ALSACE AND LORAINE

Evening Star, Issue 16629, 11 January 1918, Page 8

ALSACE AND LORAINE

AND TALK OP PEACE. FRENCH AND DESMAN ATTITUDES. Writing to the ‘New York Post’ from Paris a few weeks ago, Norman Hangood said: Von Kuhlmaim’s flat refusal in the Reichstag to consider tho question of Alsace-Lor-raine in any plan for peace negotiations was obviously done for trading purposes. Ib was an answer to the French declaration that before any peace negotiations could be entered into these provinces must be returned unconditionally, not in return for concessions on the part of Prance, but as expiation for tho crime of 71. While various of the Allies are concentrating upon one or another of the multitudinous problems which will face any peace conference, Germany sees the settlement in Belgium. Alsace-Lorraine, Russia, the Balkans, Asia, and Africa as one subject. Germany has no intention of settling these bitterly-contended problems as separate and unrelated elements in the readjustment of the world. She wishes to use the question of the Bagdad railway, the question of the German colonies in Africa, the reconstruction of Poland, as well as Belgium and AlsaceLorraine, as concessions that can be traded one for another in the arranging of a permanent peace. GERMANY NOT UNITED. Germany, however, is not united in the emphasis which is placed upon these various political changes in the map of Europe. One element wishes to keep Belgium. The progressive element desires to yield completely regarding Belgium, and partly regarding Al-sace-Lorraine, but fears to yield anything except as part of the general plan, and wih not, unless forced, yield even the evacuation of Belgium, unless such a move is procured by concessions on the part of the Allies. They wish to trade. The various political groups and classes of the population in France, as in other European countries, hold different opinions on almost all of these complicated problems. To ascertain the real feeling of the people of even so united and so lucid a country' as France is a delicate and difficult task. To make a final readjustment that will give everyone a square deal is one of the most ( complicated problems that has ever faced the statesmanship of the world. It is for this reason that the appointment of Colonel House to make a study of all these problems is favorably received here. It is recognised that America must some time play the leading role in finding a plan to reconcile the conflicting needs of all Ihe Allies. When the pease conference is finally called, America, having nothing to gain for herself except insurance against a repetition of this terrible war, must act the part of umpire. We cannot begin too soon to study the historical, geographical, and social complications that all have a bearing upon the permanence of a future peace. One of the first of these problems will be Alsace-Lorraine. Various referendum plans have been put forward, notably in Swiss newspapers published in the German language, but the articulate classes in France, which means mainly the journalists and the politicians, take a firm stand against any species of referendum. _ They rely on the' historical argument in its various branches, THE mSTOPJOAL ARGUMENT. The historical argument, in its effective form, is boiled down to the statement that , the wrong deno to France in 1871 is so recent that it ought to bo repaired now. Those who reject that argument, here or iu Germany, make a feeble mess of it when they go into history to prove Germany's right to the provinces. Bismarck, though a political forger, was not a hypocrite, any more than Frederick the great was before him One of his various refreshing observations, made in 1895, was: “We did not conquer Alsace-Lorraine because the inhabitants loved us or considered themselves Germans. All that was indifferent to us. It is, therefore, beside tho point to ask us to spend our time thinking about whether the Alsatians like being Germans or not.” A Paris _ newspaper, commenting on this point of view, told of an old rounder who said: “I am very fond of chicken, but I feel no need of having the chickens like me.” There is no doubt that the robbery of 1871 was completely cynical, and there is no use going back to Louis XIV. or the ancient Gauls to confuse the issue. Influential circles in Germany already want , some arrangement that will allow France in . the future to be her friend, and yet will not check Germany’s economic development. If the Allies can see it through in the military way, they hold the whip-hand eoo- ■ nomically. Germany can only produce one- ■ tenth of the copper she needs. As her sup- ; ply, we come first, and then Australia. Thus we hold the whip hand on her machine inl dustry and her electric industry. Australia i has a similar power over lead, of which Ger- ; many produces only a third of what she , needs. Great Britain and the United States i, supply most of her gold and silver. She is dependent on France for aluminium, and or ( France’s island New Caledonia, and Canada ' for nickel. Russia and Columbia contro 1 platinum. f It is easy to understand, therefore, whv 1 German thinkers consider peace mostlv ir t terms of economic treaties. As for thinking > men among the Alies, they all seek will j complete devotion the good of France. Tin t question of Alsace-Lorraine is the qneetior 5 °f what, deeply seen, is actually for ths best good of France. _ On that question, a: j on so many others, there is a divergence o: , thought between the’ politicians and tin 1 masses.