RACE FOR ARMAMENTS

Evening Star, Issue 19791, 15 February 1928, Page 4

RACE FOR ARMAMENTS

AMERICA’S HAVAL PROGRAMME NEW YORK, February 13. In a remarkable speech before the business men of Indianapolis, Mr 0. D. Wilbur (Secretary of the Navy) defended the naval programme. He insisted that the United States bad, and could, maintain naval superiority over Britain, but to reassure the nations of the world of America’s peaceful intentibns the United States agreed to an extensive scrapping programme at Washington Conference, which involved monetary loss in scrapping new ships and equipment. Mr Wilbur added: “And yet, we find ourselves assailed on every side by pacifistic declarations that we are becoming militaristic.” He insisted that the American programme was in a large measure a replacement programme. Then, turning to the Geneva Conference, he said: “In the sense that Britain could have agreed with the other two Powers, and did not do so, the fault for failure is hers.” Mr Wilbur said that Britain sprang a surprise by proposing to divide cruisers into two classes. This ingenious proposition was well fitted to the needs of Britain and her Empire, but America’s lack of naval bases made the proposal impracticable for her. Britain’s minimum (600,000 tons) was not a limitation of armament, but rather an agreement to extend armament, and thereunder the United States would have been compelled to build between 500,000,000 and, 750.000. dollars worth of ships which were not well adapted to American use. to obtain .nominal parity in tonnage with Britain. America could not complain concerning Britain’s desire to spread the expenditure over a comparatively large number of smaller cruisers. 'America, as long ago as last summer, had made it clear that she desired to build a navy for her needs, and not for the purpose of attaining parity with Britain. There was no idea of feverish activity because of the failure of the Geneva Conference. The fundamental reason for the present programme being so large was that the United States had not been building because of the hope for a supplemental treaty to the Washington Treaty. The United States was willing at Geneva to accept a hazard due to a decrease in the number of ships if the other nations were willing to accept similar hazards. Those who were attacking the programme would compel American sailors to fight blindfolded. The American fleet, in gun power, torpedo power and striking power, was satisfactory, but in cruisers and destroyers, which were the eyes of the fleet, there were many obsolete vessels which mnst be replaced. America was not planning a fleet superior to Britain’s. The Navy Department was desirous of building the necessary auxiliaries now before being confronted with the problems of replacing capital ships in accordance with the Washington Treaty. The five-year programme would cost 740.000. dollars. The American candy bill in 1925 was 750,000,000 dollars, while 1,825,000,000 dollars were spent on cosmetics, and 900,000,000 dollars on theatres.

The speaker then said: “ Britain’s rubber monopoly would have taken 1,000,000,000 dollars from us in the last two years if it had not been for our Secretary of Commerce.” Mr Wilbur concluded by stating that American resources were sufficiently great to justify American expenditure.