The Evening Star MONDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1929. THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE.

Evening Star, Issue 20329, 11 November 1929, Page 10

The Evening Star MONDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1929. THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE.

Professor J. H. Morgan’s protest, briefly cabled’at the .'time, against the signing of the Optional Claus© by the British Government does not lose any of its force when one reads his entire article, reproduced by. us to-day in our columns. The value set upon the Optional Clause, as we have explained before, is that it closes, so far as certain classes of legal • disputes are concerned, a gap in the Covenant of .the League of Nations as a security for peace. Tho nation not subscribing to this clause might submit its disputes to the Council of the League or to some other tribunal for adjustment, but the result of that procedure was not necessarily final: If the fourteen members of the Council (excluding the parties to the quarrel) failed 'to agree‘ unanimously on a solution, -the disputants were free, so far as the Covenant was concerned, to go to war. If their legal disputes are submitted to the court, as subscription to the clause requires that they shall be, they must abide by the court’s decision, which is quite certain to be given, and there is no recourse to war. It has been pointed out that since . August -of -last .year this additional safeguard of the Optional Clause' lias been no more than a reinsurance, since the gap in- the Covenant has been • bridged by the Kellogg Pact. The signatories to that treaty stand pledged that “ the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.”- But in a matter of this importance tho reinsurance provided: by a definite, agreed on method .of pacific settlement cannot possibly h© viewed as a superfluity. : The most natural objection to the clause has been that the court for whoso jurisdiction it provides is, for the most part,' a, foreign court, whose ideas might not'agree'with British, ideas of cither

law or justice. Another objection has been found'in the vagueness and uiicer: tainty. of the international 'law which tho court will be called on to administer, and, in administering, to make; Professor Morgan, is less concerned with tho, weakness of tho court than with what may ho regarded as a weakness of tho British Empire, making the fear in his mind that dependence on it may b<“ made a rneans by' certain' dissatisfied elements ia that Empire of working liberately for its disintegration. There is no doubt that in Ireland, in (South Africa, and in India such elements exist. The Bx*itish, Indian, New land, and presumably Australian Governments have signed the clause with the reservations that ipterempiro disputes shall be excluded from the jurisdiction of the court, and that in any dispute its proceedings may be suspended for twelve months while the matter is being considered by the Council of the League of Nations. But\iti is pointed out that it will be for tho court, and not the party cited, to say whether a special dispute is inter empire or really international, and this certainly seems to make a weakness for the safeguard: ing resolution. Professor Morgan’s fears that an ulterior end might b® sought in signing the clause were no doubt assisted, when the Irish Free State Government rushed in to sign it, five days before any other British country, without making any reservations whatever. Nor is it quite clear what the conditions of South Africa have been.

Tho points raised by Professor Morgan will doubtless bo considered when the time comes for ratification of the agreement which has been signed on behalf of British Governments. No doubt they were considered, before the signing, by authorities as eminent as himself. It seems unlikely that the ambiguity between purely interempire disputes and those which might he judged as international would often arise in practice. But iu any case risks must be taken for peace, just as they have to be taken, and on a far worse scale, in war. There will be less, not more, danger on the whole from subversive elements within the Empire—most of them idealists in their own way—if they are obliged to see that there is as much freedom for them and as much idealism in it as they could possibly find outside. If the object always sought for was their suppression, their disaffection would have the strongest incentive to grow. And thev will , always find their material advantages in the Empire when the issue is squarely faced. We can fear the extreme Nationalists in certain self-governing dominions too much. The Irish Government makes them friendly gestures at times, but it does not go far with them in matters that count. General Hertzog has said more disturbing things than most of thorn, and, with a now lease of power assured to his Government, he has just been telling extremists of his party that governors-genoral selected from their own country would have no advantages for them, and that if a secessionist, motion were passed, oven by a State Party Congress, it would mean that “South Africa would bo dealt a blow from which it would not recover for years.” The London ‘ Observer's ’ comment on Ireland’s subscription, without reservations, to the Optional , Clause may be much to the point; “ The omission is not likely to involve anything practical, and one need not let one’s imagination run into, contingencies not likely to arise.”