TECHNIQUE OF WAR

Evening Star, Issue 20434, 15 March 1930, Page 12

TECHNIQUE OF WAR

HOW IT IS DEVELOPED Writing on the technique of war in tiie December number of the ‘ National Review,’ “Rifleman ” remarks that the technique of war is itself an exaggeration of that of peace. All the modern weapons and machinery of war are the products of the development of peaceful industry. On' the other hand, developments fostered for purely military purposes are often of lasting value to industry. Modern high-grade steel is a case in point. Research work in connection with the building of warships and the manufacture of armour plate played a revolutionising part in the production of steel, which has reacted upon every branch ,of the industry. The tank, adapted to military purposes, has profoundly influenced the solution of the general problem of transport in roadless countries. The outbreak of war wilt usually find all civilised States more or less upon a level in technical equipment. In the Great War every Power had a slight superiority in perhaps one direction, which was offset by a superiority in another direction by, the others. Every nation has an approximate knowledge of the military and technical resources of the others. This was so in 1914. Had, for instance, the Germans developed a tank reports of it would have filtered through to the other Powers. There is therefore very little chance of one Power springing a surprise upon the others at the outbreak of war. Later, when hostilities add to the handicaps of the intelligence departments the chance of a surprise is greatly increased. In the’ Great War Britain surprised the Germans with tanks, and the Germans earlier gained a partial success by the use of gas.. The great handicap lies in the necessity tor secrecy, which restricts experimental work upon a large scale. For this reason the devices are necessarily crude and imperfect, and the army as a whole is unfamiliar with their use, and unused to co-operation. All these factors militate against the chance of gaining a really crushing technical superiority over an alert and highly industrialised foe.

If it took upwards of three years of experiment amid all the dreadful realities of war to produce a really useful type of. tank, and to train troops and leaders in its use. it must have taken very many years to reach an analogous result in times of peace, with small-scale experiments on the manoeuvre ground. In the one case there would be lavish financial assistance from the Treasury, and in the other money would be forthcoming only grudgingly and in driblets. Even then other services would have been starved to provide the funds for experiments. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the type of tank that would have resulted from peace experiments would have been of any uso in war. The tank came into its own as a result of unexpected trench warfare. It would have been stifled at birth had an attempt been made to use it in the rapid manoeuvre fighting which characterisedthe opening of the war. It is no doubt true that had one side or the other possessed in 1914 the technical knowledge, evolved slowly and painfully during four years of war, a .decision would have been reached at once, despite the absence of a crushing numerical superiority. But it is not possible for any army to learn these lessons in times of peace. How could manoeuvres “fought’’ between two or three divisions over an area limited to two or three days’ marches, with no bullets or shells whistling about their ears, and rigidly restricted against damage to property, form any real training for battles in which were involved hundreds of divisions, regions stretching from sea to sea, and an absolutely free hand in using any methods to disable or injure an enemy? It is nonsense to assert that the soldier of 1914 was unscientific, because lie had not the technique of 1918; this technique was the product of the war itself, and it could not have been acquired in times of peace.