OUR GENERALS

Evening Star, Issue 17154, 22 September 1919, Page 9

OUR GENERALS

THEY FAILED TO THRILL. I In criticising British generals in the wax-, Mr Philip Gibbs, through the ‘New York Times,’ admits that for many years after this war, perhaps in every generation (that follows !the men who fought in it, there will be criticism and controversy about its gesieralship. Mud will be thrown—not in handfuls, but in bucket-loads—upon tho French and British generals, perhaps also upon American generals, by officers and men who believe that battalions were needlessly sacrificed in certain actions; that horrible blunders were made from time to time, and that victory might have been gained at less cost if the strategy and tactics of the High Command had been more scientific fui« quicker in understanding the enemy’s weakness or strength in certain places on certain days. Thera was a good deal to criticise justly enough, and there is no doubt that British generalship and Staff work made many mistakes, some of them no doubt unavoidable, because it is human to err, and some of them due to sheer, simple, regrettable stupidity, Mr Gibbs admits. But from tho point of view of personal character no body of men could bo more admirable as great gentlemen of the oldfashioned English type, which is a very good type, too, in its own way. They had the easy dignity of men who belonged to good English, Irish, and Scottish families, and Who, for the most part, had been dedicated from youth to the profession of arms, like their fathers and grandfathers, as a hereditary caste. Many of them had served in .India, Egpyt, and South Africa, and had gained distinction first of all in their young days by personal gallantry, and then by administrative talent or prestige in their own profession. The “ social pull ” had been abandoned during the South African war. and certainly in this war there were no society favorites in our High Command, owing their position to petticoat or aristocratic influence in exalted places. There was a certain amount of “clannishness,” however, of the cavalry command. Both French and Haig were cavalry men. In a war which depended Jess upon cavalry (as far as the western front was concerned) than any war in history-, this, perhaps, was unfortunate, though no (Joinmander-m-Chief needs deep technical knowledge of engineering, chemistry, and other subjects which enter largely into modern warfare, provided he has the greater quality of generalship, including personal magnetism as an influence over the imagination of his troops, rapidity and sureness of judgment, and the intuitive sense of action which belongs alone to genius. Physically, many of oiu generals were curiously alike. They were mexr turned fifty, with square jaws, tanned, ruddy faces, searching and rather stern grey eyes, closely cropped hair growing white, with a little white moustache, neatly trimmed on the upper lip. Mentally they had similar qualities. They had unfailing physical courage — though courage is not put to the tost much in modern generalship, which, above the rank of brigadier, works far from the actual line of battle, unless in “ slips ” in the wrong direction. They were stern disciplinarians, and tested the quality cf troops by their smartness in saluting and on parade, which did not account for the fighting merits of the Australians. Most of them were conservative by political tradition and hereditary instinct, and conservative also in military ideas and methods. They distrusted the brilliant fellow, and were inclined to think him unsafe : and they were not quick to allow young men to gain high command at the expense of their grey hair and experience. They wore industrious, able, conscientious men, never sparing themselves long hours of work for a life of ease, and because they were willing to sacrifice their own lives, if need be, for their country’s sake, they demanded equal willingness of sacrifice from every officer and man under their authority, having no mercy whatever for the slacker or the weakling.

It is unfortunate that among theso British generals there was not one whose personality had that mysterious but essential ; quality of great generalship—-inspiring-largo bodies of men with exalted enthusiasm, devotion, and faith. It did nut. seem to matter very much to the men whether an army commander, a corps commander, or a divisional commander stood in the roadside to watch them march past on their way to battle or on their way back. They 7 saw one of theso sturdy 7 men in his I “ brass hate,” with his ruddy- face and white, moustache, but no thrill passed down their ranks, no hoarse cheers broke from them because he was there, as when Wellington sat on his whit" horse in the Peninsular War, or as when Napoleon saluted his Old Guard, or even as when Lord Roberts (“Our Bobs”) came, perched like a little old falcon, on his big charger. During the retreat from Mens, Sir John French had a touch of personal power—his presence meant something to the men because of his reputation in South Africa; but afterward", when trench warfare began and the daily routine of slaughter under German gunfire, when our artillery was weak, and when our infantry was reduced to attach fixed positions of terrible strength, without adequate support and not a dog’s chailce of lm-k against such odds, the prestige of the Oommander-in-Chiof faded from men’s minds, and he lost place in their admiration. It was washed out in blood and mud.

Sir Douglas Haig, who followed French, had the disadvantage, of inheriting the disillusionment of armies who saw now that war on the western front was to be a long and protracted struggle, with enormous slaughter, and no visible sign of the end beyond a vista of dreadful years. Sir Douglas Haig, in his general headquarters at St. Omer, and afterwards at Montreuil, near the coast, had the affection and loyalty of the Staff officers, A man of icmarkably good locks, with fine delicate features strengthened by the firm line of his jaw, and' of singular sweetness, courtesy, and simplicity in his manner toward a.\l who approach him, he had qualities which might have raised him to the supreme height of personal influence among his armies hut for one defect in his character and the tragic condition of his command

He was intensely shy and reserved, shrinking from publicity in an almost morbid way, and lidding himself aloof from the human side of war. lie was constitutionally unable to make a dramatic gesture before a multitude or to say easy, stirring things to officers and men whom he reviewed. His shyness and reserve prevented him also, I think, from knowing as much as he ought to have known about the opinions of officers and men and gelling Aired information from them. There were times when the sense ol bitterness became intense to the point of fury, so that a young Staff officer, in Ida red' tabs, with a jaunty manner, was like a. red rag to a bull among battalion officers and men, and thev desired his death exceedingly, exalting his little personality, dressed in a well-cut tunic and fawncolored riding breeches and highly-polished top boots, into the supreme folly of “ the Staff” which made men attack impossible, positions, sunt down conflicting orders, issued a litter of documents —called by an ugly name—containing impracticable instructions, to the torment of the adjutants and to the scorn of troops. This prejudice against the Staff was stacked liigh by the tiros of passion and despair. A good deal of it was utterly unjust, and even the jaunty, young Staff officer with red tabs and polished boots was often not quite such, a fool as he looked, but a gallant fellow, who had proved his pluck in the early days of the war, and was now doing his duty—about equal to the work of a boy clerk—with real industry and an exaggerated sense of its importance. Personally and with utter honesty X i can pay a high tribute to many of our Staff officers nit divisional, corps, and army headquarters, because of their industry, efficiency, and devotion to duty. And during the progress of battle I have seen them, hundreds of times, working desperately for long hours without much rest or sleep, so that the fighting men should get their food and munitions, so that the artillery should support their action, and the troops in reserve move up ( to their relief at kina proper time and Dkflfc

All lire administrative side of our war was quite marvellous in its method and organisation, and the mimes were- worked like clockwork machines, Tho transport was good beyond all words of praise, and there was one t-liing which never failed to reach poor old Tommy Atkins unless he was cut off by shellfire, and that was his food. Tho motor supply columns and ammunition dumps were organised to the last item of efficiency. Our map diprrtmorot was magnificent, and tho admiration of the French. Our intelligence branch was, as a rule, excellent, and often almost uncanny in tho accuracy of its information about the enemy’s disposition and plans’. So that the Staff was not altogether hopeless in its effect, as the young battalion officers, with sharp tongues and a sense of injustice in their hearts, made out, with pardonable blasphemy, in their dugouts. In the early days the outstanding fault of cnir generals, it .scorns to me, was their desire te gain ground which was utterly worthless when, gained. They organised small attacks lagaiiust strong positions, dreadfully costly to take, and after the desperate valor- of men had seized a tew yards of mangled earth, found that they bad made another small salient, jutting out from their front in a Y-shaped wedge, so that, it was a death trap for the men who had to’ hold it. This was done again and again, and I remember one distinguished officer saying, with bitter irony, miwanheriiiig how many of his men had died, “Our generals mrist have their little V.s at any price, to justify themselves at G.H.G.”

In tiro days of trench warfare, when the enemy artillery was much stronger than ours and when his infantry strength wag enormously greater, our generals insisted upon tie British, troops adopting an aggressive attitude, with the result that they were shot to pieces, instead of adopting, like the French, a quiet and waiting attitude until the time came for a sharp and terrible blow The battles of Neuvo ClrapeUo and Loos, in 1915, coat us thousands of casualties, and gave us no gain of any account ; and v bath generalship and staff work were, in the opinion of most officers who know anything of those buttles, grievously at fault. Alter all, our generals had to learn their lessons, like the private soldier anti the young Staff officer, in conditions of warfare which had never been seen before —and it was bad for the private soldi eland the young battalion officer, who died so that tliey might learn. As time went on staff work improved, and the British generalship was less rash in optimism and less rigid in ideas. I am certain from what I know of war that tiro .gemeralshp and staff work of tho Second Ainry, commanded by (jeneral Sir Herbert l-Mumer, was us near perfection as any human organisation may be, and all British officers who served in that army will agree, Sir Herbert IMuraer did. 1 think, more nearly approach the position of a lender of men by personality than any other commander 1 can mention l , except, perhaps, General Birdwood— known to Ail his men as "Birdie,” because of his dapper figure—who commanded tiro Australian Corps. Flumer's old Lull-dor face and bin eyes were known to his men, and they liked him and had faith iu him, chiefly because he was anxious for their com fort and never “let them down” in al the spade work that must be done t ensure success in battle. lire battle o:, Wytschaete and Messiaen-, on June 1917, was the most perfectly organise*, battle of which 1 know anything, am was a great and complete, victory owing entirely to preliminary prepara tions of all details. Sir Herbert Plume had the advantage of being advised by ; Chief of Staff who had real genius, and was, in my humble opinion, the oi • sustaining brain of the British armic in tho fields, though unknown to papula fame. This was -Sir John. Harrington who had a brain like a sharp swore an immense grasp of detail, and a fir nobility of character which wag like flame of burning endeavor. The effect of such staff work was up parent throughout the army', and the: was very little of that hostility bet woe: battalion officers and the staff which wa violent in expression, elsewhere on th front.

Unfortunately, by tragic irony, the Staf: of the Second” Array had to'direct it: energy to the organisation of the serie of battles in Flanders during 1917 i; co-operation with the Fifth Army, under General Gough, on its left. And owiiv to the state of the ground, mangled into chaos by artillery, with hundreds oi brooks overflowing their broken banks and with incessant rain for five mouths those attacks were murderous of our men. And there was the most horrible mess of blood and mud on the way from Vnre to Pusschendaelc which has ever - been scon in the history of war. The enemy were slaughtered in immense numbers, and the battles of .Flanders were part of the frightful process of breaking the German spirit, but the cost to the youth of the British Empire was appalling. Mr Gibbs acknowledges that the Second Army organised each battle with masterly attention to detail—startling in its contrast to the handling of other troops—but it was an organisation of martyrdom to English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian _ boys, who suffered 800,000 casualties in tliat black year of 1917. "