ORIGIN OF THE WAR

Evening Star, Issue 19522, 1 April 1927, Page 10

ORIGIN OF THE WAR

REVEALING BRITISH DOCUMENTS A volume of absorbing, interest and great historical, importance has been published by tho British Stationery Office. The volume is one ,of a series ot Foreign Office papers, covering the period 1898-1914, and deals exclusively with documents dated between Juno 26 and August 4, 1914, tin six weeks of momentous negotiation pre. ceding tho outbreak of war. The object of the publication of these documents, whiclin some respects involves a departure fron tradition, is to set out clcariv and withoir suppression the whole of the. "facts that let up to tho final decision of Britain to tab the-side of Franco and Russia. A vas library has already been published on anr about the same sots of facts, but the IV documents now made available throw fr<V light on a number ,of controversial points revealing also the-play of personalities be bind the conduct of British’ policv in the? fateful days. It should be said at once that the vohim can,bo read by tho patriotic Britisher, at ready fully convinced of the justice c the cause the Empire espoused, -without h 1 faith being wveakoned or hk consciem troubled. Here and there, bo will ftm some incident that induces a sense of re gret, especially in the account of the eon versations between Sir Edward Grey (nov Eord Grey),’tho Foreign Secretary, '»nd M Raul Gambon, Hie French Ambassador who,- in the last days of July, was plead ing for, an assurance of British support and pleading in vain: The substantial inv pression derived from a perusal of the volume, however, is that Britain nobly did her utmost to prevent tho outbreak of war, risking her friendships and her own safety by refraining frftm action. ns lone as there remained the remotest possibility of a peaceful settlement. One of tho enlightening features of the volume is the insertion of marginal notes made by permanent officials on documentsent up to their chief. • together with the minutes made by the Minister. In thii respect the volume is a striking vindication of the late Sir Eyre Crowe, then As sistant Under-Secretary, who, because hi; mother and wife were German, was sub ject to some natural but misinformed criticism. Those who then were disposed to say that Crowe was not entitled to a place in the Foreign Office will gladly reverse their judgment after reading hi; minutes. His German associations proved, in fact, a distinct service to his country, for he was possessed of a keen insight into German character, and his comment? are shown to be the most forceful and the most long-sighted of any made in that momentous period. On July 31 Sir Eyre Crowe, in a private and personal memo'randum to Sir Edward Grey, urged his chief to take the risk of saying that Britain would fight if war broke out. Sir Edward Grey was wavering, afraid of commercial opinion and of the political difficulties at home. Crowe sought to strengthen his chief!’:—

Commercial opinion is generally timid, and apt to follow pusillanimous counsels. The panic in the city lias been largely influenced by the deliberate acts of German financial bouses . . . who are notoriously in daily communication with the German Embassy It lias been the unremitting effort of Germany to induce England to declare herself neutral in case Germany wore at war with France and Russia . . . the theory that England cannot engage in a. big 'war means her abdication as an independent State . . . the whole policy of the Entente can have no meaning if it does not signify that in a just quarrel England would stand by her frieida . . . the question at issue is not whether we are*capable of taking part in a war, but whether we should go into the present war. That is a question first of right or wrong, and secondly of political expediency.

Sir Edward Grey allows in his own memoirs that lie was at heart substantially in agreement with these views, but other considerations were still holding him back. There was a very serious division of opinion in Cabinet and in tlie country. The point will never bo settled whether Sir Edward Grey's indecision on the last day in July, and even on August 2, was in any, measure responsible for the great conflagration. Two schools will always argue the question, one holding that until Britain found Germany determined to violate the neutrality of Belgium her course was to hold her hand, concentrating on efforts at peaceful negotiation; the dtlier contending that if before the end of July Britain had said plainly, “We will fight,” Germany would never have taken the irrevocable step. Britons will, however, derive satisfaction from tlio .knowledge that the real turning point was the violation of Belgium’s neutrality by Germany. The crucial document of the war—the one .which establishes the true reason for Britain’s action —was that despatched to Berlin and Paris by Sir Edward Grey on July 31. This is reproduced in tho volume in facsimile. The telegram was as follows:

I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to H.M. Government, in view of existing treaties,, to ask whether French—(German)—Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to Gorman —(French) —Government It is important to have an early answer.

The reproduction shows that tho Foreign Secretary added, “ otherwise H.M. Government must,” but whatever ho was going to suggest or threaten is unknown, as the words were struck out.

Documents reporting tho interviews between the Foreign Secretary and the anxious French Ambassador are of exceptional interest. The appeals of the Entente Powers became insistent and pathetic on July 30 and 31. After a Cabinet meeting on ■July .31 Sir Edward Grey saw M. Paul Cambon, who came to inquire about the attitude of Great Britain. Ho was met by an entirely non-committal reply, followed by a doleful exposition of the commercial consequences of 'intervention to Britain:—

The commercial and financial situation was exceedingly serious; there was danger of a. complete collapse that would involve us and • everyone else in ruin; and it was possible that our standing aside might bo the means of preventing a complete collapso of European credit, in which wfc should be involved. . This might be a paramount consideration in deciding our attitude. This inspired tho memorandum from Sir Eyre Crowe, previously quoted. Sir Arthur Nicolson (now Lord Carnock), then Permanent Under-Secretary, took the same view as Crowe—

It is useless to shut our eyes. Possibly within the next twenty-four hours Germany will he moving across the French frontier —and if public opinion, at present so bewildered and partially' informed, is ready, in the event of a German invasion of France, to_ stand by the latter, if we aro not mobilised our aid would be too late. Mobilisation is a precautionary and not a provocative measure.

Even on Sunday, August 2. after Germany had violated tho neutrality of Luxemburg, and the British Cabinet had authorised Grey to inform tho french Ambassador that the British Fleet would protect French coasts and shipping against German atack through tho North Sea, the Foreign Secretary pointed out to M. Gambon that the guarantee of tho neutrality of Luxemburg was collective, not individual, and refused to say that Britain would make war if the neutrality of Belgium were violated. For the first time the complete record of the conversation between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Gambon is published, and the concluding part of Grey’s account is of great interest:— I also explained (to M. Gambon) how at tho beginning of a. great catastrophe such as the European' war, of which no

one could foresee the conserpiences where we had such enormous;responsibilities in

our Empire, as in India, or as regaa-ds countries in our occupation such as • Egypt, when even the conditions of naval warfare and the possibility of protecting our coasts under these conditions were untried, it was impossible safely to send our military force out. of tho country. M. Cam mm asked whether this meant that we should never do it. I replied that it dealt only with the present moment. He dwelt upon the moral effect of our sending only two divisions. But I said that to send so small a. force as two or oven, four divisions abroad at the beginning of tho war would entail the maximum of risk to them and produce the minimum of effect.

To this Mr Wickham Steed, editor of the ’.Reviews of Reviews, 1 and then associated with ‘ Tho Times,’ adds a dramatic note in an' article reviewing the volume. “ I can bear witness to the effect which Sir Edward Grey’s words produced on tho French Ambassador's mind,” writes Mr Steed. ‘‘J saw-him immediately after ho

hr(l heard them. When I spoke to him ~ r iv vmMir.'i nf the Treaty of Luxemburg, which had been announced that .... .... OI a" pointed to a copy of the Luxemburg Treaty, and exclaimed bitterly; “ There is the signature of England. I have asked Grey whether England means to respect it."

“What did he say?” , “ Nothing, nothing. I t do «not even know whether this evening the word ‘ honor ’ will not have to be struck out of the British vocabulary." ■ -~ But that night a note from the Prime Minister (Mr Asquith) informed M. Cambon that the British Expeditionary Force would be mobilised next day as a protection against the eventuality of a- German invasion of Belgium. And France" soon knew that Britain meant to retain the word “ honor.” Numerous other documents shed light on the attitude of Britain at the time; of the difficulties with which the Government, in which tbo peace party was strong, was confronted, and of the ‘/forts to stave off the actual conflict. ‘The Times,’ in commenting upon the revealing nature of some of the documents, refers to Sir Eyre Crowe's telegram from St. Petersburg on duly 24: “ The point that matters is whether Germany is, or is not, absolutely determined to have this war now. There is still the chance that she can bo made to hesitate if she can be induced to apprehend that the war will find England by the side of France and Russia. We (hall gain nothing by not making up our minds what we. shall do in circumstances that may arise tomorrow. , . . This struggle is not for

the possession of Servia, but one between Germany, aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe, and the Powers who desire to retain, individual freedom. We ■ should ‘'decide now .to mobilise .the Fleeti as soon as any other'Great, Power mobilises,, and that decision should bo announced -to. Franco and Russia forthwith." Sir Edward Grey noted the despatch 1 : "I'think it premature to make any statement, to France, and Russia yet." ‘The Times’ remarks that the Foreign Secretary was not only profoundly conscious that to enter upon such a, conflict as’he rightly 'foresaw, a. European war must bo’l would' bo. fatal without The hearty and unanimous '■ conviction ' t of (lie nation that our cause was. just, and'-the need and duty of vindicating; it were. ■ imperative; hut be also seems to have had' n confidence which was,, perhaps, excessive.’ in the virtues'of negotiation..,' ....

The volume is unsparing,.,, and throws up some, strange episodes.,....' One of the most, extraordinary shows ’ that • when' Belgrade was bombarded ' the’ British Charge d’Affa.ires : departed to Nish' with the Servian Government, and 'deft the ‘Vice-cotisul in charge of / the■ Legation.' This' bright diplomat transferred : the ...British' ciphers and secret archives ■to the (.German ’Legation! Presumably .this ,was,.done because there was less likelihood of the German premises being ’shelled than the British. Sir Edward Grey does not, spem to,, hpve been perturbed by the announcement'’ at first, but an hour-.or so afterwards lie telegraphed ordering the • instant , destruction of the.papers.' The British-Representative, in bis next .message, mentioned-' the.'German Legation, “over a portion, of which the British flag is flying.”. The, cipher? and secret papers were “ carefully flestroyed, by fire" after being 1 for thirty-six hours iii the lust place to which'They should ever have been taken.- Another 'passing smile is provoked by'.the report -of a Conversation at The Hague on July. 28, when the l world was in a ferment. ■ The British, representative solemnly asks the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he (was at all anxious about the political situation in Europe,” and receives the cheering answer: "His Excellency said he was rather inclined to be optimistic about it.”