INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Evening Star, Issue 21709, 2 May 1934, Page 6

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

RELATIONSHIP TO LEAGUE OF NATIONS ADDRESS BY MR H. P. KIDSON In an interesting address at the annual meeting of the Otago branch of the League of Nations Union last night Mr H. P. Kidson, roctor of the Otago Boys’ High School, gave a brief but comprehensive summary of the international Situation As It Affects the League of Nations. The Chairman (Rev. H. E. Bellhouse) welcomed Mr Kidson, who was ardently interested in the work of the League of Nations Union and who, before coming from Wellington, was a member of the Dominion Executive. Mr Kidson said that the situation was so difficult and baffling that be bad decided to take as the subject of bis address 1 A Brief Summary of the International Situation as it Affects the League of Nations.’ The speaker said that the situation was difficult to appraise. Nations were moving towards the light, but wore constantly halting and glancing hackwards because of elemental mistrusts and fears. They knew that for their own preservation they must reach the light, but through fear of the insecure ground beneath their feet they were afraid to move to the other side of the dark and pestilential swamp they stood in. He passed from the armed peace that preceded the war, and from the World War itself to the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League. The League covenants provided for disarmament and the prevention of war, these articles being signed by the Allied European Powers and Japan. They then came to the Locarno agreements of 1925 which were agreed to by Germany, Belgium, Prance, Britain, and Italy, and which were a solemn renunciation of war. The Four-Power- Pact of June, 1933, which was drawn up m a panic by Germany, France, Britain, and Italy to allay fear, might be described as a kind of whistling m the dark. They agreed to a renunciation of war, to disarmament or reduction, and to pool their forces, an aggressor to bo attacked by “ sanctions ’’—moral, economic, and military. Japan was a contracting party to the Covenant and Pact of Paris, but was guilty of aggression, its solemn word thrice being broken. A commission of inquiry was set up and its report adopted, Japan withdrawing from the League. Japan was declared guilty, but materially went unpunished. The sanctions the nations provided to apply were not applied, and although Japan remained comparatively something of an outcast relatively she was unaffected as ,a European nation would be. The defection of Japan had created a profound and tragic effect, proceeded Mr Kidson. Would it be any longer possible to rely on the word of_ contracting parties? The system or collective security proposed by the Covenant had failed to act. Profound disquiet was caused on the minds or European statesmen. This was the first great blow to the League, and at the time of this crisis t another .tedious drama was reaching its climax. Germany’s attitude was hardening, Japan was demanding a new- naval ratio, France desired/ security, and Britain was making concessions to .1 ranee, embittering Germany, but not satisfying France. A Disarmament Conference was called again in November, 1932, and there was an immediate deadlock. The Allied Powers still considered Germany was bound by the Treaty of Versailles to her position of inferiority, but Germany was mcrcasingly insistent on her demand tox decent treatment and equality of armaments. Had the Allied Powers been magnanimous and offered Germany something in the nature of equality Germany would have accepted; but, tired of the interminable humbug at the conference, Germany withdrew from it, and subscquenlty from the League. Still scarcely able to stand after Japan had stabbed it in the back, this blow in the face had set the League staggering again. ; , So, they came to the spectacle to-da\. There were the protagonists in this drama, standing alarmed, afraid, knowing what must bo done, none willing to do it. France insisted on security. Could thev blame them? ,They saw in Germany a mad orgy of nationalism, glorifying war, but yet at heart knowing the disaster war would bring. Great Britain was trying to make a compromise. torn between two perilous decisions. Italv stood aloof, a destructive critic. The United States was absorbed in the pains of its own body: Austria the unhappy victim of Nazi propaganda; Russia had no influence; and Japan was defiant. What would be the outcome? Tbe collapse of the League and of international co-operation? The growth ol insane nationalism with its race for armaments, its wrecking of international trade, bringing with it war and economic disorder—a possibility not_ to be ignored. Or was it a clear seeing of the consequences and a desperate sacrifice of selfish interests to save themselves and tlveir neighbours. What must the nations contribute? France a little.more magnanimous and trusting: German}' a little more humble; Britain making a real sacrifice of its traditional attitude and pledging clear and definite military action against an aggressor; tbo United States Jielpmg again; and Italy pulling together.

“ The machine is still there to give shape and expression to the will to co-operate,” said Mr Kidson. A splendid machine is ready in . the League.” They must pass a tribute to tho persistent efforts of British statesmen to avoid disaster. They had reduced their armaments to a point beyond which self-respect would not allow them to go, not entirely through economic necessity. Now there lay a still more awful responsibility on their shoulders. On their action and leadership depended the fate of Western peoples and culture! Abhoring entanglements and reluctant to pledge themselves to a definite cause of action when the circumstances were vague and undefined, they might stand aloof and give up the efforts that appeared so vain. Aloof, they must rearm—be stronger than their neighbours. The inevitable end? A European armament race and war into which the} must inevitably be drawn. A course of action fraught with tho greatest peril. As an alternative they might adopt another difficult and dangerous course, ho continued. There was no easy road. They might make a self-sacrificing entr\ into a European fraternity, giving to France or any other nation a definite guarantee of full armed assistance against an aggressor, definitely pledging its resources of man power and wealth to the common cause of peace. Such a course was traditionally abhorrent to tho Briton. It had its dangers. It presupposed an equal loyalty and sacrifice on the part ol tho other European nations. Many of them had great faith in the result—they believed that only so soon as this guarantee was given would a reduction in armaments bo possible. France’s fear would be removed; and Germany’s self-respect satisfied. A League loyalty would develop and most would agree that there was more hope in this course of action than tho other ho had mentioned. Was New Zealand helping the British statesmen in their great responsibility, ho asked. Had it troubled to gain a knowledge of the situation? Had it any attitude towards it? Could not the Government give an indication it would stand behind the British Government if the second course of action were adopted. Could not they as a people arouse themselves and do the same? They must retain their League consciousness and loyalty, they must keep their -faith. They were not too far away for their influence to be felt. A strong public opinion in this country _ in favour of tbe second course of action would help to create a loyalty to the League in the other parts of tin? Empire. Its influence would not be negligible. They must keep firm their faith and quietly but insistently ask those who criticised the League what other hope was there? What was the alternative to international co-opera-tion and the League? “Keep firm our faith in the League. There is nothing else to save tho world,” he concluded, amid applause. A vote of thanks to the speaker was moved by Air A. Fels, and carried by acclamation. '