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SEA OUTPOSTS OF JAPAN

MANDATED ISLANDS On leaving the League of Nations Japan takes with her a* a souvenir a string of Oceania's th© Manana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands ( w ; r >L t ® s the Tokio correspondent of Ine Times ’). The islands were taken from . Germany by the Japanese navy in October, 1914; in 19.17 the Allies agreed to support Japan’s claim to them at : the peace settlement; and in 1919 the League of Nations placed them under Japanese mandate. The mandated territories comprise 2,550 islands, atolls, and reefs, which extend from the Bonins, i just south of Japan, to the ' equator, and then eastwards in the form of k gigantic, irregular, capital L, pointing, though at an immense distance,, The islands are dotted over thousands •of square miles of sea, but so vast arc the spaces of the Pacific that at the point nearest America they are half as far again from San Francisco _as New York is from Liverpool. In their midst there is a fragment of American territory, the island of Guam. The United States navy once proposed that Guam be developed as a naval base, but since 1922 it has been included in the Pacific area, where no fresh fortifications are permitted. America is also interested -IS the island of Yap, where the Commercial Cable Company has a relay station. American rights there are guaranteed by a treaty with Japan. The total land area of the islands is only 2,143 square kilometres. The popu-lation-at the end of 1932 was 78,457, of "whom 28,291 were Japanese; The natives are slowly dying out, - and in time the inhabitants will be purely Japanese. But in the Bonins 1 blueeyed Japanese ” are met, the descendants of British and American sailors who settled there with their South Sea "wives. The. principal commercial product of the islands is cane sugar; sugar \ exports - to Japan , are worth 9,000,000 ■yen , (about £525,000) yearly. The "South Seas Development Company .(Nanyd Kohatsu Kaiana), capitalised at “,000,00$ yen, is developing the islands with Japanese 'energy, and expect* eventually to-double the production of sugar. This company maintains interisland Communications with a fleet- of five steamers ranging from 100 to 500 tons. The Nippon Yusen Kaisha is subsidised by the Japanese Government to provide a shipping service between Japan and* the islands. PEARLS AT PALAO. i • About 60,000 tons of phosphate are mined each year. Efforts are being made to grow rice, and at Palao Mr K. Mikixnoto, of culture pearl fame, has established'» hatchery where oysters are assisted; indeed conipeUed, to make Karls. The seas around teem with nito. An experimental farm is maintained; the cultivation of vegetables and coffee, the planting of coconut paljps, and the drying of copra are financially assisted. Administration is in the hands of a civil governor responthe Overseas Ministry m Tokio. The Government provides a medical service with 22 doctors and 48 assistants, and there are 22 schools for natives besides primary schools for Japanese.' The Mandates Commission of he* had no fault to find with Japanese administration, which is in the hands of some 760 officials, including teachers and postmen. •• The ‘ annual budget amounts to 5,000,000 yen (about £300,000), all of which is raised by light local taxation. . The total trade last year 1 resulted in a balance of 7,000,000 yen . (£430,000) in Japan’s favour. Every addition to its natural resources and every career opened to its too- numerous inhabitants , is of value to; Japan. But when Japanese naval officers call those islands Japan’s,, lifeline in the south, as Manchukuo is. in the north, it is not of their commercial value that they are thinking; nor was it for economic reasons that the Japanese Government promptly made it* known that any attempt to deprive Japan of the mandate would be contested. The mandated islands give Japan a Jong salient into the Central Pacific. Her outposts, which formerly ended with the Bonin group, 500 miles from her shores, now extend 1,300 miles farther south, and give her an unbroken chain to the equator. They form a interposed between the United and the Philippines. Their innumerable lagoons and protected waterways make ideal hiding places for submarines and seaplanes, which could cut; America's communications with the

Philippines in case of war. Possession v of the Marshalllslands at the eastern tip of the L brought Japan 2,000 miles nearer to Pearl Harbour, and within 4,000 miles of San Francisco. The Germans, when they owned the islands, contemplated a naval base at Jaluit, in the Marshalls, which is almost equidistant frorii Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. “ Japan,” says an English •trategical writer, Captain D. H. Cole, “ had moved not merely 2,000 miles eastwards towards the United States, but 2,000 miles southwards towards Australia.” “.MADE TO ORDER.” The strategical importance of the , islands to Japan can best be described in the words of Japanese naval writers. Admiral S.uyetsugu, lately commander-in-chief of the Japanese combined fleet, in an article published over his name in the Tokio 4 Nichi Nichi ’ last January, wrote: — The mandated islands are:Japan’s first line of marine defence. . . : As long as Japan is able to hold these isles her national safety is secured. A peculiar feature is that Japan’s possession of the isles does not menace any Power, the isles being too far away from other countries. Supposing, however, that they should come into the posses-

sion of a foreign Power, or be occupied by an enemy nation, they , would at once endanger Japan’s defence. An enemy fleet would then be enabled easily to cruise in Far Eastern waters, making these islands bases. Besides, these isles are naturally-built aircraft carriers, and would afford the enemy ah squadrons ideal places from which to operate. Thesa islands are apparently made to order for Japan. In fact, the Pacific equilibrium can be maintained only when Japan holds them. Captain Taketomi, discussing the re lative strength of Japan and the United States in the Pacific, wrote:— The line connecting the Bonins, Mariana Islands, and Palao is the country’s southern defence line. When this line is protected Japan will be able perfectly to control the North Pacific. While we hold this control no economic blockade _is possible. Furthermore, this line cuts.in two the line of the United States footholds in the Pacific, running from San Francisco to Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and China. The League has seen no reason to suspect the existence of fortifications, but lias drawn. attention to relativelj heavy outlay on harbour works. At the January Council meeting the Mandates Commission requested an explanation of the following expenditures:— 150.000 yen for a new pier at; Saipan; 250.000 yen for improving facilities at Palao Bay; 150,000 yen for harbour improvements at Rota; and 689,000 yen as steamer subsidies. The Japanese answer is that those improvements are necessary for the industrial development of the islandsThe principal works are at Saipan, headquarters of the sugar trade, where a channel, 300 ft wide and 5,400 ft long, has. been cut through the coral reef, and a wharf built which will allow 3,000-ton steamers to lie alongside. These works have been continued for several years, and haris cost 1,250,000 yen (£73,000). Geneva’s interrogations reveal a suspicion that expenditure on harbours and channels .is larger than the limited possibilities of the islands would justify. The spending of less than £200,000 in seven years on harbours is not much, but the estate which is being developed is very small. It is a question of proportion. Harbours and channels are useful in time of peace and doubly useful in time of war. In fact, though Captain Taketomi made a significant reference to “ protecting ” the life line, those who look for \ fortifications on the islands are looking for something which is not there,. because it is not needed. It is not necessary to fortify the ..islands in time of peace to make them immensely useful in time of war. They will serve Japan’s, purpose, not as bases where warships can be stationed, but as a screen of hiding places for submarines, and, in the words of Admiral Suyetsuguj “ naturally 'built aircraft-car-riers.” At present fortification is forbidden not only by the mandate, but by Article 19 of the Washington Treaty. Japan has denounced the treaty, but is willing to discuss a renewal of the nonfortification agreement. If Article 19 is allowed to lapse America will be free to resume, if she chooses, the plans which she abandoned for developing and fortifying Guam. England can strengthen her defences at Hongkong, and Japan can continue those works in the Bonins which ceased on February 6, 1922, when the Washington Treaty was signed. Military works in the man-dated-islands would still be illegal, but it may be doubted whether the Geneva mandate would restrain Japan if others began fortifying. The peace of the Pacific would) be “ protected.”

AN AMERICAN VIEW. * Since Congress, before 1922, voted money (which was never expended) for the fortification of Guam, time and tide have been working for the Japanese Theodore Roosevelt’s idea of making the Philippines a strong base of American policy in the East has ceased to appeal to Americans. The growth of the Japanese fleet has exerted a silent pressure on all Pacific policies, and various reactions can be seen. The Dutch are uneasy. The British are building a base at Singapore. The United States, enjoying a larger degree than the others of the disentanglement which their first President enjoined, are preparing to withdraw from the Philippines. The American people have seen that in the event of war with Japan the Philippines could not be defended, and could'be recovered only by efforts out of all proportion to the prize. Guam is not worth fortifying if Manila is not to be defended, and there will be no need on either the American or the Japanese side for increased fortifications. All this Will make the Japanese navy more and more invulnerable in its own sphere. The Japanese frontier, which lies like an armed and defended breakwater off the coasts of Eastern Asia, from the halffrozen wastes of Sakhalin to the camphor forests of Formosa, is continued to the equator by islands, like stepping stones over the Pacific. More and more does the world see that a new great Power has arisen in the East and is obtaining its place in the sun.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19350518.2.5

Bibliographic details

Evening Star, Issue 22032, 18 May 1935, Page 2

Word Count
1,716

SEA OUTPOSTS OF JAPAN Evening Star, Issue 22032, 18 May 1935, Page 2

SEA OUTPOSTS OF JAPAN Evening Star, Issue 22032, 18 May 1935, Page 2

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