THE CERNA

Evening Star, Issue 16845, 21 September 1918, Page 9

THE CERNA

RAPID ALLIED ADVANCE. POSITION EXPLAINED. COMING DEVELOPMENTS. BAKU. [Bj Cbjticus.] Things axa comparatively quiet _ on the ■western front, save for loci offensives and counter-offensives, whereas most interesting developments are reported xrora the Balkans. For that reason it will bo advisable to look into Balkan affairs and sketch out possible developments. Tho Serbians claim to have made an advance of 12 miles, breaking the resistance of tho Bulgarians, and defeating both Bulgarian and Goman reinforcements which had been rushed up to stop the rot. Unfortunately, the Serbian communique does not state on what particular sector the 12-niile advance ha-s been made, or where it is to be measured from. Moreover, meat of the villages mentioned iu the communique cannot be identified. But an unofficial message from London states that the Serbians have reached the Cerna Plains, and that Serbian cavalry aro advancing on Prilep. The Cerna Plains lie north-east of Monastir, between that placo and Prilep, over 20

miles to the north-east, and Jf Prilep is taken the strategical situation in the Balkans will bo profoundly modified to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the enemy. Counter-attacks on the extreme kit, m the Koziac region, at the northern end of Lake Prosha, were repulsed; while on the extreme right the Serbian claim to the occupation of Vitolishte gives a clue to the position This will be better understood, however, by first referring to the map published today. The map, It may be mentioned, was published in the ‘ Star ’ before the Allies over took the offensive in the Ba limns in strength. It was designed to show the genera! lines of advance which an allied offensive in the Balkans must follow, and it is noteworthy that every allied offensive vet delivered there has followed these lines. Hie present offensive is no exception. This has followed necessarily from the peculiar character of the country Northward of Salonika, the Allies arc fared ■with natural barriers of rugged mountains, forming defensive positions of immense strength lying scparely across their lino of advance nortnwa-rd. To carry these positions successively by frontal attacks would be a terribly difficult and costly business. But further west, from the neighborhood of Monastir, tho genera! trend of the hill range is towards the north-east, with river valleys between them ; and the Allies, advancing up these valleys, tend to swing round noon the Vardar Eiver, and turn all the enemy’s positions to the eastward successively. THE CERNA LINE. All this is clearly brought oat by the map. The reader will notice that there are four arrow’s in the map. For the present the two arrows eastward of the Vardar River may bo ignored, as they are indications of future developments, and attention may be concentrated on the two arrows in the neighborhood of the Cema River. This raver, and the ridges along its banks, are the dominant features of the ! military situation at the moment. The \ uoper 'reaches of the river, to the north I ol Monastir, flowthrough the CernaPlains, and then, bending round the southern end of the rugged ridge of hills called the Selechks Dagh. the Cerna flows northeastward to the Vardar River. By thoir advance in the Cerna Plains the Serbians threaten Prilep. the great road centre of j this region. They are probably not more 1 than 10 miles from the town, and if they ; capture it they .seriously impair ihej fflnemy’s communications with their west- i am B'alkan fronts, particularly in Southern \ Albania. The enemy would still be able i to communicate with Southern Albania I through Dibra, on the Black Drin, about . SC miles west of Prilep; but if Prilep falls I there will probably bo a combined allied I advance upon Elbasan through Southern I Albania, and through Struga, at the north- j em end of Lake Ochrida, which should I speedily compel the enemy to fall back to ! toe north. _ j In addition to their advance along the j Bjpper reaches of the Cerna through the j Cerna Plains towards Prilep, tho Serbians | are advancing down the river south-east-wards towards the Tardar. Their position there is located by their announcement of the capture of vitolishte, on the northern bank of the Cerna, almost level with Prilep, and about 18 miles to the east of that town. It is only about 15 miles from Krivolak, on tho Vardar, to the north-east. If Krivolak is captured, the formidable defile of Demir Kapu, I which lies less than 10 miles to tho southeastward, will be turned. This defile is a rocky gorge several miles long, at tho bottom of which flows the Vardar River, while through it also, winding along on narrow ledges of rock, runs the railway from Salonika, through Uskub to Belgrade. This railway is the main artery of communication for the Allies in the Balkans, and if the enemy can be hustled out of the Demir Kapu defile without seriously damaging the rocky ledges along which it runs, the Allies will have scorea heavily. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT'S. There is little likelihood cf really decisive results in the Balkans this year. The Austrians, having, as it seems, abandoned all offensive proposals against Italy, will be in a position to strongly reinforce the Balkan front. Still, this is no reason why we should not go as far as wo can, and it may be possible to seize excellent positions for an advance next year. Our strategy in its general outlines may be grasped by imagining the allied left wing advancing northward and swinging round upon the Vardar River. Just to the north of Prilep is the Babouna Pass, a long defile running through the Babouna Range, which forms a formidable barrier across our line of advance. If this barrier can be carried or turned we can push on towards Uskub, on the Vardar at the point where the railway bifurcates towards Nish and Mitrovitza." Once there, we should line the Vardar on a front of 100 miles, and then tho significance of those

arrows in the map to the east of that river would become apparent. Nothing could prevent ua from crossing the Vardar, and we should be able to march in an easterly and north-easterly direction up the valiovs of all those rivers running into the Vardar from the eastward. AD tho formidable mountain barriers would bo turned. Wo should have an abundance of room to manceuvre, and abundant opportunity to spring tactical and strategical surprises on the enemy by feinting in one direction and then advancing in another. If the Germans and Austrians are kept fuly occupied in the west next summer, as they almost certainly will bo, Bulgaria mav find the dav of retribution for past treachery at hand. A later cable announces “that the British and Greek troops are taking tho offensive in the Vardar Valley, near Lake Do Iran, and have already captured the enemy’s trenches, with many prisoners. BAKU ABANDONED. The abandonment of Baku by our forces is a disapopintment, though not a very serious one, except that it is feared that the North Staffords, Worcesters, and Warwickshire's lost heavily. Its retention was dependent upon. our receiving really vigorous aid from tho Armenians; but those _ people are obviously unorganised, and their forces exhibited tho peculiarities common to irregular forces the world over. They wanted to go home, and they hankered after peace with tho Turks. They were detected negotiating for a separata peace, and the guns had to bo trained on tho Armenian quarter. As the town could only have been held with difficulty even had the Armenians yielded the fullest co-oporation, it became obviously necessary to abandon the place. We had readied it. from Enzeli,

200 miles to the south, a port on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. Our troops were conveyed across the Caspian in Russian vessels. Presumably our retreat is being effected by the same route, though this is by no means certain. A summary of the position from London mentions that the Turks recently made an advance from Tabriz as far as Jemarubad, and our watching detachment retired. Tie latter place cannot be located ; but Tabriz is in tho extreme north-west comer of Persia, about 180 miles from Enzeli. It is not improbable that the Turkish move may bo an advance upon Enzeli to intercept our retirement. But why retire that way at all? One object of our advance to Baku _was to interpose between the enemy and India, and thus put a stop to intrigues by them along the Indian border. Just across the Caspian from Baku is Krasnovodsk, at the head of the- railway running from the Caspian to the borders of Afghanistan. Our forres may possibly retire to that place and seize the railway. During the third week of August the news came of tho occupation by the British of Meshed, in the north-eastern corner of i Persia, near the Afghan border, and only about 80 miles south of tho Trans-Caspian Railway. If this force advances on the railway while the Baku force lands at Kransnovodsk they may form a junction and control the railway.