NEW LIGHT ON WAR’S ORIGINS

Evening Star, Issue 21968, 2 March 1935, Page 20

NEW LIGHT ON WAR’S ORIGINS

BALKAN TROUBLE DOCUMENTS The latest volume published of the ■ Foreign. Office Documents on the Origins of the War deals with the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and the complications these caused in the relations of the Great Powers. The volume contains little that is startling, but much that , cumulatively is significant (writes Captain Liddell Hart, in the London ‘ Daily Telegraph ’). The combined attack of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro upon Turkey, and the subsequent war between the victors over the spoil, are apt. to be regarded as a semi-detached episode in the history of modern Europe, . and one that had only an indirect bearing on the outbreak of the World War. A study of this volume will serve to correct such a fallacy. Few people realise that during these months of 1912-13 the peace of Europe as a whole was constantly in jeopardy —that its preservation hung upon a thread. The “ primary cause ” of the attack upon Turkey may, as Sir A. Nicholson (Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs) sagely pointed out, be traced to “the secret alliance which Russia encouraged the four States to conclude ” as a means “to gain a diplomatic success over Austria and to ■ re-establish Russian prestige in the Balkan Peninsula.’’ Russia’s alarm, when she saw Bulgaria’s approach to Constantinople, and her efforts to thwart this progress for the preservation of her own claims to the prize, could not quench the flames she had lighted, nor prevent them spreading in more perilous directions—especially through Serbia’s advance to the Adriatic. The early effect was that Austria called out her reservists and partially mobilised her army—not only on the Serbian, but on the Russian frontier. Russia, resolved to fight if Serbia was menaced, made counter-preparations. Germany, although originally seeking to moderate Austria’s attitude, was now stiffening it by definite assurances of unflinching support. Sir Edward Grey declined to give any definite indication of Britain’s attitude in case of war, saying that it would depend on the actual circumstances. He also seems to have had an underlying belief that Germany might stand aside if Britain and France did. The danger that the Balkan War might become a European war was ultimately averted—or at least postponed. For this, much* was due to Grey’s mod- . ©rating influence, and to Germany’s cooperation. But the influence of this peaceful issue upon Grey himself was not insignificant. It seems to have given him an exaggerated hope that further crises might be as peacefully settled. A perusal of the documents now published suggests that if one thing seemed probable it was that any fresh crisis that arose would prove fatal to the peace of Europe. UNHEEDED WARNINGS. The dominant reflection that arises from these documents is that Austria and Russia had now reached the point when both, next time, would choose to fight rather than risk a loss of “ face.” Official relation* might be easier, but public animosity was spreading, to reinforce the military party in overcoming the caution of diplomacy. Our Ambassador in Vienna predicted that “ the next time a Serbian crisis arises ... I feel certain that Austria-Hun-gary wilt refuse to admit of any Rusi gian interference ift £hg dispute* and

that she will proceed to settle the differences with her little neighbour by herself, ‘ Couto que couts.’ ...” Unfortunately there was a tendency in the Foreign Office to consider that his reports “ had been on the pessimistic side all through.” Our Ambassador in St. Petersburg sounded a similar note as to the tide of feeling in Russia. Our Ambassador in Berlin, while welcoming the new cordiality of official relations with Britain, did not fail to warn the Foreign Office of the strength of the war, or military, party, “ who are unfortunately rather strongly represented in the immediate entourage of the Emperor.” The growth of the wish-fathered delusions was ominous.

The Tsar and his counsellors were persuaded that in a short time Austria would begin to break up internally. In Vienna they were “ firmly convinced ” that Russian Poland would rise against Russia as soon as the Austrian army penetrated into that country, and that Russia herself was becoming ripe for revolution.