HOW BRITAIN RUNS PALESTINE

Evening Star, Issue 18998, 21 July 1925, Page 3

HOW BRITAIN RUNS PALESTINE

A CHEAP GUARDIANSHIP Four million pounds was the bill to the British taxpayer in 1921-22 for r running Palestine under a military adr ministration, the head of which was a . general officer. Its principal officials ■ were all military men, we learn from a special correspondent of the London • ‘ Times,’ who has lately returned from Palestine* and military forces controlled public security and the frontier. But to-day this expense account . lias been reduced to £624,000, and : Palestine is administered by a civi- . lian High Commissioner with a purely civilian staff, while its frontiers and : internal security are assured by civil j forces. This informant goes on to say: “The only military forces now in the country are a cavalry regiment, ! tho 9th Lancers, at Surafend, and a | squadron of tho Royal Air Force (with ,an armored-car company) at Ramleh and Amman, in the Transjordan. The Middle East Vote of £624,000. is, in fact, made up of the most of the air squadron, £40,000 towards the maintenance of the cavalry regiment, and £200,000 for the cost of the British gendarmerie, which forms an integral part of the civil forces of tho country. “ The Cabinet will be called upon to j take a decision on the question of (these Imperial commitments as soon as j it has been able to receive and study ; the report of its two members, who recently visited Palestine. It may, therefore, be opportune if a brief survey be given of the system at present followed in Palestine in the matter of I public security and the control of the | frontiers. ■, “ Tiie civil forces employed in the country number 2,000 officers and men I —viz., 1,000 police (including the C.1.D.), 450 native gendarmerie, and I 550 British gendarmerie, j “ Tho police, mainly foot, with a small mounted section, is locally re- ) cruited, only the senior officers being j British. The native gendarmerie, which is mounted under British officers, consists of one-third Arab (Moslem and Christian), one-third Jew, and one-third foreign clement, mostly Circassian.—a mixture which was much condemned at the outset, as not conducing to harmony or efficiency, but which, according to its officers, lias worked out extremely well. The British gendarmerie is on foot, with a small mounted section and _ motor transport, and consists of British exsoldiers under British officers, all with war sendee.” ! The police do normal police duty in the towns and districts, wo are told,

■ while the Jewish suburb of Jaffa, Tel ■ Aviv, has its own municipal force, consisting of Jews. The national gen- > darmerie patrols the land frontiers and fulfils police duties in the areas adjoining. But it is pointed out that the British gendarmerie is a militarytrained force acting as a mobile reserve and backing for the other forces, in addition to which it is used for special duty, where ouly British can be usefully employed, and for general patrol work throughout the country from Dan to Becrsheba. "Me read ithen: J “As regards the military forces, the i B.A.F. Squadron is stationed here | mainly because of the necessity of coni trolling the imperial airway to the Middle East, which passes through Hainlch and Amman. The cavalry regiment i.s part of the general scheme for maintaining a British garrison at strategic points on the line of Imperial communications, as, for example, in Egypt. “The question of retrenchment in these imperial commitments is of moment to Palestine, for, while it is intimately concerned in tho £200,001) provided ior tho British gendarmerie, it also had a close interest in the fate of the R.A.F. Estimates, since tho armored cars provided thereunder—the j cost is estimated at £oo,ooo—are, in view ol the peculiar conditions reigning in the country, a valuable support, particularly in matters of delenee. j “ Palestine is, it is true, a relatively .small country; its area j.s approxii mately 10. (JUG square miles. But it j presents features that complicate the ; i problem of public security, its papu- I la Hon coin prises 000,000 Moslems, 1 bO,OOO Christians, belonging to no - lewor than a score of more or less con- j Hiding riles, 108,000 Jews, and about I 10,000 miscellaneous sects. The at- I mosphero of religious fervor produced ! by the existence of tho sacred places 1 and tho ceremonies and festivals peri-I ouically held in and around them exercises an exciting influence on these constitutionally antagonistic communities, and gives to the daily situation a potentiality ol explosiveness that exists in no othcrjaiid. Then there are topographical difficulties to be contended against. The Holy City itself, with j its narrow, tortuous streets, and its j rabbit-warren-like houses surrounding . and leading to the various shrines and points of religious interest, is a neverending source of serious preoccupation to those responsible for the maintenance of peace and order;-while the scattered nature of the inhabited centres and settlements and the for-, motion ol the country itself complicate the task of supervision and control. Finally, it has an abnormal length of land frontier—some 280 miles—bordering for the most part on regions inhabited by nomad tribes and exposed to (he constant danger of raids.” It i.s interesting to note, says tins ‘ Times ’ correspondent, that the city ol Cairo requires a police force more than double the total civil forces employed in Palestine. Yet the population ol Cairo is only 12 per cent, greater than that of Palestine and is nowhere as antagonistic in its composition, nor exposed to anything like tho same exciting influences. To this police force of Cairo, wc arc told, is added a body of 1,100 public gliaHhs (native policemen), and behind them all is the moral influence of the British garrison of some 4,000 men. This iintei then remarks: “In tho circumstances the Middle East Vote, covering purclv oca' ieq- ireraouts, assumes the elianu-Ler if an anumimlj cheap insurance premium, considering the risks it covers and the heavy expenditure in the matter of garrison and reinforcements it obviates. . “ If -tho present satisfactory condition of things, in so Jar as concerns the maintenance of public order, is to continue, no very radical change in the at present followed should, or can, ee made. That some British support lor the native civil forces is imperative, all authorities agree. .11owcver efficient these force., may be they require to have at their back the moral stiffening of a non-native element. “ Purely military units arc not of the same value in this respect as a white element forming an integral part of the civil forces. The former can o'dv hn called upon in a crisis, when the situation has for all practical purposes got beyond the control of tho ordinary civil force, whereas a mili-tarily-trained British element in that force has the advantage of boiim able to come into action ns a normal feature oi the public security organisation while there is still a possibility ol circumscribing or even preventing tho threatened trouble. In other words, the presence of a British civil element, acts as a salutary deterrent, and it is no secret that during the critical period of the Balfour tour, although the_ police and native gendarmerie very satisfactorily afforded the necessary protection and maintained public order, the key to the situation was furnished by the white element, in this case the British goadanueriePl