NAVAL LEADERSHIP

Evening Star, Issue 17958, 3 May 1922, Page 9

NAVAL LEADERSHIP

xegkssitv of the future.

ESSENTIALS TO- SUCCESS.

f}!v the Naval Correspondent of ilio ‘Morning Post,']

The importance the question of leadernhip hears on naval efficiency nobody who In:.-; studied history will deny, and) the fnipstii'ii is (renncirt-ly asked; Can leadership higher leadership—bo acquired? The naval correspondent of the London ‘ Mon> ing Post,' writing on February 15, says it is true that, in certain individuals the chief characteristics which make a great leader are inherent. It is also the case that those who have these characteristics to such high degree that they constitute genius are very rare, let it is certain that, provided they set aboidq it in the right mannor and receive official encouragement and help instead of, as too frequently, squashing, many men, although far from being geniuses,_ can attain to a high quality of leadership. The making of naval lenders is a necessity of the future ; and one of the first steps towards it is to get rid, in the higher ranks at least, of that rigid, for-niald-v which is so often the outcome of naval discipline. Leadership in the highest ranks of the senior service is perhaps even more essential to success than is tho ease in the Army. Admirals lead their fleets in person. Their subordinate leaders —semadron and flotilla. —are in close contact with them, often within visual distance, andi control directly their immediate commands. At sea. the movements aro so extraordinarily rapid, opportunities so fleeting, that success in a. naval battle may depend literally on a coup d’oe-il. In the Army it is now recognised that the efficiency of its platoon commanders will often, ho the measure of an army’s success. For the Navy it may be said that the quality of leadership shown by its squadron and' flotilla commanders will, other things being equal, decide the day. The development in promising young naval officers of the qualities necessary for higher leadership is therefore of paramount importance, and it is strange indeed that it has been lelt hitherto move or less to chance. If our Navy is to be relatively small, efficiency must, lie in inverse ratio. The highest moral, tho best material, the most scientific gunnery, the soundest of staff work—all these are of no avail unless the leadership is of the very highest quality.

The genesis of the modern .staff arose /•.lit. of an understanding that tho heaveubnrn genius would not invariably arrive with the hour. I’y means of a common doctrine held by all {he principals in a fighting service, it. was considered (hat. the potency of that service would be largely increased ; the studies of the staff being the means whereby that doctrine was formulated. it being disseminated 1 by their activities. This idea, has stood the test of successive wars, and is sound. Again, more uerhaps in a. navy than an army, tor the reasons given above, it is necessary to cap good stall work with tire best leadline. The staff to a. large extent forges the weapon for the leader to. wield, amt africis him in wielding it. At the same time the work done by the staff on the instructions of the command is largely preparatory. When Rattle is joined, the ultimate decision rests in the bands of the leaders, all of whom should be animated by the common doctrine, ready to act promptly with full force in the direction which their teaching ami instinct tolls them is correct; and, moreover, without waiting for orders to do so, if thereby an opportunity might be lost. Rigidity being apt to cause opportunities to be lost, elasticity should take its place.

Nelson’s part in the Battle of St. Vincent is so germane to the subject now mirier discussion that it may be recalled briefly. The, British fleet, under Sir John Jervis, in single line, was passing ahead of the, larger section of the divided Spanish, licet, at that time steering at right angles to the British. During the process the Spanish, who had been “ running free ” he., with the wind astern-—hauled to the wind, the effect being to throw the loading British ships astern of the Spanish licet, necessitating Sir John leading his licet round in succession to follow the Spaniards in order I<> get into action. Nelson v.’as third from (lie rear. Had lie been of the stereotype rigid class of naval officer ho would have stood on, in the wake of his nest ahead, until it cainc to his turn, to follow round astern of Sir John. Seeing, however, that the manceuvre, if carried out, would give the two sections of the Spanish licet an opportunity of eli'eetiug a junction. Nelson “ wore ship,” which meant hauling out of line and steering a course which, although directly away from his own licet, would 1 lay him athwart the direction in which the Spaniards were heading. He reasoned that his one shift against the. whole enemy’s fleet, would noil stand 1 much chance, but that in any taco before Captain was sunk she would l have delayed the main portion of the .Spanish fleet sufficiently to afford l time for Sir dolin' to arrive and finish the business. Nobly supported by Troubridge in Culloden, who followed his* example, Nelson accomplished' ins object.

But thirty-nine years of age, and not even a junior admiral, he had acted in direct opposition to the accepted practice and general instructions of the day. Disobedience? Perhaps; but as Sir John Jervis afterwards remarked, when o:no of Ids admirals complained that Nelson's action was unauthorised: “ It cor tain'ly was so. and. if ever you commit such a breach of your orders *1 will forgive you also.” Sir'.John Jervis, better known as Earl St. Vincent, used to say that the test of a man's courage is responsibility. Itaadiiioss to accept responsibility is the hallmark of an officer; while willingness_ to depute full latitude, within certain limits, to a trusted subordinate is the seal of the leader. That he possessed these *ivo attributes in the highest degree is perhaps the main reason for Nelson’s success. Even so. Ik bad to acquire knowledge by .study. True, bo was of the species of genius*; but emulatkin is open to all. I liven character and personality, without which leadership is impossible, many of Urn altiihutes of higher leadership may be acquired by historical study. Have wo not Napoleon’s authority for this? Although perhaps it would not,ho correct to say I hat great brain power is essential to higher leadership, yet an .aptitude for profound study is necessary. A coup d'oeii docs not arrive in a Hash; it arises out of eiib-conecionanets, that mental storehouse which should bo well filled with sound principles and 1 examples. But study is not, all ; there must be graduation'll! the. school of men, as it is the love homo by men for their leaders which enables military miracles if) be performed. Opportunity for testing theories by practice, too, must be ample. The next few years will afford time for that study which is the foundation of leadership. The danger lies in the fact that during profound peace there is always a tendency to rigid formalism. Some, indiscipline, it would acnm, must bo inherent in the potential leader. Can he ho recognised and the latent power bo fostered instead of extinguished by unimagijiative people? It would not seem unpoe-

sible, but our methods mustg be altered, and first of all an analysis of all tho ingredients of naval leadership must ho made, in order that it may bo recognised in its incipient, form. It only requires digging out from history, and now is tho time to do so. Even if all ca-nnot_ bo great leaders, there must ho no chaff mixed with the wheat in the highest ranks of our future X.q.'y. Email men may wreck great schemes; but a band of brothers can 1m irresistible.