BROODSEYNDE RIDGE

Evening Star, Issue 16548, 6 October 1917, Page 9

BROODSEYNDE RIDGE

BEG FORWARD STRIDE. MAIN' RIDGE CAPTURED. THE RAMADIE BATTLE. A TACTICAL STUDY. [By Criticus.'] We have gained another valuable success, and taken another substantial stride towards the complete possession of the Flanders ridges. It is claimed that we penetrated over a mile deep in places. That this is substantially correct is proved by the admission of a German communique that we penetrated a kilometre deep between Poelcapelle and Gheluvelt. The two villages named apparently mark the limits of the British attack. Poelcapelle lies a mile and a-half east of Langemarck, and Gheluvelt stands on the high ground six miles to the" south-east. Allowing for the curvature of the line, we are attacking on a front of some seven or eight miles. We havo crossed the Stroombeke River, which flows from south-east to north-west a little more than a mile to the south of Poelcapelle. The centre of our attack was directed against the Broodseynde Ridge, lying to the east of Zonnebeke. . Hero we captured the main ridge for 1,000 yards north of Broodseynde, the Australians pushing well over to the eastern slopes and

occupying the village itself. At this point one of those curious coincidences occurred which are not infrequent in war. The Germans, either ignorant of our coming attack or endeavoring to anticipate it, had concentrated three divisions east of Zonnebeke, who had been ordered to attack on a twomile front in order to'capture the positions lost on September 26. They, were just in time to get caught and cut to pieces by our concentrated barrage, which was naturally fiercest at that very point. A correspondent describes them as being churned into a bloody "loblolly." Three thousand prisoners have been taken, and a few guns. OTHER POINTS. We attacked in a misty drizzle behind a terrific barrage, and the German plan of, thinly-held advanced lines reinforced bv " pill boxes" again seems to havo broken down. Machine guns were silenced and counter-attacks broken, and our advance was swift and successful. Mr Philip Gibbs calls the struggle the battle of Broodseynde, because the struggle was fiercest at that point. We advanced upon Passohendaele Ridge, to the north of Broodseynde, capturing most of Poelcapelle, Molenhoek, and Arelsthoek: while the New Zealanders took Gravenstafel. We are also making good progress south of this point as far as the Ypres.Menin road, the villages of Poldenhoek and Reutal being captured, and the enemy are in immediate danger of losing all the high ground to the south of the Passchendaele Ridge. This is rendered the more noteworthy by the fact that, as. Colonel Ropingtoh points out, "for weeks past the British alone have been attacking and doing the chief fighting on a front of 1,600 miles." Our attacks have been confined to a front of 12 miles, and the enemy are thus enabled to concentrate men arid guns against us; but in spite of this fact we have beaten them almost uniformly every day. Colonel Repington is of opinion that the only course of action likely to imperil our success is the withdrawal of bombing squadrons for the purpose of counter-raids on Germany before the present operations are concluded. He overlooks the. fact that our present policy compels the tying up of scores or hundreds of fighting machines in passive defence without imposing a similar policy on Germany, whereas vigorous counter-raids would compel the withdrawal, of large numbers of German fighting machines and anti-aircraft 'guns from tho fighting front for the defence of their own towns. However, when tho American aeroplane building programme, gets well under way there will be. ample nwXWes for complete supremacy on the fight my line and smashing raids'on Germany.

A GERMAN TANK. A correspondent with the French Headquarters states that the Germans are experimenting with a tank which is'filled with a tilted beak to assist it in crossing trenches. Its caterpillar wheels nre tected by armor, it is fitted with a small conning tower for observation purposes, and it carries a 3in gun and two machine guns Apparently it very closely follow? the lines of the French tank. ' It is a notable fact that the Germans have not yet produced an effective reply to the tanks. They affect to regard them as a failure because they are not always successful, and there arc certain conditions for winch they are unfitted. It would he as reasonable to regard infantry or cavalry as failures. The real reason whv the Germans have not employed tanks on the west front is that they'are definitely on the defensive- The only way to beat the tanks is to secure a direct hit with a shell, and tins is rendered difficult for tho Germans by the fact that thev have drawn their artillery far back its capture. Even the special anti-tank guns do not appear to be thrust very far forward. But, as we arc continually 'attacking, our guns are not kept far back. Our li«ht artillery will be pushed close up behind the lighting line, and will therefore be well placed-for a shot at any German tank winch may appear. In fact, the conditions are such that if theTGermans were to employ tanks thev would probably be bowled out very quicklvi A TACTICAL STUDY.

The accompanying map will give clear conception of both the strategy and the tactics which led to the destruction of Ahmed Bey's force at Rr.madie, on the Euphrates. The chief points to bear in mind are that the nearest Turldsh force, from which Ahmed Bey could have received reinforcements was over 100 miles away up the Tigris, and that General Maude, at Bagdad, held a central position between these widely-separated Turkish armies. The position of the Turkish Ramadie force is shown 'by the black block covering Ramadie, whileHha British, who had already beaten the Turkish force and driven it back upon Baniadie. had a force engaged in hatching it in. front of Lake Habbania. It is about 60 ; miles from Bagdad to Ramadie, and, as the map shows, they are connected by a caravan track. As the Tigris provides good communication with Bagdad and the British armies to the north, it was a simple matter for General Maude to bring reinforcements swiftly and secretly down the river to Bagdad and march them thenee. to strengthen the British force before Bamadie. When the British had obtained a sufficient superiority, the main body attacked in the direction shown by the* large arrow, while the cavalry swung right round tbe Turkish

flank, as shown bv the 'smaller curved arrow. The Turkish" right flank' was turned completely and rolled iip, and the whole Turkish force was jammed up against the river. Our cavalry reached the river to the west of the Turks, and cut off their retreat, so that only by crossing the flooded river could they escape. The result was the complete cutting up of the Turks, with the capture _of their commander and his Staff, and ; probably all.the Turkish artillery. ■ ' - ; THE DRAKE. Tactical considerations of another order are recalled by the news that the armored cruiser Drake was torpedoed on "Tuesday off the north coast of Ireland, and sank in shallow water, with a loss of one officer and.lß men. , Tho Drake was a fine vessel, of 14,100 tons, and a speed of about 24 knots; but her tactical value was reduced to perhaps 50 per cent, of what it might have been by the stupidity of her armament. • She carried two 9.2m'guns and no less than 16 6in. Eight of these 6in weapons were carried on .cither broadside, so that only one-half of them could be brought into action at one time, and the other half represented dead weight of no tactical value whatever. Had sho been equipped instead with eight or ten 9.2 in guns, arranged to fire on either broadside, she would have been superior in tactical value beyond all comparison. A vessel so armed would have been able to stand off at long range and batter the Drake to piece; almost with, impunity. The Drake was one of the last productions of a period during which tho lighting vessels of the British Navy wen, persistently undergunned—not in numbers, but in weight-'-a policy which might have resulted iu national disaster, but that it was put an end to by #Tie advent of Lord (then Sir John) Fisher. ~

TIGHTENING THE SCREW. _ In the-tTays before the United States joined us it was often pointed out here ■that when she entered there would no longer be any neutral country sufficiently powerful to seriously, embarrass the Allies in any measures thev liked to take in tightening the blockade of Germanv. The effect of this is now becoming apparent. There is to be an embargo upon all exports from allied countries to neutrals, except under license. The neutrals, particularly those adjoining enemy countries, have got to give guarantees that they will not re-export the goods to supply the enemy. Indeed, the screw will probably be so tightened that they, will be themselves practically blockaded unless.thev •refrain from supplying tho enemy at all. Sweden has been a bad example in this respect. She has been very pro-German, and has furnished Germany with food.' iron ore, and other valuable' supplies. It will be folly for the Allies, particularly America, to export goods to Sweden in order that she may export supplies to Germany. Either she must stop supplying Germany or do without foreign supplies herself. The Allies have a free hand now. and they will probablv malco use of it.