ETHIOPIA TACTICS

Evening Star, Issue 22194, 23 November 1935, Page 9

ETHIOPIA TACTICS

DANGER OF FALSE CONFIDENCE -From a military' point of view the main question of the initial operations in Abyssinia concerns the strategy and tactics likely to be adopted by the Ethiopians (wrote the military correspandent of ‘ The Times ’ in the first days of fighting). Assuming that the Italians prosecute their advance the first few weeks will he a crucial test. Consequently, there is special significance in the words of advice to his soldiers, uttered by the Emperor in his address on Thursday: “ !3o cunning . . . face the enemy one by one, two by two, five by five, in the fields and mountains. . . . Do not mass as now; hide, strike suddenlv, fight the nomad war. . . . To-day the war has begun; therefore, scatter and advance to victory.” This advice undoubtedly represents the wisest course for the Ethiopian forces to pursue. ■Much depends on whether the memory of their victory at Adowa 39 years ago has still a sufficiently intoxicating effect, when blended with the natural ferment of war, to prevent the Ethiopians from realising that their best hope of successful resistance te an army equipped with modern weapons lies in playing the guerrilla game steadfastly from the outset. The most serious danger to the Ethiopian forces lies in the possibility that they may, in false confidence or under the sting of a loss of territory, assemble in mass to oppose the invaders near the frontier. In that case they would offer a promising target to the bombs of tho Italian aircraft, and in some areas to the thrusts of mechanised forces. They might even be tempted into launching attacks in vain gallantry against the Italian machine-guns. Omdurman might be repeated. The student of military history appreciates how easily, with a little ‘ cunning, the Sudanese might have made things awkward for us m tho advance to Khartoum, instead, by excess of courage they played into our hands, and, by their massed advance in daylight offered themselves up as a sacrificial demonstration of the effect of fire-power. EFFECT OF AIR BOMBING. At the worst, more tactical sense is to be expected of the Ethiopians, but fire power has developed more in the past 30 years than any improvement in tactics can overtake. The only chance for the ill-equipped nowadays lies in guerrilla tactics. Information ,froin some sources makes it doubtful whether tho Ethiopians have realised this essential truth, and are of a mind to act upon it.- Adowa may prove stronger than reason. ... If the Ethiopians should be so unwise as to present a target to modern weapons, the consequences of a crushing disillusionment are not easy to predict. Its ripples might spread wide. When considering the possible effect of concentrated air bombing on Nich an unacclimatised people, one recalls tho reaction which the Arabs suffered, on the other side of the Red Sea, when they first made contact with artillery fire during the revolt in the Hejaz against the Turks. The shells which exploded among them were nothing compared with the weight of explosive that the Italian aircraft could drop upon the Ethiopians to-day. The Japanese have shown in Manchuria how air bombardment may pave the way for the advancing troops, serving as a substitute more flexible, and at a longer range, for the artillery barrage of the last war. It is likely that this method, with tanks as a secondary agent, will be the Italians’ strongest card in forcing the evacuation of points where a prolonged delay might otherwise be imposed, but the farther the advance progresses and the less the defenders offer a target, the greater the handicap in obtaining the full effect of these new tools. “ TACTICAL ARTHRITIS.” If the Ethiopians were wise enough to adopt guerrilla methods from tho outset, one does not envy the Italian commanders the problem that they would be called on to solve in carrying the advance far enough to procure the subjugation olj the country. But it is far more diffictit to change to guerrilla methods after a shattering reverse. Here is the risk that the Ethiopians run in remembering Adowa too well. It is true- that the Spaniards succeeded in making sdeh a change against the Napoleonic armies after 1 their own regular forces had been smashed. But they had Wellington to support them, and by his intervention could gain time and space for their guerrillas to sprout throughout the countryside, and that success ful change of method was achieved more than a century ago. The time which the Ethiopians have had for training may not prove altogether an advantage, if one may take iis having any general application some recent reports as to the well-drilled state of these troops. That type of of training runs the risk of paralysing their natural fighting instincts and leaving them a paralysed target. Primitive man knows how to fight with cunning, but a long course of drill may do no more than develop in him ‘‘tactical arthritis.” To counter the modern weapons of their assailants the Ethiopians do not need similar heavy weapons any more than they need European drill, but they certainly require an adequate quantity of light machine guns and small arm ammunition. These are the material foundation of guerrilla tactics against a modern army, as Lawrence of Arabia diagnosed and demonstrated 18 years ago on the other side of the Red Sea. THE ITALIAN 'ADVANCE. The Italian advance has taken place in accordance with a schedule drawn up many weeks ago, the provisional dates being known then by intelligence staffs in Europe. This rather tends to discount the official Note to the League concerning tho forward movement becoming necessary owing to provocation by mobilisation in Abyssinia. The movement of Italian troops to the frontier was ordered for October 1 and 2. a reconnaissance on October 3. and occunation of new positions by the mam bodies on October 4. The Italian plan may reveal itself as two strategic flank movements from north and south on Addis Ahaha and a central holding force, the latter to be formed from the northern and southern armies by infiltration _on the seaward flanks outside tho British and- French Somaliland frontiers. This centre is assumed to be a holding force across the railway line and against the defence of the capital, whose perimeter' is at Awash, about 100 miles cast of the city. The movements of tho main bodies constitute a forward attack in the north, and a retarded movement in the south, presumably designed to contain on its front a large part of the Abyssinian forces, to make the northern attack more easy. A glance at the map of Abyssinia will show that a short route to Addis Ababa is from tho triangular apex at lsoio, where tho frontiers of _ Konya, Italian Somali land, and Ethiopia meet. The route is distant for supplies. There is a better route in a parallel lino which runs through Geledi and Imi, as

heavy country is not met with until the hill region at Ginir is reached. Tho central force aims at the railway line, and may cause friction with French rights. The use of this line would simplify transport administration, as supplies could be conveyed off, right and left, from an advanced railhead. The use of light field railways would bo essential as feeders. The northern advance, although direct and nearest to all seaborne supplies, is the most difficult owing to the mountainous nature of tho country. Should this advance be held up, the assumption is that the southern columns would press on to threaten the capital and so relieve the pressure in the north.