SECOND PHASE

Evening Star, Issue 16408, 26 April 1917, Page 6

SECOND PHASE

PROGRESS LESS RAPID, BUT STILL STEADY. MORE TANKS WANTED. TIGEIS STRATEGY. [By CaiTicus-l The second great phase of the Arras battle is being fought out with unexampled fury, and it is admitted .that the Germans are putting up a most determined fight. This tar our progress has uot been, so rapid and decisive as during the fast phase. But it has been substantial, and it still continues; while wo must remember that the enemy are now fully informed as to the point and directum of our attack, so we no longer have the Advantage of surprise. We have taken 3,029 prisoners. Most of our gains have been made on the sector lying between Gavrelle, a village 2>i miles north of the Scarpe, and Villers-Guislain, a village lying 15 miles south of the Scarpe. The length of this sector is nearly 20 miles, and it stretches away in a souih-easterly direction from Gavrelle to Vallers-Guitslain. We eeem to havo made little progress in the neighborhood of Lens -. but we have captured Gavrelle and Guemappe, tho latter being a village five miles south of Gavrelle; and lying just south of the Arras-Cambrai road. Between these two points wo have made considerable progress, and most of the village of Roeux, on the Scarpe, seems to be in our hands. South of Guemappe our line has been advanoed to within a few hundred yards of Foutain-les-; Croisilles and Cherisy, villages lying respectively two and three miles north-east of Croisilles. To the south, again, notable progress ha.3 been made in the neighborhood of Havrincourt Wood. The whole of tho wood is now ours. KJid we have captured Bdlhem, a village lying east of the wood and northeast of Trescault, and also Villers-Pluich, Beaueamp, and Villers-Guislain, lying to the east and south-east of the wood. Between this point and St. Quentin we have fought our way to the St. Quentin Canal, in the neighborhood of Vendhuil, two miles southeast of Villers-Guislain. THE QUESTION OF ATTRITION. The enormous strength of the Hindenburg lino is admitted, and at present we are only just astride the Oppy line 'at Gavrelle—the line which is merely "the cover for tbo Hindenburg line. But Mr Philip Gibbs deolares that our casualties are much lighter than those of the Germans; and how we can regard the present position of affairs turns very much on this. The struggle may resolve itself into ono of attrition; and if the enemy's losses are heavier than ours, the best policy will be to force the fighting, as this will exhaust their reserves more quickly. The German official messages reveal unmistakable anxiety; and although they declare that the fighting was hottest in the suburbs of Lens, and at Avion, Gavrelle, Itoeux, and Guemappe, they do not mention the capture of several of these and numerous other places by the British: There are some factors which will tell strongly in the direction of inflicting losses upon tho enemy far heavier than our own, and others which will tell in tho opposite direction. In spito of the -admittedly increased strength of tie German artillery, there seems no reason to doubt that we still have a big superiority, and th« value of this will be increased by our almost complete command of the a'r. It is an interesting commentary upon recent scares that Sir Douglas Haig reports that 15 German machines were destroyed and 24 driven down, while onlytwo of ours are missing. The value of this command is illustrated by a statement of Mr Philip Gibtw that our airmen discovered "IjOOO Germans in the Bois du Sart, just east of Monehy-lc-Preux, massed ready to attack the British batteries'. Our batteries filled the wood with gas shells, and the German casualties were horrible. The Germans are delivering numerous desperate and costly counter-attacks, and with such advantages as these and unlimited machine guns we may presently be able to exhaust their reserves and break down their resistance. On the other hand, tlie correspondents dwell upon the immense numbers of machine guns employed by the Germans and the less tangible character of their present line. ARMOR IN DEMAND. This fact, and the admission that whenever our men were held up they had to wait for the tanks, reveals again the importance of armor for the troops as the logical reply to the machine guns. Unfortunately, it seems clear that we have neglected it, and many scores of thousands of men wall pay the price. The tanks are proving their value, but it seems doubtful if they are being used in adequate numbers. A German official report states that the British troops were often led by tanks: but why only " often,' instead of always ? If we arc not supplying- our infantry with armor, we should make it up in tanks. Wo should have a sufficient number in the field to supply each battalion. That is the way to ensure the success of our attacks at a minimum cost. We should employ them not merely byhundreds, but by thousands. Machinery is cheaper in the long run than flesh and blood. Here the immense engineering resources of America can give invaluable aid. If the plans and patterns cf the latest types of tanks are standardised and sent over to America, there is no reason why that country should not very soon be turning them out by hundreds and thousands. She could help us this way much more effectively and quickly than by despatching an army. Let us make the fullest use of the gigantic superiority in mechanical equipment and building capacity possessed by the Allies to beat tho enemy by machinery, not by the mere expenditure of flesh and blood. America could not only build tanks, but she could man them also. SAMARA STATION. The anticipation expressed in Tuesday's notea that the Turks would not be able to hold on to the Samara position long waa soon justified, for the news came yesterday that we drove out the enemy from their elaborately-prepared position on Sunday, and occupied the Samara railway station. Wo captured 16 locomotives, and this seems to suggest that Samara is tho terminus of tho 100 miles or so of railway running north from Bagdad. But General Maude's despatch doers not mention this, and it is generally shown on the map as continued as far as Tekrit, 30 miles further north, and there, have even been reports that the two ends of the line have been linked up through Mosul; but that is extremely doubtful. Where tho line exists, however, it is of great value to us. Prom Samara to the point where the Tigris flows through tho Jebel Hamrin Range the Turks will bo faced with the difficulty, whenever they attempt a stand, that if they mass their principal forces on one bank tho British will have the alternative of advancing up the other. But when the passes of the Jebel Hamrin Range are reached, although we shall have the chance to feint on one side of the river and deal our real attack on the other side, yet the Turks may be able to find positions which are impossible to turn, and of such great natural strength as to discount this advantage. If this occurs, the operations of tho British and Russian forces on the Diala River will assume importance. The hist we heard of the Russians was that they were held up by the enemy along the Diala line, and we have heard of no progress since. But the British have occupied Deli Abbas, on the west bank of the Diala, and just this side of the Jebel Hamrin Range, while the Russians have seised Kizil Robat, 'on the other "bank of the river, and just over the other skle. of the range. The two towns are less than 20 miles opart, and tho combined Anglo-Russian forces may be able to seize both tho passes of the mountains and tho fords of the Diala River. That being done, they will be in a position to advance the northern edge of the Jebel Hamrin Range, with the ultimate object, by an attack upon the Turkish rear, of assisting the main British force to carry the passes of the range at the point where the Tigris flows through. But at present they arcfully 100 miles from Fatha, tho point at which the Tigris pierces the mountains, and during the advance they will be completely separated from the main body of the British, with the Turkish forces occupying a central position between—a strategical situation involving some dan-er to the flanking forces. ° A DESTROYER DESTROYED. A very interesting little incident is reported by the Admiralty as having occurred five miles off the Belgian coast, between Blankenburg. and Zeebrugge. Three British : naval aeroplanes attacked five German destroyers, and dropped a large number of bombs, obtaining four hits. The leading destroyer was struck, and was seen to havo listed to port and remained stationary, and as only four destroyers re-entered Zeebrugge, there is good reason to believe it to have been sunk. This was a very exceptional feat. Lestroyers can manoeuvre so swiftly, and are such difficult targets, that hj is necessary for the aeroplanes to descend very low in order to have a reasonable chance of scoring a hit, and this brings them within easy range o'f the guns. Nevertheless, hits can bo made with skill and daring; and it was in that same neighborhood, at an earlier stage of the war, that a British aeroplane sank * German submarine.