ARCHANGEL

Evening Star, Issue 16837, 12 September 1918, Page 6

ARCHANGEL

AND THE MOSCOW LINE. THE ICE ROAD. EASTERN SIBERIA. WESTERN SPECULATIONS. [By Caixicus.] It is a gloomy picture that the war correspondents paint of the condition of things in Russia—anarchy, a reign of terror, and starvation everywhere. To crown the edifice of folly which the Bolsheviks have been guilty of erecting, they are now openly at war with Russia's friends, and making common cause with Russia's enemies. The one redeeming feature of the situation is that events are rapidly hastening towards the complete overthrow of the Bolshevik regime, and the open hostility of the Bolsheviks towards the Allies frees our hands. As the Bolsheviks are allied with the Germans there can be no valid reason why the Allies should hesitate to wage war against them and make common cause with those Russian parties who are hostile to the Bolshevik Government. This probably accounts for the allied occupation of Oberzerskaya, 75 miles south of Archangel and rather more than 500 miles from Moscow. The question arises whether we are going to advance upon Russia's ancient capital. South of Archangel the country for hundreds of miles is desolate and sterile, and nothing is to be gained by occupying it except as a preliminary to an advance . upon Moscow. Yet the project of an advance upon Moscow during the winter months opens up great problems. Archangel, the only sea base linked up directly with Moscow by rail, is frozen over from October to June, so it will be accessible to the allied transports only for another five or six weeks at the outside. Can we risk an advance under such circumstances? Why was the ArchangelMoscow line of advance chosen instead of the Ekateriua-Petrograd line, seeing that the latter lias an ice-free port, accessible all the year round, and a double-tracked railway? The answer to the last question is that there are two main reasons which have probably dictated the choice of the Archangel-Moscow route. One is that it is far les3 exposed to a German attack than the Ekaterina-Petrograd route, and the other that there is every prospect of our being able to link up with the Czechoslovaks and the Japanese from Siberia by the routo of the Volga via Jaroslav, which stands on the banks of the Volga and the Archangel-Moscow railway as well. The Ekaterina-Petrograd route has the disadvantage that it is open to attack by the Germans through Northern Finland, and offers no immediate prospect of linking up with our Allies from the East. It is a question whether the advantages of the Archangel-Moscow route outweigh the disadvantage that Archangel is frozen over during sis months of the year, and whether this apparently fatal handicap can be overcome. OVER THE ICE. As the Allies are advancing south from Archangel, in spite of the fact that they well know that their base must be frozen over in a few weeks' time, it would appear to be a legitimate inference that they have some card up their sleeve, and that they are confident of being able to overcome the difficulty. What will the method be? The most obvious solution which presents itself is that they propose to take advantage of the freezing over of the White Sea and organise a transport system across the ice. Archangel itself stands on the eastern shore of the White Sea, which projects southward between the EkaterinaPetrograd and Archangel-Moscow railway lines to a distance of 200 miles from Ekaterina at Onega, at the head of the Gulf of Onega, nearly 100 miles south-west of Arc-hansel. On'the western shore of the Gulf of Onega, about 100 miles from Archangel, stands the port of Kern, which has been occupied by the Allies, and through which passes the Ekaterina-Petrograd Railway. The White Sea is usually frozen over from the beginning of September until the end of May, ho it is probably in process of freezing over now. What -is to prevent the Allies from using Ekaterina Harbor as their base, and establishing a transport service over the ice across the White Sea to Archangel or Onega? Supplies could be railed to Kem, nearly oU) miles south of Ekaterina. From Kem to Onega is about 125 miles, and it so happens that the Onega River passes quite close to the Archangel- oscow Railway, at a distance of about 100 miles from the head of the Gulf of Onega. Wlien the river is frozen over it will make a natural highway for sledges, and supplies could bo carried right across the White Sea and up the river from Kem to the allied line of communication with Moscow upon a fine roadwav of ice. Possibly this is the solution of the allied problem of bases and communications. The distance between the two railway lines along the southern shore of the White Sea is 2CO miles, and, in view of the wild and swampy character of the country, it is dor... inl if the construction of a light railway between them is practicable within a reasonable length of time. PROGRESS IX THE EAST. Tientsin reports that a big fight has occurred at Lake Khanka, 100 miles northeast of Vladivostock, and a short distance to the eastern side of the VladivostockKharbarovsk Railway. If this is true, it throws considerable doubt upon the previously reported capture of Kharbajovsk by the Allies. This place is on the Amur River, 300 miles north of Lake Khanka, and it is very irnnrobable that the Allies would advance so great a distance while leaving a hostile force right on the flank of their line of communication. The Japanese, it is true, occupied Nieholaievsk, at the mouth of the Amur River, about the middle of last month.. and there is a possibility that they may have pushed up that river to Kharbarovsk in steamers; but the Amur will soon be frozen over, and will remain frozen over for six months, so it cannot be relied upon as a line of communication. The Tientsin cable states that in the battle of Lake Khanka "the Magyar casualties were 4,200." The Magyars are the ruling race in Hunpary, and must not be confounded with the Czecho-vSlovaks. Being the ruling race, they are loyal to the Central Powers and hostile to the Allies; whereas it is because the Czechoslovaks are a subject race that thoy are fighting for us. There is a report that the Czecho-Slovaks and Japanese are near Chita, 1,000 miles west of Vladivostock. It is from a point a littlo to the east of Chita that the branch line leaves the Trans-Siberian Railway for the Amur, and when that town is occupied by the Allies the communications of the enemy forces on the Amur will be cut. Washington states that official despatches from Irkutsk say that Samara is reported to have been captured by the Bolsheviks. As that town stands at the point where the Trans-Siberian line crosses the Volga, its capture by the Bolsheviks would imply that the Czecho-Slovak front along tho Volga had been cut in two. Fortunately, however, the report is not definite. .SPECULATION IN THE WEST. Speculation is rife as to the noxt move of Marshal Foch on the west front. Doubt is expressed in some quarters as to whether ho will attempt to carry the Hindenburg line by a direct frontal attack, auu mcio are hints of an attack in the Champagne, to the east of Rheims, or even east of Verdun. An attack "in the Champagne would represent an attempt to roll up the Hindenburg line from the south, and would probably be a better move than a frontal attack, especially as a successful thrust in that quarter would bring the Allies comparatively close to the Briey Valley and its iron supplies, and might even lead to its capture. But an offensive in the Champagne has the disadvantage that it leaves the enemy the inner line. An attack east of Verdun might mean a thrust across the Lorraine border or into Alsace. The former thrust would bo the most immediate threat to the enemy's \ vitals, but the latter -would have, the great-

est chance of success, both because the Alsace front is almost certain to be more thinly held, and because it is farther away from the enemy's reserves. We have the inner line Micro, and to reinforce it the enemy would have to bring their men and guns right round the angle of the southern salient. Once across the Rhine, we should threaten the heart of Germany, and have the enemy, strategically' speaking, on the hip. They would have to defend two widely separated and vital points against the Allies holding the inner line with greatly superior forces. There is another reason why a fooling across the Rhine would be of immense value. Much indignation is being expressed at the wanton destruction of towns, villages, and historic buildings in the evacuated territory, and there are demands for retaliation. Once across the Rhino, we should have a large number of populous and historic German towns under our guns, and we should then be able to argue this point with the enemy to some effect. There is not a great deal of change in the situation. The French have advanced between the Somme and the Oise, occupied Hinacourt, three miles west of the Hindenburg line at Moy, and progressed beyond that place. Fighting is reported on the lino of tho St. Quentm-La Fere road, and as this runs only a mile to the west of Moy, the French are evidently in close touch "with the Hindenburg line at that point. North of Hinacourt the enemy are resisting on the line Hinaeourt-Essigny-le-Grand, the latter village, a couple of miles from the • Hindenburg line, being still in the enemy's hands; but the French arc closing upon it. The weather is stormy and the country deep in mud.