ITALY’S AIMS

Evening Star, Issue 16082, 6 April 1916, Page 1

ITALY’S AIMS

HER DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT.

JEALOUSY OF BRITAIN

MEDITERRANEAN CONTROL

In vieiv of the Paris Conference and the recent visit of General Cadorna to London, the following article by Dr Dillon should prove interesting and instructive :

Every appeal • heretofore addressed to Italy that she should actively co-operate with the Allies on one of their own Eastern fronts has been met with a courteous but firm demurrer. In the expeditions to the Dardanelles, Serbia, and Salonika she would have no hand or part. That the military authorities really differed from the Entente Powers on technical grounds, and held that the conception and equipment of each of these undertakings were inadequate to secure their object, is true. But this explanation covers only part of the entire ground. It behoves ns to fullfront the facts, and of these the most salient is that the economic orientation of Italy is tow’ards the German Empire. The currents set in motion by Germany’s crime against humanity have drawn many peoples from their old moorings and effected a temporary chassez croisez. But the cause of these far-reaching changes will, it is believed, cease to be operative after the war, and many things will revert to their old grooves. Military operations, bounded by the Isonzo and the Carso, but gradually extended to Albania, and waged primarily for tho redemption of Italy's enthralled sons and collaterally for the purpose of weakening the least formidable of onr enemies, is the war policy pursued by the Salandra Cabinet. A member of the Cabinet delivered an eloquent speech in Palermo towards the close of last year (November 21), which one of the principal Press organs ‘La Stampa,’ (November 23, 1915) commented upon as follows One must conclude that, with the exception of the war, which is a fact, wo have no other realities in common with onr Allies, unless it be that one. two, or three of our enemies happen to be also their enemies, and that for other reasons of a superior order our war and that of our Allies tend towards a common goal. . . . Our object, national unity, is not of the same nature as France’s object, which is, beforeall else, the liberation of her territory from the enemy who occupies it.” Italy, by waging her own war against Austria, is undoubtedly helping tho Entente Powers. But her goal, according to her own Press organs, is not our goal. Her methods are not our methods. It wouW be a delusion to imagine that she visualises the situation, its requirements, and the collective duties of the allied belligerents, from our coign of vision. Italian Nationalists are discontented with us. We have done too little for them and too much for ourselves. For example, they hold that -their financial and economic plight entitles them to a larger and cheaper measure of relief than was vouchsafed to the other Allies.

—England and the Mediterranean.— The occupation of Mitylene was a stumbling block to Italy. If it, was- uocos-

«3.ry that islands in that quarter of the world should be occupied, why, it was queried, should it be reserved to Britain to take possession of them? Italy's interests in the Mediterismean Sea are mar© extensive and more vital tßan those of France or England. “ England,” writes on© of the principal and most friendly Press organs of Rome, “ England is the only European Power which down to the present moment lias culled any tangible fruits from the great war. Given if wo leave out of account Germany’s African possessions which fell into her hands this year, and consider the Mediterranean alone, she has annexed the island, of Cyprus there, she lias proclaimed a protectorate over Egypt, she has occupied (provisionally,'if you wall, hut independently) Lemnos, at the entrance to the Dardanelles, and also Mitylene, the biggest, richest, and most important island of the Algean. That means that up to now England has not merely augmented but actually tripled the strength of her political position in the Mediterranean Sea” (‘LTdea. National©’). And this increase, Hie journal adds, is detrimental to Italy’s interests. “This, however,” it significantly adds, “ dues not mean that we ought directly and concretely to oppose or bemoan tile protectorate over Egypt, the annexation of Cyprus, or the occupation of Mitylene or. Lemnos. But what it does mean is that we ought, with tenacious, intelligent, and effective resolve, not only to set ourselves to re-establish in our relations the former equilibrium, but to improve it in our favor in the way required by the dynamic necessity of our existence. * ’

"I n order to secure this object, mere verbiage and platonic recriminations are, as usual, fruitless. It behoves us in the first place to apprise our Allies and. to improfi upon them this- our resolve, nay, this national necessity of ours, and to do it- with our prompt and conscious sensitiveness to everything that concerns the, Mediterranean. In the second; place, it is our duty without too dangerous delays to take an active part in the action against .1 urkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, and we ought further to set out explicitly and concretely ia our dealings with our Allies the rights—also those which we possess by way of compensation for the advantages they have already harvested in—which our action unquestionably gives us. These rights must be proportioned to the real value not merely of our special intervention in the Orient, but of our war, taken as a whole.” The remainder of this remarkable article deals with the claims which Italy is justified in making. And one hopes that Entente diplomacy has taken cognisance of them and of the mental attitude whence they sprang. For a long time the friends of Italy were concerned at the thought that she had refused to sign the London Convention, binding each ot the Allies to eschew a separate peace. For it was obvious to the dullest apprehension that her aloofness in this matter might suddenly, become fraught with tragic consequences to herself. If, for example, the vicissitudes of the war were to compel Austria to withdraw from the battlefield and make terms with the Allies’, Italy left alone to wrestle with the Habsburg Monarchy would have been confronted with disaster. , Luckily for herself, the trend of the campaign and the requirements of her own position brought the policy of her statesmen decisively into harmony with her national interests. And at ter much anxious thought and many animated conversations with her Allies, she signed the agreement, and moved one step closer to the Entente (November 30, 1915).