RAMMED BY CAMPERDOWN

Evening Star, Issue 19197, 13 March 1926, Page 12

RAMMED BY CAMPERDOWN

FATE OF H.M.S. VICTORIA NAVAL TRAGEDY RECALLED [By Commander \V. 0. Castuk, 11.N.J Tho loss of H.M.S. \ ictoria is of particular interest non', because ot the great controversy it provoked throughout the country on the wisdom ot building big battleships. ■ At the time of this mostminfortnuate accident, both H.M.b. V ictoria and H.M.S. Campcrdown, which, rammed her, belonged to the latest types ot British battleships. ’The \ ictoria was about 10,bill) tons and 14,000 horsepower. She carried two 100-ton guns in turrets Forward and a o.2in gun ail - The Campcrdown was of 10,600 tons and 11,600 horse-power. She carried two 33.5 in guns on barbettes Forward and all. Both ships carried a secondarc battery of 6in guns. The Victoria flew the ling of ViceAdmiral Sir George Tryon, Commander-in-Cliief of the Mediterranean, and the Campcrdown that of Ids second in command, Rear-Admiral Markham. On June 22, 1893, at about 9.30 a.in., the. fleet, eleven ships of which were present, got under weigh From Beyroufc, in Syria, with the intention or proceeding to Tripoli, some sixty miles to the north. The weather was particularly fine, tho sea calm, and there was practically no wind. The Admiral spent most of the Forenoon in exercising his fleet at what were called T.A. manauivres, a typo of fleet exercise based on “ Follow my leader,” and invented bv Admiral Tryon himself.

In considering this disaster it should ho borne in mind that Ibe Admiral was considered—and rightly, too—as the finest naval tactician nl bis time. This fact explains much which otherwise i» unexplainable. Admiral Tryon was not only a. great tactician, but he was also a very stubborn one. and was extremely hard to dissuade from In's purpose once ho had made up his mind. Moreover, he was an innovator, and performed manoeuvres with his fleet which the average captain could not understand, until the Admiral hud subsequently explained bis reason. THE ADMIRAL’S SIGNAL. Just before 3.30 p.m. the fleet was steaming in two lines, the Victoria leading one line, with the Nile astern of tho Victoria and the Dreadnought astern of the Nile; with three other ships bringing up the tail. On the port or left-hand side of the Victoria was the Campcrdown, loading four other ships. The distance between the two lines was six cables, or 1,200 yards. Whilst the fleet was thus disposed Admiral Tryon made a signal lor .the two leading ships—ids ship, the Victoria, and Admiral Markham's ship, the Campcrdown—to turn both together inwards, tho remaining ships to follow the leader round in succession. This manoeuvre would have been a perfectly proper one to perform providing that the lines were far enough apart to turn towards each other without touching. Tho room the ships needed depended on tho diameter of the circle in which they could, and would, normally turn, which in the case of both the Victoria and the Camperdowu was 800 yards. Now, if each ship required 800 yards—and technically thov would really require more—it was obvious that the least distance between the lines needed for this manoeuvre was 1,600 yards. But wo have seen that the lines were only 1,200 yards apart. Therefore the manoeuvre wiis an impossible one.

Admiral Markham realised that the manoeuvre was impossible, and so, instead of repeating tho signal completely by hoisting it right up, lie kept Hie signal at the “ dip ’’—that is, halfway. This was to show Admiral Tryon that his signal was seen, but not understood. Communication was then made by semaphore, and Admiral Markham was asked: “What are you waiting for?” As he did not answer this ques'fion, Admiral Tryon showed the Camperdown’s pennants, which means, roughly, “ Get on with the business.” In fact, it is a mild way of reprimanding a junior.in front of the whole fleet. This was too much for Admiral Markham. At 3.36 the raanrouvre took place. At 3.39 tho Auotoria was rammed, and at 3.491 she capsized and sank. Jt is hard and unfair to blame Admiral Markham. The court martial did not find him at fault. It rather .suggested that the loss sustained was paid lor by tho strict adherence to orders. AVHEN TO DISOBEY. The Duke of Clarence, when Lord High Admiral in 1828, publicly stated that <f Tie didn’t give a damn for any officer who didn’t know when the good of the service required his disobeying written orders.” Again wo have Nelson’s blind eve.

It is only lair to Admiral Markham, however, to state that ho thought Admiral Tryon would so carry out the mtantnuvre that the Arictoria would turn outside tho Caraperclown. AATiatever was in the mind of the two admirals, tile fact remains that tho AMctoria wa-s rammed, with great loss of life.

There was one captain in tlie fleet who foresaw how matters wore likely to go, and that was Captain Noel, of the Nile. He not only made a .signal to his next astern, tho Dreadnought., to stand by to go astern, hut lie shot the Nile out clear of the stern of the ANctoriu.

As soon almost as the Cainperdowu rammed tho Victoria, and this she did first under the fore turret, she hacked out again. Almost the same moment the ANotoria took a heavy list to starboard, and began to settle down by the head. A CANCELLED ORDER. Admiral Tryon then made a signal lo send boats-, but cancelled it almost immediately. This cancellation was given because the admiral made up his mind to try to run tile ship ashore, which he promptly proceeded to do by going full speed ahead. As things turned out, it was a hopeless and fatal manoeuvre, since the action of the ship going ahead forced the water faster and with more violence into the groat rent, so that the Victoria heeled more and more to starboard and settled further down by the head. /At 3.49|, ten minutes and a-half after she was rammed, tho Victoria gave a sudden lurch and turned completely over. Never was there such a. ghastly row as when this groat battleship turned over on her side. It sounded to-the writer, who wa.s standing on the quarter-deck of tho Nile, as if all the crockery that Lyons o\or owned was being smashed by all the “Nippys” in England. The noise was probably caused by the breaking away of tho 6in gnus in the secondary batteries. The curious point is that not a sound came from the COO odd men on board that ship. Those who were able to do so went overboard without a murmur, and those who remained below died at their posts like British seamen. 1 have mentioned that the Admiral cancelled the sending of boats, but in this case Captain Noel disobeyed orders, and all the Nile’s boats were levered from the davits, and the boats ,-n the boom were being hoisted out as last ns tho steam derrick could hoist tm-in. The consequence of this action and iho fact that the Nile was the nearest ship to the Victoria resulted in tho ho-.ts of the Nile saving some .121) officers and men out of tho total of 293 mat were saved, her total crew being fifty-three officers and 659 men.

A.court martial eventually sat, nominally to try Captain Burke. Admiral Tryon’s flag captain; but, ns I have hinted, it came to no real decision. It did state one curious fact, and that wa.s that the bottom of the ship did not blow out ns the ship sank. J saw on

board the Nile a box containing documents which had been kept in the double bo H orn of the Victoria. How it came to ilie surface, without coming through the ship’s bottom, passes understanding. Two things arose nut- of tin's great loss. One was the elimination of lore and aft bulkheads in men-nf-war. Those bulkheads were watertight, and ran practically from end to end of a ship, dividing her into two separate parts. The consequence to the Victoria was that the water got into one side of the ship only, and thus caused her to capsize. It is far-fetched, but i£ the Nile could have only given the Victoria a gentle ram in the port quarter the ship might have kept an even,keel, and have thus sunk upright, -and by so doing possibly less lives would have been lost. The other point was a great publicoutcry against building such large ships carrying so many men. The public agitation pointed to the great expense to the country in men and treasure when such large ships were lost. However, nothing came of this agitation; ships grow larger and carried more crews, until wc have reached the present ultimate in H.M.S. Hood, of ■14.600 tons, and carrying a crew of over 1,000 officers and men.