"SPARE ME"

Evening Star, Issue 17234, 26 December 1919, Page 6

"SPARE ME"

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG CUTS A 60RB* FMJURB. GERMAN WAR INQUIRY. ' A dramatic Nemesis has come to tha author of that famous phrase "A Scrap or Paper." - '"Tho ex-German Chancellor, BethmannHollweg in his appearance and statements before tha Reichstag Committee of Inquiry into the facts of the war, was in striking contrast to Count Bernstorff, German Ambassador in the United States," says tho Berlin correspondent of tha 'Daily Telegraph.' "I BEG YOU TO SPARE ME." "The ex-Ambassador told a plain and apparently straightforward tale. He 'answered all the questions put to hiia tersely and promptly. Only on one or two occasions did he hesitate for a few seconds before bringing out his reply. The fifth Chancellor, on the other hand, began by reading a long written statement, full of reservations, qualifications, and alternatives, which left very few clear ideas in the rmnds of its hearers, and even cross-examination failed almost completely to elicit definite facte and opinions. Again and again Beth. Mann said that ho could not answer, that ho had forgotten, that he would have to refresh his memory, that he must consul* documents before committing himeelf, thai he would make a statement another day. Finally he made frank appeals to the pity of his inquisitors. ' I have already described my monstrously difficult position,* he «&. claimed. 'I must beg you to 6pare me from going into it again.' A BROKEN MAN. "The appeal was not without effect. The members of tho committee no doubt felt that it was cruel to drag from a broken man a confession of his own inadequacy, of that feebleness with which, instead of deciding tho lino of policy which it was his business and his duty to do, he allowed liimMlf to be pushed this way and thfcfc by men with stronger wills than his own, and to assume responsibility for actions ho disapproved of. A FRUITLESS STRUGGLE. "For that, at bottom, is the net purport of Bethmann's evidence to date. From tho beginning of the war he struggled feebly and fruitlessly against the military rulers of Germany, who in the long run always got their own way. The. interpellation by Or Oscar Cohn vividly illustrated the fifth. Chancellor's position. " Professor Hans Delbruck was prohibited by the Berlin Chief Command from publishing certain articles. He pointed out that they were written by agreement with Bethmann. To this objection the only answer he received -was 'so much tho worse for the Chancellor.' '" Bethmann explained his policy towards the United States by reasons which are not likely to satisfy anyone but himself. The dilemma was put to him in a very awkward way. He was asked how it was that, while Foreign Secretary Herr Zimmermann on November 26, 191 C, wrote to Washington that Germany would be 'extraordinarily glad' if President Wilson took a step in die direction of peace, ho himself, on tho following day, said in a note to Hindenburg 'We must come out with our peace offer.'

" His explanation of this was the theory of the desirability of having ' two irons in e lire, which he attempted to render more plausible" by suggesting that there was a

' procrastinating trait in. President Wilson's character,' and that it was impossible to count on the American peace move conning at a moment -when it suited •German policy. RUTHLESS SUBMARINING.

"With regard to ruthless submarining itself, he tried to shift the responsibility on to the Reichstag and public opinion, in which he said this form of warfare was very papular. But why was it popular? Professor Schuckiug asked witness whether he knew that even, purely scientific discussion_ of the League of Nations idea was forbidden by the censorship, and that its supporters were threatened with preventivft arrest and imprisonment. At first Bethmaim professed not to understand the pertinency of this question, but on being pressed he said he could give no definite reply, though lie added that the measures referred to wero not in accordance with his ideas. '.Chat was just it. Apparently a great deal, if not most, of what was dona in Germany during his days as War Chancellor was not in accordance with his ideas; but he continued, nevertheless, to cling to the post of the one responsible Minister, and he has no reason to be surprised if a good share of the blame for the resulting fiasco is placed on his shoulders. Bethmann-Holl-weg has to answer the question why he did not prevent measures of winch lie disapproved. The real interest of the inquirywill come when Ludendorff and Hindenburg are asked why they insisted up6n thoso measures in spite of the dissent and resistance of the civil authorities. THE MAKERS OP SUBMARINE WAR. " Heir Von Betlmiaim-Holhveg said that the Reichstag- supported tho Supreme Army Command, as did also the Kaiser, and that Marshal Yon Hindenburg and General Ludendorlf were the decisive factors in tha proclamation of the submarine war. A telegram from Marshal Von Hindenburg to the Government had demanded the ruthless utilisation of all war measures. 'On my refusal a sharply-worded telegram arrived from Marshal Von Hindenburg saying that the military situation demanded energetio action at sea. The decisive fact was "that the Supreme Army Command was resolved to take up the struggle -with. America also. Admiral Von Tirpitz advocated the immediate beginning of the submarine war. . . . 'After our indescribable collapse,' th(j ex-Chancellor continued, 'which was only possible because we have all sinned, I will not throw the blame on others, but I must state tho facts. lb must be declared that the majority of the German people and its lawful representatives desired the predominance of their military leaders.'"

'Vorvarbs,' ib<i organ of the Majority Socialists, says that everyone who does not deliberatly blindfold himself now sees that the tragic fate of Imperial Germany was an ineri'tefafe necessity, that it perished becnuso it must parish, and "its one-time, rulers now move about among us like shadows." It continues: "We, the people, still live, however, although we are still today threatened with destruction by an unprecedented peace. History has given U3 a cruel lesson, and only if we ara in a position to learn from it shall we l» ablo to become- a mature nation and to act politically ourselves." "I "WAS EXPOSED TO INFAMOUS CALUMNIES." "I do not want to throw the blame on others," declared Beshmann-Hollweg. "but I must state that when Hindenburg and Ludendorff were called to the head of ib» Supreme Army '-Command civilian Germany was convinced that the decision was to rest with them as to how tba war was to be conducted and terminated. It was an established fact that the Government had to yield to them. If, in order to avoid the impression of weakness, wo desired to makeour peace offer at tba moment when we wore militarily at the high-water mark, wo should have misae<J that moment if we had waited for President Wilson. When the decision regarding unrestricted submarine warfare was taken the German naw boasted it would bo able to compel England to bo ready to malco peace before the nasi harvest, li tho submarine war was begun by February 1, 1917, this demand of the Supremo Army Command was also the desire of an overwhelming majority of the nation, which had for the year past been convinced that the submarine war alone would lead Germany to victory. This belief was so deeply rooted that I, who did not share it, was exposed to the most infamous calumnies.' "