The Evening Star TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1921. Force for Bormany.

Evening Star, Issue 17604, 8 March 1921, Page 4

The Evening Star TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1921.

Force for Bormany.

Db Vos* Simons has failed to amend his counter-proposals for reparation to the satisfaction of the Allies, and, according to an “ extraordinary” message, which reads like a retnrn of war times, Marshal Foch has ordered his troops to advance on Germany. Xbo idea that the Allies were bluffing when they threatened to bring force to bear if practically the full terms which they considered just and reasonable were not concsded must have strongly possessed the mind of the Berlin Government, because the latest answer of the German Foreign Minister shows him as still playing with tin question. His first proposals were ridiculously inadequate, and they have not jbeeu appreciably enlarged as the result of second thoughts. Germany, he states, is

| prepared to pay the annuities which have been fixed for the next five years, during which their amount does not rise above [ 150 million pounds, together with a levy of 12 per cent, on exports; but oven this agreement is dependent, it would seem, on the German retention of Upper Silesia, which, according to the Prussian census of 1910, contained only 884,000 Germans and 1,169,000 Poles, and on the abolition of certain restrictions on Germany’s trade, framed to protect her neighbors from dumping while the exchange value of the mark is abnormally low. The coal and other deposits of Upper Silesia were invaluable to Germany in war time. It has been said that without them she would have had to give up the light two years before she did, and it is most natural that she should dosiro to retain them now. But the Peace Treaty which was signed by Germany cannot bo torn up with the consent of the Allies because Germans dislike its terms, and the reparation conditions must bo treated seriously. It is too soon for Berlin to eay that compliance with them is beyond its powers before it has ipade the least attempt to carry them out; and at this stage no one outside of Germany will believe that they arc impracticable. It is not a new campaign to which the Allies must look forward if the “ extraordinary ” message reporting orders to advance into Germany proves a correct announcement. The country has been pretty completely disarmed, and the occupation of Duisburg, Kuhrort, and Dusaeldorf, which is all that has been threatened by the Allies, may be expected to be made without opposition. The command of those strategic points will enable the Allies to collect some rcpiiyations, in the form of Customs duties, for themselves, at the same time that the cost of occupation must la; added to the total bill. The worst feature of the use of force in Germany as an aid to collecting reparations is that it makes more reparations to collect. Yet a display of force is the only argument, apparently, which the German people can understand. There is no doubt that they have been behind their Government in the attitude it has adopted towards the demands. When Marshal Foch’s troops march through their streets again they will realise that the Allies are in earnest, and bring pressure, we can hopq, upon their Government of a different kind from that which they have used before. For the Germans hate these allied occupations. They regard them as the greatest humiliation. If allied troops had marched into Berlin before the armistice was concluded the Germans would have realised more completely that they had lost the war, and many later troubles might have been averted. As Pistol ate the leek when his head was cudgelled, so the Germans will pay their indemnities under pressure. They will swear and pay, as he swore and ate. When a different spirit is shown by them, and force is no longer required, their obligations for forty years to come may be lightened.