TOWARD WORLD GOVERNMENT

Evening Star, Issue 21638, 6 February 1934, Page 11

TOWARD WORLD GOVERNMENT

SETBACKS SEEN IN PERSPECTIVE [By Sir Arthur Saltish, in the ‘ Christian Science Monitor.’] In a period when shattering- events succeed each other rapidly there is a special value in any occasion which gives us the perspective of a longer review of 25 or 50 years. It is otherwise only too easy to mistake the mere recurrent ebb of a tide which must flow again for a permanent natural change, or on the other hand to ignore the permanent significance of passing phenomena. At the present moment we see all around us, tottering or falling, the pillars of the economic system under which our material civilisation developed last century; of the political system of representative government which expressed and nourished the social ideas in which we grew up; of the new “ collective system ” which, seemed the postwnr decade’s greatest contribution to humanity. Do recent events mean that these three systems will disappear, or only that they are being subjected to a severe bub temporary strain? It is the fate of the third system which 1 noiv propose to discuss. It is beyond dispute that the new “ collective system ” of restraint against war has been seriously weakened during tho last five and especially the last two years. There has been everyw-here a recoil toward nationalism. We are, I think, helped to understanding the real significance of this recoil by looking back to before the war. Let me recall a few contrasts and attempt to interpret them. Twenty-five years ago “ foreign affairs ” wore for the United States, and even for Great Britain, a mere fringe upon them in fabric of domestic interests. Contact with other Governments was confined to occasional disputes. The conception of national sovereignty was absolute, with scarcely any sense of collective responsibility even to restrain war. Grey in his ‘ Twenty-live Years ’ describes how the Balkan countries, after the first of the two wars which ’preceded the World War, met in London to negotiate a settlement. He saw clearly that they were proceeding on lines which must mean a resumption of war. Bub that w r as their affair. He did not feel justified in attempting any intervention. CENTRE OF GRAVITY SHIFTED.

Contrast the present position. The whole centre of gravity has shifted, world problems have, for every great country, occupied for twenty years a substantial and often a predominant place in the preoccupations of government. Conferences and negotiations are almost continuous. Even in the United S.tates the recoil from ratification, after signature, of the Covenant has been followed by an increasing return to a share in collective responsibility through the Kellogg Pact, the practice of organised consultation, the development of the new doctrine of neutrality.

To recall these familiar facts at once gives a ,new perspective to the present setback toward nationalism. Let me take one example. The chief failure of the collective system has been in the Bar East. But a quarter of a century ago disturbance in Manchuria would have meant competitive intervention by the Western Bowers, each intent on a national advantage. Now, so far as they have intervened—although feebly and ineffectively—it has been for the purpose of collective restraint. Usually in the past the Powers have appeared in the role of competitive burglars; now their role is that of collective policemen. This difference is, after all, of more significance than the regrettable fact that so far they have shown less enthusiasm and determination in the second role than the first.

Now, in the light of these contrasts, let me attempt a brief interpretation of what is happening. The fundamental force which is compelling change is the increase in the facilities for transport and the transmission of news. This is inevitably making the world one in the sense that the main activities of_ each country, and especially its economic enterprise and any international conflict, increasingly affect all countries. Government is adjusting itself to the new needs. It lias done so in a great leap forward, the post-war experiment of the “ collective system.” WILL MEET NEW NEEDS.

But public psychology, in which government is rooted, adjusts itself more slowly than the actual machinery of government to the changing needs of mankind. Even when the new international system was working a,t its best

the mass of popular sentiments and prejudices and loyalties associated with national sovereignty was only changed superficially, not fundamentally. As the first serious setback of the new system—itself largely due to accidental or temporary causes—these deep-rooted feelings have reacted violently against the new advance in government. It is this which constitutes its real weakness. And my conclusion P I am certain that man will ultimately achieve a system of government and control appropriate to his new needs. But what is really doubtful is whether this well be achieved without a disastrous intervening period, perhaps extending over our lifetime, of chaos, revolution, and wars. In this danger we should find a stimulus to renewed effort; and a consideration of the permanent forces which are moulding man’s destiny gives, I think, a sufficient certainty as to the ultimate goal to enable us to direct that effort. What is uncertain is not whether there will be a world system, but whether we or only our descendants will achieve and enjoy it.