BACK TO THE RHINE!

Evening Star, Issue 16234, 2 October 1916, Page 10

BACK TO THE RHINE!

OR ATTRITION SOLELY?

TWO FALLACIES EXAMINED

.There are, broadly, two fairly common conceptions of the probable future course of the military operations in the west (said a writ-er in the ' New Statesman ' of July 22). One looks forward to a monotonous and terribly costly process in which the Germans will be driven back step by step, from trench line to trench line through France and Belgium, offering at every stage the sort of resistance which the British Army offered at Ypres, the French army at Verdun, and the Germans themselves at Loos, in Champagne, and now on the Sorame; until at last they reach the Rhine, where they will make a desperate and probably successful stand on what is a more or less impregnable line of defence. That conception—which was commoner, perhaps 12 months ago than it is to-day—is' of course, false in nearly all its premises and bears little relation to likelihoods, or even possibilities. The other conception, which is more up to date but hardly more cheerful, embodies the idea of " attrition." It looks on the war in the west as a simple question of wastage. We must kill or disable a million or so Germans, either on the present line or elsewhere; it will probably cost us an almost equal expenditure of men, but when we have done it the Germans will have too few men to hold so extended a line and wo shall bo able to "break through." This picture is much nearer tho truth than the other, but in its crude form it is probably almost as misleading. Both conceptions overlook "tho fact that although in modern warfare armies are disposed along vast trench lines covering hundreds of miles, heavv fighting only takes place on quite narrow fronts at selected points, where both sides, first the attackers and then the defenders, concentrate enormous masses of men and guns forming a large, fraction of their total resources. At the present moment there are two such concentrations in the west, one at Verdun and the other on the Somme. The Germans apparently were confident that they had so engaged and weakened the French at Verdun that it would be impossible for them to prepare a serious concentration at any other point. Events have shown that thev were mistaken, but if they had been right, then their Verdun offensive might have- been worth all it cost them. It is important to picture the struggle as a series of separate offensives rather than as a continuous line, because if and when there comes a time, when one side, although it has still men and guns enough to man its front as a whole on the recognised minimum scale, cannot meet a. concentration at any given point by an approximately equal concentration, then something will happen which has never yet happened on the western front. The stronger side will occupv territory, taking probably great numbers of prisoners, as quickly and as i-asily as tho Russians have latch done in the Bukowina.

Here is whero the fallacy of the crude attrition theory appears to lie. It is perfectly true that everything turns on numbers, but is not true that as long as the Germans can maintain a force of so many men per yard along thoir whole front they will be able to offer sustained resistance to any attacking force which may be brought against them. It is not enough that thev should have say 2.000,000 men, with proportionate guns, on their western front; they must have approximately the same number of men as the Allies can bring against them, or they will risk disaster. It is fairly clear- that just now on the Sonimo, although we are steadily advancing, the Germans can oppose us in such force that, accidents apart, they have nothing worse to fear than the necessity of a gradual withdrawal extending over a front of a dozen miles or so; and if the Allies were now putting forth their maximum effort, then, indeed, failing a break, we should have to wait for a long time for the gradual process of attrition to do its work. But suppose—it is a mere supposition—that the Allies now possess so many men and guns that they can afford to make another concentration and begin a fresh attack on the same scale on another part of the line, then the whole situation is changed. There is reason to believe that the resources of the Germans aro already strained to their limit; that whilst they still have drafts (of doubtful quality perhops) wherewith to fill up gaps in their present formations, they have very few, if any, reserve units which they can bring into action as such. It is therefore doubtful whether they could take any measures adequate to meet a new first-class British or French offensive at Ypres or Loos or in Champagne. And if they could not—well, dramatic events would follow.

There are, of course, very obvious and elementary considerations, but they seem to be worth recalling, not only because they serve to correct the two fallacious conceptions which we have referred to, but because they dispose also of that yet more erroneous butstill, we fear, uncradicated picture of dwindling German numbers being replaced by tens of thousands of machine guns. Millions of machine guns will not save the Germans if at some point or other we can concentrate batteries of howitzers and divisions of infantry which they cannot-meet by a like concentration. Elaborate systems of trenches and underground dugouts hamper tlio stronger side, but they cannot avert or even very greatly delay its victory. For a long line to be as stable as many people still imagine- ihe western front t.i be, there must ho approximately equal forces on either side; otherwise by means of simultaneous offensives at several points the side which has a substantial predominance can at any time force the issue and make the enemy's line too dangerous to be held.