FRENCH NAVY

Evening Star, Issue 22195, 25 November 1935, Page 14

FRENCH NAVY

THE RIOTS AT THE BASES GOVERNMENT ANXIETY ‘ The intensive manner in which tho recent riots at Brest and Toulon af© being investigated by the French Admiralty,- and .the acknowledged Uneasiness of the Government in Paris concerning the “ loyalty ” of the employees at the “ port militaires,” are outward signs of a new determination to weed out highly-dangerous elements, writes a London' correspondent of the ‘ Sydney Morning Herald.’ Though tho French navy has 'its roots in the past. and is proud of its traditions, it has small confidence in its shore communications. So anxious is it about the lack of spirit manifested by the arsenal workers and shipyard operatives that it is pressing for an exhaustive inquiry into the whole of the circum-• stances. It fears the existence of a widespread plot against the development of French sea .power, which,- in. view of the resurrection of the German navy, is more important for i the preservation of peace than ever. The Paris • correspondent of ‘the * Naval and Military Record-’—a paper which circulates almost exclusively ' among British naval and -military officers—takes a somewhat pessimistio view of the.position, and regards the recent disturbances and bloodshed as “ the warning on the wall,’’ “Toulon,” he writes, “has been associated in history with so i many-, treacherous deeds that .many officers call ‘it *le port maudit.’ - Brest had not, up to ; the present, been in such ill repute, and the fact that disturbances with a distinctly revolutionary and anti-patriotic character should have burst. out simultaneously in the north and in the south, with faint subsequent attempts at Cherbourg' and Lonent, points clearly to the existence of a long and minutelyprepared' plot' against French' sea power and against the safety of, the country. . “ ONLY A PRETEXT.” " The 10 per cent, reduction in the. pay of arsenal workers was only a pretext, and'the signal for strife cam® from abroad. In Brest especially, where the former' Socialist municipality has been ousted from power, the majority of the : ‘ ouvfiers ’ meant nothing more than a public, demonstration- in support of their claim to be exempted from the financial penance' which is th«J rule for State-paid workers. Rioting,'* violence, and destruction were no part of the programme they had in view,, but it was the whole programme ■ of the low-class, , Communistic rabble, which is the plague' of French ports militaires, since all : undesirable from other lands, convicts -included,, arc assured of finding in .Republican France a safe refuge. Tt must not be forgotten that there are some three million non-French people, half of whom are Italian, residing in France, where they - constitute a dead weight and a danger.” It is a significant fact that half of, the persons arrested during the riots at Toulon (in which over 1,000 revolver shots were fired at the police and troops) were foreigners. It is equally, significant that the foreign Communistic elements were largely responsible for the pillage and destruction of property/ A delegation representing the French artisans on strike waited on Admiral Berthelot, the prefect, and specifically repudiated all responsibility for the terrible damage that was done. The feeling in France, is that fighting efficiency and'good training can be of little avail to the nation if admirals cannot at all times absolutely rely on ' the ready and coriiplete use of the whole of the; resources of their naval bases. That the navy is not anxious on this point without good reason has been amply demonstrated. , / the rmsT out: For example, the arsenal workmen who were the ; first to go on strike were those employed on hoard-the 26,- ■ 500 ton Dunkerque, by. far the . most , important fighting unit in the arsenal, and the very ship which Paris wishes to have at sea at the earliest possible ■ moment. This' showed the motives, of the agents at the root of the agitation, and . tie danger of letting Communists - take a hand in the forging of the- instruments of national defence.. Events . in the last war, and, especially the mysterious blowing-up of allied ships in Italy and elsewhere, are a reminder that the hammering and smashing of an enemy fleet on - the high- seas is not, the only road, to victory., (There are ways more economical to victory., in the sabotage of the material. and in < the undermining of .the morale of tho crews. The French navy is probably more vulnerable to that class or danger than any other great fleet, as the consequence of the lack ■ at the head of 'the Government of a stable and uncontested authority. Hence: the need of a new firmness in the management of the port militaires. Tho Ifrench Government is evidently bent upon a belated “'dean-up,”- ", though its ability to complete, the process is open to doubt. It will probably couple the attempt, with changes., in the hierarchy of the ports militaires made necessary by German naval expansion. After the Great War, to meet easier naval conditions, Cherbourg was reduced to secondary rank, as was Lorieht, preserved as an arsenal, whil® Rochefort was suppressed and transformed into an aeronautical training centre. There were three first-class ports militaires —viz., Toulon, headquarters of the battle fleet; Brest,brought down to the rank of flotilla base and of State yard; and.Bizerta. justly considered as the key to North Africa.

To copef with the German menace, Brest is to replace Toulon. as th# premier naval base and headquarters of the battle fleet, end Cherbourg is to be considerably strengthened. In other words, the bulk of France’s naval might is. in future, to be centred upon the Channel, instead of the Mediterranean.