RUSSIA’S NEXT

Evening Star, Issue 20958, 24 November 1931, Page 15

RUSSIA’S NEXT

NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN WHAT IT CONTEMPLATES The decision of the Soviet Government to inaugurate a second Five-year Plan immediately after the conclusion of the first at the end of 1932 is or great importance, both for Russia and for the rest of the world, writes W. H. Chamberlain in the ‘ Christian Science Monitor.’ , . . The preliminary calculations of tne commission which has been entrusted with the working out of this second plan indicate that there will be no relaxation, but rather an intensification of the strained pace of industrialisation which characterised tho first Five-yeai Plan. Indeed, tho constructive achievements of the first Five-year Plan striking as they are in some ways, will seem very puny by comparison with tho projects of the second plan, if these are realised by the 'end of its final year. 1937. „ , Ft might be worth while for the curious student of Russian affairs to make a note of tho following figures and refer to them in 1937. In that year, according to the preliminary calculations, the Soviet Union is to produce 62,000,000 tons of pig iron, 650,000,000 tons of coal, from 125,000,000 to 150,000,000 tons of oil, while the capacity of its electric power stations is to bo 60,000.000 or 70,000,000 kilowatts. Taking as a basis the latest complete set of available figures, those of 1929-30, one sees that the Soviet Union expects to increase its output of coal fourteen times, its oil production eight times, its pig iron twelve times, and the capacity of its electrical power plants by more than thirty times. ODDS AGAINST SUCCESS. Mathematics and general technical conditions both seem to weigh the odds against the fulfilment of this amazing programme within the scheduled time. The experience of 1928-29 and 1929-30, during both of which years the economic body of the country was strained to the utmost, indicated that 25 per cent, was about the limit in the rate of annual increase of industrial production. This, compounded up to the end of 1937, would mean that industrial production would have almost quadrupled, by comparison with 1929-30 —a striking enough achievement, to be sure, but far below the soaring figures of the second five-year plan. It may be objected that the plan for 1931 "calls for an increase of 45 per cent, over last year. But the results of the first few months indicate that the actual rate has been somewhere between 15 and 20 per cent., with especially serious underfulfilment of the ambitious plan in the coal and metal industries. There may, of course, be an improvement during the second half of tho year; but whether there will be a gain above the 25 per cent, which was the rate of increase during tho last two years seems doubtful. Where the engineers and skilled workmen who will be needed for the 1937 production programme are to come from, when even now tho resources of the country in technical knowledge and skill are distinctly overtaxed, is a puzzling problem. BOUNDLESS FAITH. The extremely high goals set for tho second plan reflect almost boundless faith in the endurance of the Russian people and in their resolute determination to “stick put” the sacrifices which have been find will be demanded of them in the name of high-speed industrialisation. If the intensive strain of the last two or .three years merges into a more normal rhythm of rapid progress, and if even half of the figures projected for 1937 are actually realised, the result will be notable in more ways than one. In the first place it will e an exhibition of sustained hard effort over a considerable period .of time unparallelled in Russian history. In the second place the Soviet Union, if it achieves even half the projected industrialisation of tho second Five-year Plan, will grow substantially in economic, and hence in political, power. Its voice will count for more in Europe; its influence in the Far East is bound to become more effective as the mineral resources of th; formerly agricultural Siberia are utilised for new mines, factories, railroads. What will be the significance to the rest of the world of 'this Soviet industrialised colossus, bestriding half tf Europe and a third of Asia? Some circles in Western Europe and America are inclined to see in it an unmitigated menace of the existing social order. Certainly military power iii the modern world is inseparably associated with economic power, and it is a pretty safe assumption that tho war industries of tho Soviet Union have not been lagging behind other branches of economic life in development. PURELY DEFENSIVE. At tho same time, until and unless tho rest of Continental Europe agrees on some definite plan for the reduction of armaments, it will be impossible to disprove the Soviet contention that its military preparations are purely defensive, contention that has been reinforced by sweeping disarmament proposals at Geneva. And there is at least a possibility that a series of fiveyears plans, instead of a prelude to war, may be a psychological equivalent for war. Between tho Civil War and the World War, except for the minor clash with Spain and a few border skirmishes, the United States had little of foreign conflict. One reason for this was that it had the untapped resources of a new continent to develop. The Soviet Union, in its enormous potentialities of eternal development, is another America. All the energies of the Soviet Union could easily be absorbed for decades in big tasks of domestic construction. In the last analysis the question whether tho Soviet Union during the next decade will bo a menace to the existing order in Europe depends more on Europe than on Moscow. If Europe remains stricken with economic depression and re- by national feuds, tho new social order that controls the destinies of 160,000,000 people, and some of the richest resources of two continents, is bound to constitute a menace, even apart from the amount of actual Communist propaganda which may be carried on. '"'ii tho other hand, if Europe finds strength to emerge from its crisis am. finds means of reasonable international co-operation among its component States, tho danger of direct iiiilitar\ aggression on the part of tho Soviet Union seems very remote. A country like Russia that is almost falling ovei itself in its zeal to rush forward, thiff is chronically in difficulty with made quate transport, deficient food supph and other accompaniments of the drive towards industrialisation, is not likely to plunge into a war that would _ increase immeasurably deprivations which are already calculated to ta.' the people’s endurance almost to the limit.