PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

Evening Star, Issue 19022, 18 August 1925, Page 3

PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

STORY OF THE SECURITY PACT A White Paper containing important official papers relating to the “Rhineland ” Security Pact includes the original Gorman proposals, the French reply, and the correspondence exchanged between the British and French Governments with regard to that reply. The original German memorandum was communicated on February 9 by the Gorman Ambassador in Paris to M. Horriot, In it Germany declared her willingness to accept the pact, “by virtue or which the Powers interested in the Rhine—above all. England, Franco, Italy, and Germany—entered into a solemn obligation for a lengthy period (to bo eventually defined more specifically) vis-a-vis the Government of the United States of America as trustee not to wage war against a contracting State. A comprehensive arbitration treaty, such as has been concluded in recent years between different' European countries, could be amalgamated with such a pact. Germany is also prepared to conclude analogous arbitration treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts with all other States as well.

“ Furthermore, a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status (gegenwartiger Besitzstand) on the Rhine would also he acceptable to Germany. The purport of such a pact could ho, for instance, that the interested States hound reciprocally to obse.rve the inviolability of tho present territorial status on the Rhino; that they furthermore both jointly and individually (conjointement et sepraement) guaranteed the fulfilment of this obligation; and, finally, that they would regard any action running counter to the said obligation as affecting them jointly and individually. In tho same sense, the treaty States could guarantee in this pact the fulfilment of tho obligation to demilitarise the Rhineland, which Germany has undertaken in articles 42 and 43 of tho Treaty of Versailles. Again, arbitration agreements of the kind defined above between Germany and all_ those States which were ready on their side to accept such agreements could be combined with such a pact.” THE FINAL FRENCH REPLY.

The French reply, as approved by the British Government and handed to Herr Stresemann, consists of a short protocol and seven sections embodying the principal points, whereon preliminary agreement appears to he the necessary basis for any future negotiations. The protocol states that the French Government and the Allies regard the step taken by the Gorman Government ns earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own mid expressed desire to give' all States concerned supplementary guarantees of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles. The seven points on which preliminary -freemen t is demanded arc ns follow ;

The memorandum only incidentally the League of Nations. Now'the Allied States arc members of the Longue of Nations, and arc bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them clenrly-dcfnicd rights and obligations with the object of maintaining pence. The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, hut no agreement could he achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant of the League. This agreement, then, can only ho conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of Ho Femme of Nations, dated iUarch Id. TT. The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the peace treaties. The agreements to he concluded ought not, therefore, either ro imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses. Thus Hie Allies cannot in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them. THE INCLUSION OP BELGIUM. HI. The memorandum of the 9th February contemplates _ first of all the conclusion that the ‘“’Powers interested in the Rhine ” of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles;— 1. Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States. 2. Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the. Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States. d. A guarantee ’by the contracting I States of the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarisation of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under Articles ‘l2 and 13 ot the Treaty of Versa dies.

The French Government docs not fai to apprcciale the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the. principles inscribed in the 'Treaty of Versailles, of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war (an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any time limit) between the contracting States. Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested. It also goes without saying, and, further, results from the silence on this point of tho Gorman memorandum, that the pact to he concluded on these lines could not affect tho provisions of the treaty relative to tho occupation of tho Rhineland, nor tho execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement. IV. The Gorman Government next declares itself prepared >-» conclude with Franco and with the »Gier States parties to tho Rhineland Rnco arbitration treaties guaranteeing “a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts.” France considers that an arbitration treaty of tho kind which Germany proposes would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must he understood that, as between Franco and Germany, such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes, and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall bo undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties, or of tho Rhineland Pact or in virtue of the guarantee given to an arbitration ! treaty by the parties or by any one of | them. An arbitration treaty of tho ! same kind between Belgium and Gerjmany would be no less necessary. I To give full effect to those two j treaties, their observance ought to ho I assured by tho joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties refusing to submit a dispute "to arbitration o» to i carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures.

Where one of the contracting parties, without resorting to hostile measures, fails to observe its undertakings, the Council of the League of Nations shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty. GERMANY’S OTHER NEIGHBORS. V. In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who

were so disposed arbitration treaties of tiro same kind. The Allied Governments-note this assurance with satisfaction. They even agreements between Germany and those of her neighbors who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Past, arc signatories of the Treaty or Versailles, the peace of Europe, which the Rhineland Pact tends to consolidate and of which it is to constitute an essential element, could not be completely guaranteed. The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League ot Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves. These arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in section TV. The Powers signatories of the Treaty _ of Versailles and of the proposed Rhinoland Pact would have the option, if they so desire, of constituting themselves the guarantors of such arbitration treaties.

VI. Nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present note should affect the rights and obligations attaching-_ to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant of the League, VII. The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present Note come into force simultaneously. , . These agreements, in conformity with the Covenant, ought to bo registered by the League of Nations and placed under its auspices. Finally, it goes without saying that, if the United Stales were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realised, France would bo only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general pence and security. Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary_ to obtain precise knowledge of the views of th* Gorman Government.

The French Government would_ hn glad to receive a reply on this subject, which will permit the opening of negotiations with tho objcCT of concluding agreements which will constitute a now and effective guarantee of peace.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH CORRESPONDENCE. In the. course of the Anglo-French correspondence it appears that the British Government on May 28 stated, through the British Ambassador in Baris, that they could not entirely endorse the French draft in its original form, and advocated its amendment so as to confine it to a statement of views which were common to the Allies. In enclosing a remodelled draft containing the amendments which tho British Government proposed, the British view on security, as it had been defined by Mr Chamberlain at Genova, was recalled: “ That the best way to carry out a programme of security, arbitration, and disarmament was with the co-operation of tho League of Nations to supplement tho Covenant by making special arrangements to meet special needs.” These arrangements should bo purely defensive in character and should be framed in the spirit of tho Covenant, working in close harmony with the League and under its guidance. While declaring that they would not hf-ur any new obligation beyond the. maintenance of the territorial arrangements at present existing in the West, the British Government repeated that “ they do not, themselves question or give any encouragement to others to

question tho other provisions of treaties which form the basis of the existing public law of Europe-” ENGLAND'S OBLIGATIONS. i The following important passages then occuri—‘‘Tho basic principle by which llis -Majesty’s Government, are guided in their approach to the matter now under discussion is, and must bo, that any new obligation which they undertake shall bo specific and limited to tho maintenance of the existing territorial arrangement on the western Iron tier of Germany. His Majesty’s Government aro not prepared to assume fresh obligations elsewhere in addition to llm.-c already devolving upon them as signatories of tho Covenant of the League , of Nations and of the peace treaties. 1 At the same time it may ho well to repeat that, in seeking moans to strengthen the position in the vest, His .Majesty’s Government do not themselves question, or give any encouragement to others to question, tho other provisions of the treaties widen form the basis of the existing public ; law of Europe.” ! “The substance of Hie Note, how-' ever, goes in certain respects consider- , ably beyond what llis Majesty’s Government could for their part endorse consistently with the principles enunciated above. Section IV., for e\- j amide, contemplates tho conclusion he- i tween the signatories of the proposed •. Rhineland Pact of arbitration treaties 1 which would apply to all disputes of . whatever nature, and would ho guar- ! anteed jointly and severally by the sig- | natorios of the Rhineland Pact., Section V. suggests that the same joint and several guarantee should he given by tho same Powers to similar arbitration treaties between Germany and States other than the sigatories of the i' Rhineland Pact,” j Tho Note goes on to express the Bri-: tish approval of any treaties of arbitration or concilia l ion into which Conl i-

nenrai rowers may outer, providing that their obligations to the League of Nations aro not hereby affected. So far as the British Empire is concerned, her world-wide responsibilities place her in a different position from that of Continental Powers. •And as regards the proposals for peace which are under discus-on, the British Corernniont led that while for the Continental Powers concerned the conclusion of the suggested arbitration treaties Coitus flic natural complement of a. Rhineland Pact, this is not equally the case with Croat Britain. Nevertheless, the British Government aro prepared in principle to give the guarantee flowing logically from the territorial guarantee of the Rhineland, of arbitration treaties which may be concluded between Germany and her Western neighbors who are signatories of the. pact. The typo of guarantee contemplated would operate if one of the parties failed to refer the dispute in arbitration or to carry out an award, if such failure were coupled with a resort to hostilities. The guarantee would be defensive. It would not entail upon the British Government any obligation to resort to force elsewhere than in areas covered by the proposed Rhineland Pact, and would not operate in any event in favor of the party which had refused arbitration or had refused to give effect to an arbitral award. FRANCE FREE TO SUPPORT HER

ALLIES. The British Note of June 8, which Mr Chamberlain handed to M. Briand at the nicotine of the League Council in Geneva, and which enabled M. Briand to declare that complete AngloFrench agreement had been reached on the terms of the reply to Germany, contains the following important passage:— “The French Government arc right in assuming that His Majesty’s Government recognise that the proposed Rhineland Pact cannot operate as a barrier to prevent France fi;om taking action in conformity with such guarantees as she may Lave given to arbitration treaties between Germany and Germany’s neighbors, and they therefore concur in section IV. of the proposed reply as at present drafted. His Majesty’s Government, in fact, regard this proposition as self-evident and as applicable equally to all States signatory of the proposed pact. It is one to which, if rightly understood, there should be no difficulty in obtaining the

ready assent of any of the parties concerned, for it is a particular application of the general theory which, in the interests of all the parties, must be at the base of the mutual settlement now in contemplation. “It would clearly be inequitable that the proposed Rhineland Pact should in any circumstances operate in favor of any signatory Power which subsequently broke tho treaty obligations into which it. bad entered. The pact ami its cognate agreements must necessarily be so drafted that, on the one hand, they will give the fullest possible security to all the Powers concerned so long as they abide by their treaty undertakings, and that, on the other hand, they cannot be invoked by a guilty Power to protect it from the consequences of a wilful broach of its treaty obligations.”