AMERICA'AND THE LEAGUE

Evening Star, Issue 17318, 5 April 1920, Page 6

AMERICA'AND THE LEAGUE

LORD ROBERT CECIL OX RESERVA, T lON'S. • XO BAR TO CO-OPERATIOB. Lord Robert Cecil discussed the Amerl* can reservations to the League of Nations at a meeting of the Historical Association s of Leeds University on January 2. He said the Senate were entitled to make clear their attitude to the League by means of reservations, but, on the other hand, we could not he expected to assent to these reservations, as that would involve r.n amendment of the treaty. Insisting on tljs aspect of the League of. Nations as an alliance, he 4aid the League was an alliance of sovereign and independent States coming together for the common purpose of preserving peace. He took it that many of the misunderstandings which had arisen with reference, to the League were rooted in this: that the pe< - pie had conceived of it as a super-Stai > rather than, an alliance. They knew, he continued, that the Sen ate of the United States were considerinj what attitude they should take with re* card to the League, and in particular whether or not they would attaciriTo their ratification of the League certain reservations. As he understood it, a reservation was nothing more than this; a public statement of the sense which the Government making the reservation proposed to attach to their reservation of the Treaty. Xo one could complain of a Government making such a public Statement if they desired to do so. Whether iu such a case as this it was necessary might be a matter of question, but, after all, it was a matter for each country 7 to judge, and as long as it was just a statement of what a Government desired to be understood by their actions, he did not himself see that any criticism could he made. NO ASSENT TO RESERVATION’S. It was quite a different thing if we were asked to assent to those reservations. He did not see how wo could do that. Some of the reservations now being discussed had an international bearing, and if we were aeked to assent to them we should, in effect, he asked to make an amendment of the Treaty. He had not the least doubt that the statesmen of the United States were considering very 7 carefully whether or not any 7 particular reservation was or was not a wise one to make. They would consider, no doubt, not only the effect the reservations might have on their own domestic attitude towards foreign policy, but also on world public opinion, for no country in the world, however powerful, could abstain from con-* sidering what would be the effect of any action they might take on world public opinion. It was obvious that they could conceive of reservations which, as. had been said, might cut the heart out of the Treaty 7 ; but he was very far from saying that any reservations that had been proposed in the L T nited States Senate and accepted by 7 a majority of the Senate were of that character, and lie should not think, therefore, of expressing an opinion as t6 whether they 7 were so vital, or any of them were so vital, that we could not accept co-operation on ’he terms of those reservations. THE NEEDS OF EUROPE. But he did want to say this. A reservation would have to be a very strong and vC very extreme one to justify 7 us I in refusing the co-operation of the United States, because the urgency of the European situation was so great that it would | be a tremendous responsibility to take to ‘ refuse the help of the' United States in * trying to bring order out of chaos in ‘ Europe on almost any terms. (Cheers.) 1 It would be the height of folly for us to conceal the fact that yve valued the assistance of America in the great task of recon--7 structing Europe very highly indeed. We ‘ wanted peace; we wanted the real security 1 for peace that could only he given to ' Euorpe by the assent of all the belligerent ‘ Powers to the treaty 7. We wanted the 7 League of Nations brought into existence without delay. (Cheers.) He was sure of this—that if the United States resolved to accept membership of the league, the Americans would do their ■ duty, as they did their duty during the J war. (Cheers.) We wanted, if we could ' have ‘it, the assent, not of one party in ’ America, but the assent of the whole of j America, and though he would infinitely ; prefer the unreserved adhesion of the j United States, he would accept personally the undivided assent, even if it were limited by certain reservations. J Regarding the suggestion that the Brij tish Empire had an unfair advantage over • the United States because the Empire had six votes in the Assembly to one pos- , sessed by the United States, Lord Roberts ' said there was an entire misunderstanding. ’ Article 10 of the Covenant, he explained, meant that no attempt must be made forcibly on territorial freedom or political integrity 7 . Changes might come by discusion and agreement only 7 . The constitution 3 of the council had been arranged so that ' the British colonies could express differ--5 ences, and not so that they would vote to ‘ the advantage of the British Empire. He I regretted the attitude of the Senate on ! this point, and said that the suggestion 1 of over-ruling America was a weapon tq ; create bad blood used by th'e enemies of

both.