STORY OF THE IRISH-AMERICAN PLOTTINGS

Evening Star, Issue 16822, 26 August 1918, Page 2

STORY OF THE IRISH-AMERICAN PLOTTINGS

U BOATS AND SHIPMENT OF ARMS.

A PRECIOUS BIT OF HUN SCHEMING.

£This article appeared in our first edition on Saturday.]

On May 24 the Press Bureau issued a rtatement on the recent arrest of Sinn Fein leaders, which sets forth that plans for a second rising in Ireland, in connection with the present German offensive on the western front, were maturing, and a new shipment of arms from Germany was imminent. To avoid useless bloodshed the statement concludes, there was no other course for the Government hut to **intern" the authors and abettors of the intrigue. The statement deals with negotiations between Irishmen and the German Government, both before and siace the rising of Easter, 1916, chiefly through Count Bernstorff previous to America's entry into the war. A full disclosure of the facts and documents in the Government's possession bearing on reCent developments is withheld as being against the" public interest; but it is stated that about April last it was definitely ascertained that a plan for landing aims m Ireland was ripe for execution, and reference is made to the arrest of a German asent landed from a submarine on April" 12, and to other U boat operations. The Prime Minister, in a speech at Edinburgh, declared that no taunts would drive the Government to publish evidence sivin" awav their sources of information. The evidence, which he had read, could leave no doubt as to the duty of the Irish Government, The Nationalist leaders •were not even cognisant of the conspiracy. The rising appeared to have been fixed for the moment when the German attempt to crush the British Army in France would have reached its culminating point. Below is the Press Bureau statement in full:—

The revolutionary movement in Ireland, which culminated in tho arrest of a considerable number of persons last week. consisted of two closely related series of activities—(a) The attempts of the German Government to foment rebellion in Ireland, and (b) The preparations made in Ireland to put those attempts into action. The story of the active connection between the leadera of the Sinn Fein movement and the Germans, as disclosed by documents la the possession of the British Government, falls into two parts—tho period prior to and the period since the abortive Irish rebellion of 1916. The events of the first period can be told with some detail, but the second period, which concerns recent events, permits of no more than a graaniary, as a full statement of the facts and documents in possession of tj*f» Government would disclose the names oi persons who stood by the Government ana also the channels of communication through which the German Government were acting, and which it would not be in the public interest to reveal at present. L—BEFORE THE 1916 RISING. Tho story begins as early in the war as November "6, i 914, when'Herr Zimmarmann transmitted through Count Bernstorff a message from Casement asking that S. messenger, if possible a native-born American, be sent to Ireland with the word that everything was favorable. He ■eras to earrv no letter for fear of arrest. Casement also asked that an Irish priest should be sent to Germany with the assistance of the German Legation in Norway to work in prison camps and corrupt Irish prisoners of war. This priest was a certain Father John T. Nicholson, an American citizen of Irish birth. He reached Germam' safely, and we find him in January, 1915, transmitting messages to America. According to a report ci" Captain Von Papon, dated December 5, 1914, the verbal* assurances sent ; n response to Casement's rerraest had produced an excellent impression in Ireland. ARMS AND WIRELESS. In the beginning of 1916 the plot ripened. On February 10 of that year Count Bernstorff sent to a covering address in Rotterdam a despatch signed with the name of Skal, one of his principal American agents. This despatch included an extract from a report of John Devoy, the head of the Clan-na-Gael, to the effect that action in Ireland could not be postponed must longer, since he feared the arrest of the lenders. It had been decided, he said, to begin action on Easter Saturday, and he urged that tho arms and munitions mus|>bo in Limerick bv that date. Later in the game month Count Bernstorff, following his usual practice, surreptitiously attached to a message io Berlin passed by the American GoFernment a note fixing Easter Satuiday for the rising, and urging the despatch af munitions in time. On March 4 Von Tagow replied that the arms would be landed in Tralee Bay, and asked that the necessary arrangements should be mnd--> In Ireland through Devoy. On March 14 Bernstorff replied that the Irish agreed, and that full details were being sent to Ireland by messenger. Next day Bernstorff telegraphed, a code to be used between the Germans and the rebels whilo the arms were in transit, and explained that a submarine might safely enter Dublin Bay and go as far-as the Pigeon-house without encountering nets. On March 26 Von Jagow replied that the arms would be sent, and that a soecial coda word would be used every nieht as an introduction to the German Wireless Pre? 3 Service. In a message from Bernstorff to Berlin the Germans were ssaurrd that there were numerous private wireless receiving stations in Ireland. On April 18 j and 19 urgent messages were sent from, America to Berlin fixing the delivery ofj the arms for the evening of Easter Punday, pressing for the landing of German troops, and asking for an air raid on England and a naval attack on tho English coasts These _ attacks actually took place between April 24 and 26. REBELS DISAPPOINTED. It was the declared hope of the rebels and their German and American friends to blockade the Irish ports against England, and establish bases in Ireland for German submarines. The rebellion broke out a day later than the schedule —on Easter Monday, April 24 but, as tho world is aware, the German support had miscarried, and it ended In complete failure. The report of the Royal Commission on the rebellion in Ireland stated: "It is now a matter of common notoriety that the Irish Volunteers have been" in communication with the authorities in Germany, and were for a long time known to be supplied with monev through Irish-American societies. This was so stated in public by Mr John M'Neill on November 8, 1914. It was suspected long before the outbreak that Borne- of the money came from German Bourses." The evidence on this subject in the possession of the British Government provides the clearest proof of these suspicions. n.—SINCE THE RISING.

It became clear very soon after the ris- "' ing that the Sinn Fein leaders were again asking Germany for help. On June 17 there was a message from Berlin to Washington referring to "A 259 of May 6" (a message which is missing), and saying that Germany was perfectly ready to givo further help if the Irish would only say what sort of help they required. On June 16 Bernstorff had already ser\t a despatch giving an account of the rebellion as f:ir as his Information went, and stating that £I,OOO had been provided for the defence of Qwement. On July 25 ho sent a long message giving further news from Ireland, end explaining that the work of reorganising the rebels was making good progress, and that their lack of money had been remedied by him. GERMAN TROOPS REFUSED. Ob September 8, in a despatch to Berlin, ha enclosed a memorandum from a parson called "Irish Revolution Director resident in America," which contained de-. ' Mled proposals for a fresh rising. Any

A RISING IN SIGHT BEFORE THE ARRESTS.

rising, savs the Irish Revolution Director, must" be contingent upon tho sending by Germany of "an expedition with a sufficient military force to cover the Landing." On this new occasion the German Government were to fix the time, and as an inducement the advantage of having submarine and Zeppelin bases in the west of Ireland was insisted upon. Count Bernstorlf was evidently having difficulty with his tools, for on October 24 he warned his Government not to allow a certain Captain Bochm, then resident in Rotterdam, to write to Irishmen in America, since his letters were apt to go to tho wrong peoplo. Later Captain Boehm was arrested by us in British waters. On December 4wo find Count Bernstoril again attaching surreptitiouslv a. note- to a. message passed by the American Government, in which ho mentioned that tho Irish leaders in America were pressing for an answer to their proposal of September 8. He seems to have 'followed this on Christmas Day with a message which is missing, for on the last day of 1916 Herr Zimmermnnn informed him of tho quantities of munitions which, it was proposed to land between February 21 and 25, 1917. Ho added that it was impossible to send German troops. On January 18." 1917, Bernstorff replied that his Irish committee deemed the proposal, as without German troops a rising would be useless. DE VALERA'S SPEECHES. After America's entrance into the war, on April 4, 1917. the line of communication between the German Government and the leadens of the Sinn Fein party "was temporarily broken, though there is no reason to 'believe that the messenger service devised bv John Devoy between America and Ireland was affected. A clue to the new lino of communication was _subsequently obtained, and has been actively followed' up. Tho effect of this now line in Ireland 'is visible in tho speeches of the Sinn Fein leaders during this period. For example De Valera. addressing the Convention of Irish Volunteers on October 27, 1917. said : Bv proper organisation, recruiting, thev could have 500.000 fighting volunteers in Ireland. That would be a big army, but without the opportunity and the "m°ans of fighting it could only bo used as a menace. • There had already b°en too much bloodshed without success, and he would never advocate another rebellion without hopeful chances of success. They could see no hope of that in the near future escept through a German invasion of England and the landing of troops and munitions in Irelaud. They should be prepared to leave nothing undone towards that end.

On another occasion, in January, this vear. De Valera said: "So long as Germany is the enemv of England, and England' the enemy*of Ireland, .so long will Ireland be the "friend of Germany."

DISCOVERIES IN APRIL AND MAY. For soma considerable time it was difficult to obtain accurate information as to the GeTmnn-Sinn Fein plans, but about April. 1918, it was definitely ascertained that the plan for landing arms in Ireland was ripe for execution, and that the Germans only awaited definite information from Ireland as to tho time, place, and elate. The British authorities were able to warn the Irish Command regarding the probable landing of an agent from Germany from a submarine. The agent actually'landed on April 12. and was arrested. The new rising depended largely upon the landing of munitions from submarines, and there is evidence to show that it was planned to follow a successful German offensive in the west and to take place at a time when Great Britain would be presumably stripped of troops. According to documents 'found on his person, De Valera had worked out in great detail the constitution of his rebel army, and hop-ed to be able to muster half a million trained men. There is evidence that German munitions were actually shipped on submarines at Cuxhaven at the beginning of May, and that for some time German submarines had been busy off the west coast of Ireland on other errands than the destruction of allied shipping. THE NEED TO "INTERN." It will thus bo seen that negotiations between the executive of the Sinn Fein organisation and Germany have been virtually continuous for three and a-half years. At first a section of the Irish-Americans was the intermediary for most of the discussions, but since America's entrance into the war communications with the enemy have tended to be more direct. A second rising in Ireland was planned for last year, and the scheme broke down only because Germany was unable to send troops. This year plans for another rising in connection with the German offensive on the western front were maturing, and a new shipment of arms from Germany was imminent. An important feature in every plan was the establishment of submarine bases in Ireland to menace the shipping of all nations. In these circumstances no other coui-e was open to the Government. if u-elivs bloodshed was to be avoided and their duty to tho Allies fulfilled, but to intern the authors and abettors of this criminal intrigue.

MR LLOYD GEORGE ON IRISH LOYALTY.

The fellowing are the principal points of the Prime .Minister's speech' at Edinburgh : I wish I cmild say tlie contribution of Ireland to this struggle for human liberty was equal to that of '.Scotland. Irish regiments h;i.vc fought valiantly—(hear, hear) —as Irishmen always do when they are face to face with danger. They are a bravs people, a ga!lant~peop!e, and Irishmen in this country and in America and in the Dominions have taken an equal share with other races in the burden of sacrifice, and* a highly honorable share it has been, j'.ut the bulk of the young manhood of Ireland has unfortunately held aloof, and it is not relevant to say that England has tseated Ireland badly In the dim past. This is not England's struggle. It is the struggle of Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, tho small Catholic nationalities in the Austrian Empire. Tt is the struggle of France, the truest and most loyal and most steadfast friend that Ireland has ever had. I am sorry to ?ay that they nro not merely sullen, but many of them, some of them men of great sway and influence amongst their countrymen, had entered into a conspiracy with the military autocracy which is trampling down the liberties of the small nations of Europe—("Shame!") —to stab Britain in the back whilst the whole of her attention and strength were concentrated on the struggle to deliver those enslaved nationalities. The wholo story, n. sad story, an unpleasant story, a painful story to every friend in Ireland, will be complete in the course of the next few days. I have seen the evidence, and after perusing it there can bo no doubt left in any reasonable mind as to tho duty of the Irish Government. Much of it cannot be published without endangering tho public safety, because itgives away the sources of our information, and no taunts will drive us to the publication of that part of the evidence. THE MOMENT CHOSEN 7 FOR THE RISIXG. But enough can bo made public to demonstrate two facts to the satisfaction of all well-disposed men—that arrangemonls had been concerted for a great rising in Ireland, and that the conspirators were ready at tho moment which seemed most critical and dangerous for Britain and her Allies. All the indications in our possession point to tho fact that the blow was timed for the moment when the German High Command deemed its offensive operations in France for the crushing of the British Army had reached the culminaiing point—an army that has many Irishmen, as well as Scotsmen, and

Welshmen in it. (Hear, hear.) If wo had sliirked action, stem action, action without delay, we should have deserved impeachment for betraying riot merely the cause of our country, but the cause of freedom. Let me make one point clear. The Irish Nationalist leaders had nothing to do with it. They were not even cognisant pf it. That lam convinced of from the evidence, and I am therefore not in the least surprised a,t the doubts they have expressed in its existence. Nevertheless T regret to say there is no doubt. Ido not despair of Irishmen realising soon that they are not doing well for the credit of their great race to stand out of this straggle. An opportunity will be afforded them to come forward of their own accord, and I am hopeful that the response will bo worthy of the best and highest traditions of their race. (Loud applause-)