The Evening Star SATURDAY, APRIL 13, 1935. STRESA AND ABYSSINIA.

Evening Star, Issue 22004, 13 April 1935, Page 14

The Evening Star SATURDAY, APRIL 13, 1935. STRESA AND ABYSSINIA.

It was to be expected that reports from Stresa would be brief, at least until the Three-Power Conference was concluded. Its delegates, in retiring to an island for their consultations, did not intend that their conclusions should be given to .the world before they were complete, and the conference, which began on Thursday, is only holding its final session to-day. The Italian Press is not so free to guess as some English newspapers, and the concise statement it has given of the programme of the deliberations may therefore be surmised to be official. The first business, after hearing reports on the British missions to different capitals, was to he consideration of a motion, proposed by France to be laid before the League of Nations Council on Monday, emphasising the difficulties made for international co-operation by Germany’s onesided denunciation of the Versailles Treaty, without, however, pressing for any action to be taken by the League. The question whether the Rome and London agreements could be adapted to the new conditions was then to be discussed, followed by consideration of the problem created by the demands of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, following the example of Germany, for military parity. It is natural to suppose also that other questions affecting Central and South-eastern Europe, including guarantees for the independence of Austria, will assume a much greater prominence at this gathering than in the talks at Warsaw and Moscow. The protection of Austria has much more importance for ’ Signor Mussolini than a north-eastern pact, and the dream of a Germany that would include Austria is likely to be one of the hardest for Herr Hitler, born in the southern country, to relinquish. But it is not only war in Europe which Mussolini will be expected to do his utmost to avert. The Italians have another quarrel bn their hands, which has advanced much further than their difference with Germany. Mussolini's conviction appears to be that his arguments for peace in both quarters will have their best chanco of prevailing if they are hacked by the strongest possible display of force. Though the Abyssinian Government, as Jong ago as the end of February, had accepted the proposal for a neutral zone between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland, one hitch after another, causing exasperation and delays, has occurred in that business. Rome blames the Abyssinians for postponements, and the latter have protested against the. armed forces which Italy has been sending to East Africa as an attempt to force the issue. Reports allege that 120,000 Italians and 40,000 native troops, equipped with 200 aeroplanes, have been massing in East Africa. The Italians profess that these arc required to prevent disturbances by frontier tribes when the stage begins which would naturally follow the declaring of a neutral zone—exact delimitation of the frontier. Since the border extends for four hundred miles, that would naturally be a long process, and longer if interrupted by desert attacks. It was reported in Rome lately that there were at least 90,000 armed Abyssinians on the Somaliland frontier, and that recent acquisitions of aeroplanes and other modern war material in Europe and from Japan had been substantial. The Abyssinian Government replied that the purchases made by it had been greatly exaggerated, and that what was purchased was out-of-date material, intended by the Emperor' for rise, should occasion arise, ngqinst unruly local chieftains. The Emperor has declared that, if Italy withdrew her “ last man and her last gun,2’ Abyssinia would not touch a single stone of Italian soil ” and there is not, perhaps, much more than stones to touch. It is well known, however, that the Emperor can, have no easy task at times in restraining his local chieftains. To a third demand, for reparations for certain attacks, Ethiopia has declared her , complete willingness to agree, so soon as an impartial tribunal shall have pronounced her the aggressor. It is not only against Ethiopia, however, that Italy lias been measuring her military might. An official statement which was published at the end of February seemed to bo meant for a wider audience. It set forth that “ the embarkation of troops - of the Peloritana division for East Africa, intended for the timely reinforcement of our colonies, is being carried, out in perfect order. Any further mobilisation of classes before tho class of 1911 is to be excluded, except for a certain percentage of officers and specialists who may be found necessary, or in the eventuality of European complications arising. Such an eventuality appears to be out of the question at the present moment, in view of the recent accords of Romo and London, and in view of farther possible developments which may derive from them and which harmonise with the principles of Italian policy. In any event, it should be recalled that tho new Fascist military laws, which have extended the obligation of military service from eighteen to fifty-five years, make it possible to call up thirty-seven classes with a total of from 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 effectives. . . . All the material sent to. Africa is being replaced simultaneously by orders given to national industries.” A double object has been suspected, in some quarters, for these pronouncements and proclamations—that of overawing Germany, while Mussolini argues with her, ns well as Abyssinia. Tho Fascists at the same time must be gratified, and given some employment, by tho methods of their leader. - But if 20,000 Italians have gone to Abyssinia it may bo hard to .bring them back ffiithput firing a shot*