SEPOYS OF MOROCCO

Evening Star, Issue 18374, 7 September 1923, Page 7

SEPOYS OF MOROCCO

FORCE THAT SAVED SPAIN. A correspondent of 1 Tho Times ’ describes Spnilda native troops in Morocco, It is only just (ho states) that Spain’s Moroccan troops should receive tho reward of their loyally, and Madrid has given a worthy welcome to the “ Regularee ” do Ceuta. Tho King himself presided at the ceremony of tho presentation of colors to this regiment. These native troops since their formation havo shared with tho more recently rocruiocd Spanish Foreign Legion tho honor of leading tho attack in almost every engagement, They aro reported never to have faltered, no matter what tho odds against them or how difficult their task Their loyalty, thoiy courage, and also their daredevil exploits havo rendered them popular amongst the Spanish population of Dio zone, though a tendency to marauding—a national heritage—-sometimes causes inconvenience to tho peaceful inhabitants of tho occupied parts of the country, and they aro apt to bo destructive where firewood is required and orchards aro near at hand.

But all Moorish troops aro born with an instinct to loot, which they consider a justifiable occupation, warranted by the profession of war to which they so easily adapt themsolvea. i'L has always been bo nr Morocco, and in the days nob so long gone by of the independent Sultans, woebetide the tribes through whoso territory tho Shorelian army passed, even in peaceful progress. In those days every soldier was a thief almost without exception. I remember well ono of them applying to me to enter my service ns a servant. As a final recommendation ho stated that ho was tho most expert chicken-stealer in tho army, and could extract fowls in such a way that neither tho bird seized nor Jta companions wbuld even oacldc. He promised to keep my kitchen fully supplied. Bo if tho “Roguiares" as those native regiments of tho Spanish zone nro called, err at times in duo discrimination between too property of the “IMoro Enomigo” and tho “More Amigo” this littlo failing baa nob prevented Dieir being a very loyal, very courageous, and very useful body of men. “STAUNCH AND LOYAL.” 1 When tho time arrives for the Introduction into tho Spanish zone of tho proposed now form of government and for tho withdrawal of the Peninsular forces, it is on the “ Roguiares ” and similar now troops that tho Spanish Government will have to depend for too maintenance of their authority. Tho correct attitude of tiro “ Regulaxeu ” in times of great difficulty-—and under great temptation—certainly warrants confidence in tho loyalty of thoco and similar Moroccan troops, although tho native polioe forces havo uot been reliable. They treacherously murdered their Spanish officers during the catastrophe of July, 1921. After that tragio disaster, when on entire Spaniah army of nearly 20,000 men was dispersed and almost annihilated l by the ■Rif tribes, tho “ Regularee ” of Ceuta were hurriedly shipped from that fortress to Aldiila and saved the situation there. I; to to their honor, and to the honor of their Spanish officers, that those troops remained staunch and loyal in euoh a econo of unparalleled disaster and defeat. On the presentation of colors to this Ceuta regiment at Madrid, tho D'uquo del Infantadb recalled their services in the following words In those days of July, 1921—the most ominous of our military history, in which a hurricane of misfortune and cowardice sterilised tho fruit of twelve years of effort and sacrifice—all would havo been lost in Molilliwave/n honor—if Divine Providence had not inspired tiro Supreme Command with what, though it appeared a danger, was in reality a necessity—the derision to summon for the protection of the city tho “Itegulares” of Ceuta, Tho “ Regularea ” justified the call. They fought with heroism, and their losses were tragically heavy. Spain’s experience of these Loops warrants the eventual raising of a native army to replace tho Spanish soldiers from the Peninsula employed in the Rif. It it the transition stage that is going to be difficult, for neither in Madrid nor in Morocco does the situation appear promising. The resignation two or throe days ago of the Minister of War and of General Vires, who commands the Meli.lla district, is evidence of a want of unanimity in high places on tho proposed programme. In Die Rif the tribes, under tho leadership of Abdul-Krim, are preparing fresh attacks upon tho Spanish posts end camps. If this transition period oau bo passed without a defeat all may be well, but the situation t-hia summer will bo critical.