NAVAL PROGRAMMES.

Evening Star, Issue 22070, 2 July 1935, Page 8

NAVAL PROGRAMMES.

A holiday in naval 'construction was provided for by the Washington Treaty of 1921, which set age limits, ranging from twelve to, twenty years, for various types of vessels then existing, within which they were not to bo renewed. The holiday was extended by the Treaty of London, which expires, at the end of 1936. Naval discussions have been in progress for some time past, and are to be followed this year by a naval conference, to see if new limitations can be agreed to. Acccording to a Washington report, the American Government is already considering what the next step of America will be if the conference fails. It is contemplating the commencement of a battleship replacement programme as soon as the present treaty,expires. That news would not surprise anybody. It can be taken for granted that all the Powers concerned have the same activities in view. The naval holiday will be followed by a very lively period of naval construction.

Mr Hector By water, a first-class authority, puts the prospects plainly in his new book, ‘ A Searchlight on the Navy.’ A heavy cost will be incurred if the conference ‘fails. “ The principal maritime Powers,- having enjoyed a holiday lasting twelve years, must now face the /unpalatable task of paying for it.” Between the years 1936 and 1942 no fewer than 844 men-of-war belonging to the five principal Powers will complete their span of effective life. If they are all replaced no Power will necessarily be a fraction stronger in comparison with others than it is at present. But the total cost of replacing them—capital ships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines—is estimated at 831 million pounds. Divided between the five Powers concerned that will mean an addition to each of their Budgets of twenty-eight millions year for six years for naval construction. ‘ The amount is more than two and a-half times as much as Great Britain has spent on new ships in any year for the past six years. The armament expenditure that was prohibited in 1921 will not have been saved; it will only have been postponed. There are two ways by which the appalling cost may be lessened. The naval conference may agree on new general limitations, or the sizes- of "battleships may be reduced. The prospects of any major agreement by the conference have recently been black. It remains to be seen if they will be helped by the new Anglo-German treaty. But the case for smaller battleships with smaller guns commend itself generally. The standard is now 35,000 tons and 16in guns. Great Britain has argued for 25,000 tons and 12in guns, or, subject to corresponding cruiser restriction, 22.000 tons and llin guns. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond has contended that the world’s naval affairs could be managed just as satisfactorily as now if an embargo were laid on the construction of any man-of-war exceeding 6.000 tons. The layman may easily wonder why large ships (at much greater cost) should be preferred to small ships or new to old ones, provided.all Power* hare .the. same,. . Mr

Bywater estimates that by reducing sizes, without going to lengths which would shock general opinions of the British Navy, his total naval Bill could bo cut down by 194 million pounds, and the smaller ships would cost less to maintain. The Powers would have the same ratios of security that they have at the present time. It seems probable, however, that in the struggle for advantages, the smaller ships would soon be made to cost as much as the big ones do now. The biggest battleships built in Great Britain cost £2OO a ton, but the German “ pocket ” battleships cost from £375 to £4OO, duo in large part to the special alloys and other expensive materials ■used in their construction.