THE ROUND-UP

Evening Star, Issue 16847, 24 September 1918, Page 6

THE ROUND-UP

ALLENBY’S NET CLOSES. TURKS IN DEADLY PERIL. ’ , A BIG BAG. MACEDONIA, [By CaiTicus.] It was not so very long ago that the writer, replying to a.n enthusiastic correspondent who confidently hold that this war uouid bo decided upon the Plain of Armageddon, pointed out that those who held that belief might soon anticipate an interesting time waiting for the brakes to bo applied and watching for tho collapse of the struggle as wo approached- the famous battleground-. This interesting timo is upon us now, and tho faith of enthusiastic believers should soon bo tested. Our troops have swept in triumph over Armageddon, which is identical with the Plain of Esdraelon, or Jezreel, lying in th© western angle formed bv the junction of tho Hadfa-BcLsan Railway, with the railway running south. Not only have our troops crossed the fatal plain, but General Allenby’s victory is 'likely, to wove a •veritable Armageddon for the Turkish armv in Palestine. The latest news, contained in an official message from fine High Commissioner, is that the passages over t*bo Jordan, wtuv, on Sun-clay, Lli-at-the 'Seventh and Eighth Turkish armies have ceased to exist, and that 25,000 wisoners and 260 guns have already been counted. This means that tho main body of tho Turkish Palestine army is in _ imminent peril of being completely wiped out, and that little short of a miracle will bo required to save it.. A. later cable re - ports that 40.QC0 Turks are in tho net. _ The position now is that our cavalry in the north have crossed the Jordan, and occupied J isr- e1 - Mejanric, on the eastern bank, nine, miles sou lie of the Sea of Galileo. ’This plac© R where tho railway to Damascus crosses tho river, lo the northeast tho Arabs arc. raiding and destroying bridges along the valley of the 5: arnruk, otherwise known as tho Pl l ci id t-cI -Moi)adirah along which the Damascus Railway runs. Further south mu- troops, advancing up (ho Jordan Valiev with the object of cutting off the retreat of tlie Juris across the river, appear to have reached and occupied Jisr-cd-Dannoh. an important ferry over the Jordan, about 20 miles south-east of Nablus, and perhaps 30 miles south of Behan. Thus tho Turks are surrounded on practically ©verv ride, and, though there is still a possibility that they may succeed in Kilting across tho river between Jisr-cvd-Damieh and Bofsnn, their chances aro not very bright, and diminish hourly. _ rl

’ AS THE ENEMY SEE IT. Let us look at the situation as the enemy see it. Who commands ibis Turkish army vvi.th.LiT ChiiVAra-I A-llonby's net. 13 not* ol tecta'. Lruiiti-raA Ivhnan \ on tho L*ci’niait loader who commanded tho Turks on Gallipoli, is mentioned as holding tho chief command; but be is reported to have bolted from Nazareth, when he heard that j the British had crossefft the Iskau- ■ ueniiii, and. entered tho Plain oi • Esdraelon. Most likely he would | wend his way northward m tho direction I of home ami safety rather than plunge , into danger in a desperate attempt to save tho Turks from disaster. Whoever the Turkish loader immediately responsible nra-v bo, he tacos a critical situation with demoralised troops, greatly reduced iiu-n-lv.-.i-a, and a cc-nsidenable part oi his artillery already lost. Before him. to the north, is a powerful screen of British cavalry. Behind him hi hot .pursuit is tho main body of British infantry already well to the north of Nablus. To the oast ' lies the Jordan, tho passages across which are already closed except for a stretch of ■ 30 miles between Jisr-o!-Mejamio and Jisri cd-Damieh. and this gap will be rapidly | cloving. Tho only two courses open to tho Turkish leader are n,n attempt to break through the British cavalry screen to -the north, or an attempt to cress the Jordan to tho cast, and then force his way northeastward towards Damascus. Ho has not an hour to lose in h-ritation, and must make a. promot decision between them. THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE. Should ihc- decide on the first alternative he must gather his forces into as compact' a body aa possible, march due north as hard as his wearied troops can travel, and strike at our cavalry screen as hard as ho can, endeavoring to break through regardless of cost. But then lbs weakness will begin to appear, Ifis jaded infuntiy will have little heart left in thorn. The screen through which he proposes to break consists of cavalry, and cavalry can always outmarch infantry, especially tired infantry. It will be the policy of our leaders to fight harassing and delaying actions until our pursuing infantry can close on th© Turkish, rp.ii-. In the old days In South Africa, when the mounted Boers fought the unmounted natives, a common feature■ of Boor tactics was to allow the natives to charge to comparatively close quarters, shooting them down as they Came, then mount their ponies, gallop some distance away, and flion dismount and repeat the process. A tactical method closely ana logons with this will no doubt be follower! by our cavalry leaders. They will make their screen elastic and yielding, but unbreakable. They will thus delay tho enemy until our pursuing infantry can take the Turks in -rear, and then pass from defensive and delaying tactics to a vigorous offensive. Our infantry to the west of tho railway are marching parallel with the retreating Turks to tho east of this line, and, if the enemy’s march is effectively retarded by our cavalry, can close on their left flank, as well as on their roar. The only complication likely to embarrass us is the arrival of powerful Turkish reinforcements from the north ; but that is unlikely. It is not probable that the Turks have large reserves close at hand, and General Allenbv’s dispositions provide for any attempted interference by bodies of moderate dimensions. It is to guard against, such an eventuality that part of our cavalry has pushed on to Nazareth .and another part has pushed north-east across the Jordan at Jisr-cl-Mejnrrne. A later cable reports that our cava!- are approaching Kefr Kanna and RefFarieh, a. few miles north of Nazareth, and have beaten off an 'attack from the direction of Haifa, on the coast. THE JORDAN ROUTE. On tho whole, it is probable that tho enomv's most promising line is the attempt to cross the Jordan and escape north-east-ward. Thov will almost certainly have considerable ‘bodies of troops on the eastern bank, which wore posted there before tho opening of General Allonhy s offensive to guard against an attack across tho Jordan. These, marching northward, can co-operate in the crossing of tho harassed Turks from the western bank if skilfully and energetically handled. But tho gap still open is by no moans a wide one, and every move of'the Turks will he promptly notified to tho British leaders by our aeroplanes, which are closely pursuing the enemy everywhere along the valleys, and pouring machine-gun fire into tne iniantry If word comes that the Turks aro maidng for the Jordan, the greater part of the British forces will at once change direction. The infantry now marcning northward wort of tlie railway wi 1 swing eastward towards the Jordan on the. heels of "the Turks. The infantry inarching up the Jordan Valley may cross the nver and march up the eastern bank if the Turks on that side are not too strong. Our cavalry to the north will probably strike eastward and cross the river to cut the enemy’s line of retreat towards Damascus. This will bo tbs decisive movement Our cavalry should easily outmarch the retreating Turkish infantry, and all will depend upon whether or not they are strong enough to dispute the passage. Tho Arabs are already cutting tho bridges eastward of the Jordan, but their strength is an unknown quantity, and they are rather an uncertain factor in a pitched battle. Still unless the Turks on the eastern bank arc very strong, our cavalry should bo able to "intercept the enemy and delay them sufficiently to enable our pui-usuing infan-

try to close, with them. So the prospects of tho Turks are gloomy, and General Allonby has a splendid chance to render hia victory overwhelming and complete. SUCCESS IN MACEDONIA. Good progress k still being made in Macedonia and a French communique states that the enemy are destroying material wholesale, and burning stations, munition depots, and aviation paries at Grodslco and in the region of the Yaxda-r and Doiran. This is explained by the advance of the French and Serbian? on tbs left centre. They have advanced north of Kavardar towards Necotin, near tho Vardar and the Salonika-Uskub railway, which runs np the Yardar Yalloy, Kavardar is only about eight miles from Kcgotin, so a report that tho railway has been cut is by no means improbable. This would bring tho Allies right on tho’rear of tho enemy forces confronting tho British and Greek troops in tho Yardar Yalloy, near Lake Doiran, and compel them to fa'i back north-eastward towards the Stramitza. Yalloy. Grodsko is just to tho north of tho junction of tho C'erna with tho Vardar, and is threatened by the French and Serbian advance.

The Allies have now passed a line well to the north of Prilep, and this explains ; a statement that the enemy are retreating i all along the line of the Coma, By crossing the Clem a from the neighborhood of ; Ka.varda tho French and Serbians can strike the Yeles-Prilep road on tho western bank and march down it upon Prilc-p. : This, in conjunction with the advance from i Oenia bend and across the Oerna ! Plains, renders tho early fail of that place almost certain. This will put us in control of tho chief road centre in Macedonia. The enemy must fall back upon tho Babouna Range, but their whole lino west of the Yardar and thoir position in Southern Albania is seriously threatened. A USEFUL MAP. Messrs J. Wilkie and Co. baro been kind enough to send me a- specimen- of their latest map of the western front, showing tiro Hmdenburg line, the line marking the maximum advance made by tiro Gormans this year, and various other i details of interest. It is on a large scale, ; divided into 10-rhilo squares, and altogether makes a most useful map for the - general public.