impos-, sible m the narrow between Sicily and the coast of Tunis on the African side. If a line is drawn through the Islands of Corsica and Sardinia downward to the shore of Africa, and another, parallel to it from Sicily through the Island of Pantellaria, the zone enclosed represents an. area in which submarines, minelayers, aeroplanes, and swift surface vessels can prevent the passage of all foreign shipping. On the other side of the peninsula the Adriatic Sea can be cut off in a similar manner, thus creating around, Italy an ample zone of protection against sea raids. Malta is under the immediate of at least 17 aerodromes in Sicily and in the itself, and no commanding officer in his right senses would consent to remain in such a trap. This means that the principal link in the chain of bases in the Mediterranean is no longer of value. The main body of the Mediterranean Fleet must bo taken back to regain its freedom of manoeuvring. This can be achieved only by removing it into the Atlantic, with Gibraltar as an advanced post at the entrance to the inland sea. ; This seems indicated all the more because the protection of British interests in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean can be left to an air force with its principal bases in Palestine and Cyprus. THE BASIC LINE. In these two localities the ground units of the air force can be efficiently protected, an advantage not obtainable elsewhere. A line drawn from Palestine to Cyprus represents the basic line of British air defence in that part of the Mediterranean. Under its protection the fleet may gather for the protection of the entrance' of the Sue* Canal. The situation means that both the North Sea and Mediterranean divisions of the British Navy have to be brought back into the open spaces of the Atlantic. If one imagines several shipyards and docks created on the west coast of Africa (somewhere about Takaradi, for example) and the battle fleet stationed in\ the triangle formed by lines drawn from the island _of St, Helena to the Azores on one.side and to Trinidad on the other, one obtains the ideal .solution of the problem of distribution of naval strength which the Admiralty and the Committee of Imperial Defence are now called upon to solve. .

The idea that the Mediterranean i« the principal route between Great Britain and the Far East cannot be allowed to remain. That sea in modern circumstances is too narrow. The Empire needs alternative routes across th« open spaces of the great oceans. The old Cape-India line of navigation must coma into its own again. But th* Atlantic possesses yet other gateways to the East—around Cape Horn and through the Panama Canal. For this reason good relations between the United States and Great Britain, more than ever before, appear to be necessary for the security of the Empire,