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THE PIAVE

ENEMY FORCE CROSSING. FONZASO FALLS. VENICE AND THE ADRIATIC. PALESTINE. . [By Crtmcus.] The news from Italy is less favorab'e to-day, and the Piavo line is in obvious danger. An Italian communique, after claiming the repulse of a heavy attack along the Asiago Plateau sector, and announcing that the enemv are in contact with the new line from 'the vallcv of the Upper Brenta, or the Val Sugana", to the Lower Piave, goes on to "say: " The. enemy, by means of largo beats, crossed tho Piave, establishing a bridgehead at Zenson. We counter-attacked, "repulsing them towards the river." That looks ugly. There is no claim to have driven the Austro-Germans back across the river, and if the Italians could not prevent them from crossing and establishing a bridgehead, the chances of their being able to drivo them back do not seem verv bright. The weight-of the enemy's artillery was apparently greater than the Italians were able to stand up to,' and the enemy were able to force their way across in large pontoons, under the weight of an overwhelming bombardment, which induced the Italians to keep under cover. Having established a .bridgehead, the enemy will be able to mass "large forces on the right bank, preparatory to a foTward thrust, and there is small'probability of the Italians stopping thorn unless the Anglo-French are present in sufficient numbers for a counter-attack designed to recapture tire bridgehead. Of that there is no sign as yet. and the communiques have not begun to mention the AngloFrench forces. This is rather odd, if they are present in strength on the Piave. Possibly there is no intention of holding the Piavo line, and the Anglo-French forces are really massing further back for the defence of the Adige, owing to the immense looses of the Italians in artillery having rendered it impossible to mass sufficient forces in time to hold up tho enemy on the Tiavo. We should knowwithin a few hours, for the situation on the Piave is one which calls for a vigorous counter-attack, with orders to retake the bridgehead at any cost. If such a- counterattack is not delivered, we may expect soon to hear news of a further Italian retreat, which will not stop short- of the Adige. THE TRENTINO FRONT, j Yesterday it was suggested that the Italians would probably "fall back nut of the Ynl Sugana and the Upper Piave Valley, in the neighborhood of Feltre, to the line Mont Bertiaga-Mont Grappa. Today the Germans claim to bz advancing from the Val Sugana down the Cismon Valley, or the Valley of the Brenta. which runs out of the Vai Sugana and down to the Adriatic by way of Cismon, Cittadella, and Padua, they "assert that they have captured Mont I.ongara and the town of Fonzaso, and also other high positions south of tho Sugana Valley. Fonzaro lies six miles west of Feltre. between the Upper Piave a:;d Upper Brenta Valleys. The enemy's advance in this quarter does not necessarily mean anything beyond a voluntary Italian- retirement, which is obviously called for by the strategical situation. A hint has been given to the Italians by the Austro-German crossing 0 f the Piave to get their forces out of the narrow mountain valleys towards the edge of the plain, in order that they may be In a position to fall back into the plain' and south-westward over the Adige if the enemy's westward advance across the Piave cannot be held up. It is not improbable that tho danger from the Trentino is preventing , the AngloFrench from at present sending large reinforcements to the Piave, as their first.concern is obviously to fee that their Trentino flank is secure. A withdrawal will need to be very skilfully co-ordinated in order to prevent the cutting off of further large bodies of Italian troops. There is danger of break-through by the onemy_from the Trentino upon the rear of the Italians upon the Piave. and there is also danger of the forces holding back the enemv on the northern flank (if they hold on* too long) being cut off by the enemy's westward advance. ' , SHOULD VENICE FALL. If Venetia should be abandoned by the Allies only_ a comparatively small Traction of the Italian territory wiil hitve been occupied by the enemy, although it is one of Italy's richest provinces. But the defensive position of the enemv will bn enormously strengthened, and tho Italian fleet will be seriously handicapped bv the loss of Venice. Along the whole stretch of the Italian Adriatic coast, from Brindisi northward, representing ricarlv 300 miles of coastline. Venice is the onlv suitable naval base. Whereas the Austrians, with their much-indented coastline, have excellent bases placed at suitable intervals all along the Adriatic ; while the innumerable islands off the eastern Adriatic shore afford covered channels up and down which the Austrian raiding squadrons can steal with an excellent chance of evading detection. If Venice falls the Italians will have no suitable naval base north of Brin disi. In that event, it will hardlv be possible for tho Allies to effectivelv hold the Northern Adriatic, as it will not bo practicable to keep squadrons of Dreadnoughts steaming about in tha open sea exposed to constant submarine attacks and hundreds of miles away from a suitable base; while unsupported squadrons of cruisers and destrovers will be exposed to attacks from the Austrian Dreadnoughts. This affords good reason for a special effort to hold the Piave line. TOWARDS LUDD. To-day's cables contain a. brief review by General Allenby of the past operations in 1 alestine, which, however, tells us little that is new, and also a verv interesting, though somewhat doubtful "message from Router's correspondent at the Egyptian Headquarters. Yesterday it was suggested that the next decisive British move would take the form of an advance upon Ludd, 20 miles north-west of Jerusalem, from the Wady Sukerier. Router's correspondent, after_ reporting severe lighting with the Turkish rearguards in the vicinity of Wady j Sukerier, adds: "According to" latest reports, our men made an important advance', bringing them within sc\cn miles of Bamleh, which is the centre of the Turkish position. Our left pushed across the Wady Rubin, occupying the important hamlet of Ya-iileh. and reached Kubei- j beth." Now, the Wady Rubin is a watercourse which enters the Mediterranean 10 miles north of the mouth of the Wadv Sukerier; while Ramleh is a town on the road from Esdud to Ludd, which crosses the Wady Sukerier and the Wady Rubin in a north-easterly direction. It 'is seven miles north-east of the Wady Rubin, and only three miles from Ludd'. So if this news be correct our troops are carrying out that thrust towards Ludd just as was suggested. It will mean a big encircling movement upon Jerusalem by the left. But it is necessary to note that the news is unofficial,, and it is rather strange if we have made such great and rapid progress without an official report of it. There is no official announcement even of the crossing of the Wady Sukerier as yet. Still,. it may be true." The correspondent, mentions that the Turks are " offering a stubborn resistance in front of our right and centre, which, nevertheless, gained considerable ground." This means that the Turks were expecting the main thrust from our right, which offered the more immediate threat to Jerusalem. They had probably massed the greater part of their forces on that wing, and this would provide excellent reason for making the main thrust with our left. The same correspondent puts our total captures at over 6,000 prisoners and 90 guns* THE RUSSIAN SITUATION. It is obvious that civil war on a small scale is raging in the neighborhood of Petrograd, but there is an entire absence of details which affor3 scope for

strategical or tactical comment. The only thing which is perfectly clear is that the reports of decisive victories industriously circulated by the Bolshevik party in Petrograd are quite untrustworthy. They are put forward to bolster up the morale of the ietrograd revolutionaries. It is not in the least likely that troops led by generals of tno calibre of Komiloff or Alexieff would be r-uted by a rabble led by the fanatical extremists temporarily in power at Petrograd. Stockholm and Copenhagen both report the victory of M. Kerensky, and Aew York, the messages from which have been very reliable in regard to Russian events lately, definitely announces that he has. got the upper hand in Petrograd. The statement that General Korniloff is in command of the troops of the Provisional Government is a good sign, as that suggests that he has adjusted his differences with M. Kerensky, and his popularity with the troops, his patriotism, and his ruthless determination constitute Russia's best hope.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19171115.2.45

Bibliographic details

Evening Star, Issue 16582, 15 November 1917, Page 6

Word Count
1,464

THE PIAVE Evening Star, Issue 16582, 15 November 1917, Page 6

THE PIAVE Evening Star, Issue 16582, 15 November 1917, Page 6

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