ON TURKEY

Evening Star, Issue 16626, 8 January 1918, Page 4

ON TURKEY

; . • A FULCRUM FOR OUR LEYER. r —. THE HEDJAZ LINE. ITALIAN PROSPECTS. OUR CONVOY SYSTEM. (By Criticds.] Tho pence terms offered by Turkey to Russia aro such as might be proposed by a conqueror to a beaten enemy rather tlian such as .might be expected from-a Power which has suffered a series of disastrous defeats, and a great part of whose territory is in tho enemy’s hands. It is coolly proposed that Russia should restore all her conquests and disband hor troops, save for a limited mobilisation graciously permitted for purposes of national defence, while Turkey is to retain her forces on a war footing. This attempt by Turkey to secure a separate peace with Russia,' by the way, illustrates tho diplomatic. importance of keeping ourselves in the right and the enemy in the wrong by cordially assenting to tho Russian proposal that the future settlement shall be along national lines, and that the populations concerned shall l>e allowed to determine their own destiny; also, ’ how safely such a course may bo followed. It really commits us to nothing save peace on our own terms. Thus Russia now holds a large part of Armenia, including many of its most important cities. For centuries the Armenians have been the victims of Turkish oppression,- and since the opening of the present war they have been massacred on a wholesale scale. Turkey could not possibly consent to a plebiscite of the population being taken as to the future destiny of the country, for she knows that the result would certainly be an overwhelming demand for separation. For this reason a separate peace between Turkey and Russia is practically impossible unless Russia is prepared to sacrifice the principles which she has laid down as indispensable ; and we risk nothing by adopting her formulas. What applies to Armenia will apply also to the other territories conquered from Turkey—to Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Palestine. TURKEY AS A FULCRUM. There have been many rumors that Turkey would bo willing to make a peace, with the ‘Allies independently of the Centra! Powers; but this is a practical impossibility, as it would involve the handing back to Turkish tyranny of the unfortunate populations just rescued from Turkey’s yoke. ’ So Turkey should be considered rather as a possible fulcrum for the strategical lever with which wc hope to*overthrow,the Central Powers. If wo could crush Turkey and open the Dardanelles we should get into immediate touch with Rumania, with the Ukraine, and with General Kaledin and his Cossacks, Tho combined military power of these three factors is not to be despised. Ukrainia alone-is said to control a population of 30,000,000. Greece is now with us. and in a few; months the development of America’s military power should enable ns to drain away the Sulk of the Austro-Gennan forces from the east to the western front. If we’ had, in the meantime, crushed Turkey and opened the Dardanelles, then the crushing of Bulgaria by the combined Anglo-French, Greek, Italian, Serbian, Rumanian, and Ukrainian forces would be quite a practicable proposition. Moreover, the moral influence upon, Russia of such developments would be_ profound; and. if she were finally disillusioned as to tho intentions of the Central Powers, onr access to the ports of the Black Sen would immensely facilitate her recovery.

It is to these possibilities that the immense importance of the Palestine campaign is due, and it has already been shown that an advance upon Constantinople will he quite possible when our Palestine and Mesopotamian forces have been united at Aleppo. Napoleon proposed to advance from Palestine, not only upon Constantinople, sjgjt also upon India.; and this in spite of the fact that Britain had control of, the sea. If Napoleon thought this practicable without the aid of sea transport, and with his communications exposed to attack from the sea, it is surely practicable for us, whose control of the sea is almost absolute. _ It is sometimes hinted that the suggestion of a- junction at Aleppo of our Palestine and Mesopotamian forces is chimerical, owing to the distance which separates them, but this is merely confusion of ideas. To junction they need not march along the Bagdad Bailwav, though It is probable that they will join hands along that line by means of troops despatched in armored trains from either end. When the railway is cut at Aleppo our position in Mesopotamia will be so unassailable that we shall be able to send back most of our Mesopotamian troops to the coast, and despatch them bv sea to Egypt and thence by rail to Aleppo. That will be as effectual a junction as if they had proceeded over tlie Bagdad line. THE HEDJAZ RAILWAY. The fact has several times been commented upon here that there is no evidence . that our forces in Palestine have vet cut the Hedjaz Railway. An item in to-day’s news renders it practically certain that they have not. The War Office announces that the Arabs of the Hedjaz province successfully raided the railway southward of Maan,_ and also took prisoner the garrison of ah important post further south. , Maan is a town of some importance, standing miles from the head °f the Guff of Akaba, at the northern end of the Red Sea, and on the Hedjaz Railway, not far , from the edge of the great Arabian Desert. It is connected by caravan route with the more important oases and caravan routes of the desert. It is about 100 miles southeast of Jerusalem, and, though our forces to the north are within 30 or 40 miles of the railway, it does not appear to have been thought advisable to despatch a force to cut the line. This is strange, as to cut the line would lead to the destruction of all the Turkish forces in the Hedjaz province, and the railway might provide a useful addition to our communications if linked up with Akaba, on the gulf of that name, where a base might be established !t is strange, also, that Turkish forces shsuld linger m the neighborhood of Maan, seeing that they are liable to he cut off at - any time by our forces further north. When we force the enemy back from the head of the TJHi'd Sea, and secure the crossings of the JdiV.rv time will be ripe to q«t the Hedjaz ind it is not likely that the step will «H., be neglected. ITALIAN PROSPECTS IMPROVING. For some time there has been little news : from the_ Italian front, and in this case no, news is good news. It means that the operations of the Austro-Germans have been checked by winter weather and deep snow. So long as the snow remains deep it is not likely that they can do much. . and even when the spring thaw comes there will be a period when the deep slush, the mud, and the depth of the rivers and mountain torrents will greatly handicap thgm. So it is probable that Italy has several months in which to . . strengthen her defences, during which she , is in little danger of further big attacks. Ihe Paris journal Le Matin’ publishes an 1 interview with the Italian Finance Minis- , ter, in which it is stated that 4,520,000 Italians are now in the field, allowing for reduction by losses. Italy has a population of nearly 40,000,000. The usual estimate of the proportion of the population that can, take the field was one in ten . before the war, but during the present struggle this proportion has been largely , ■ exceeded by practically all the belligerents. So , the figure given is well within the bounds of _ possibility, and it is evident that Italy is in little danger of being outnumbered in men; while the breaking off of the peace negotiations between Russia ■ and the Central Powers may put a stop to the despatch of enemy reinforcements from the Russian front. It is only in the matter

of artillery that the enemy are likely to have, the advantage, and the Allies can redress the balance by spring if they put ♦Hair ohonldera to. the .wheeJ.. ■

THE CONVOY SYSTEM. At the outset of tho submarine campaign the position taken up in these notes was that, although we should lose heavily in ships, it was foredoomed to failure in the long run, owing to the fact that convoy had proved an adequate defence. An interview granted by Sir L. 6. Cbiozza Money to tho ‘Pall Mall Gazette’ shows that this forecast has been fully justified, and that it is to the convoy system that the steady reduction of our losses has been duo. It is declared that tho convoy system is proving a magnificent success. “ Out of 176 homeward-bound convoys, comprising 2,430 ships, with 17,500,000 tons of cargo, the losses were only per cent.” History is .repeating itself. During our wars with Franco in the 17th and 18th centuries the French sent out hj, swarm of privateers, who waxed fat by preying upon our commerce. The French Channel ports. became immensely prosperous as tho result of the innumerable rich cargoes captured and taken into them. Many of the leading privateers, such as Jean Bart and Dougay Trouin, became famous. They headed fleets and amassed groat wealth at the game. But then Britain took to convoying her merchantmen, and the collapse of tho privateers was sudden and complete. It was useless for them to multiply their ships and increase their armaments, as everywhere they found tho merchantmen guarded by superior forces. Privateering became a precarious and dangerous profession. It ceased to pay, and tho grass began to grow in tho streets of tho French Channel ports. Tho development of our convoy system is producing similar results in the present struggle with tho submarines. If wo are still losing heavily it is probably because our convoy system is incomplete, and • because the German submarines aro increasing in number. But when the system is perfected it is doubtful if an increase in tho number of tho submarines will affect tho situation any more than an increase in the number of privateering vessels saved the {7reuch privateering business from destruction, because the intended victims will be everywhere guarded by superior forces. An occasional successful surprise attack by a submarine will not amount to much.