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Evening Star, Issue 16051, 1 March 1916, Page 6

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GERMAN -ATTACK FAILING. ARE%HE HUNS BEATEN? CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES AND FUTILE STRATEGY. AYLMBR MOVES. [By Criticus.], AH seems to promise well at Verdun for tho present. It is noteworthy that there are no more claims of German advances as the moment of writing, while all tho French accounts are glowing and confident', and seem to agree that tho French are in possession of Douaumont. If so, the main defences of Verdun are still intact, and tho Germans • have nothing to show for their huge efforts and sacrifices save the possession of tho outworks. Probably the contradictory assertions as to the possession of Fort Douaumont axe due to the Germans having a footing on the plateau,_ which enables them to keep up the spirits of their people by a slight readjustment of the truth. It is noteworthy, by the way, that though they tiave claimed the capture of 15,000 prisoners, they have not yet claimed the capture of a'single gun, a fact which suggests that they have rob succeeded in storming and holding any important French positions. From Paris comes a claim that a. German regiment was surrounded, a fact which indicates that the French have the best of the argument; but the surrender of tho'Germans is not reported. One of yesterday's later cables, it may be noted, reported that Fort Douaumont remains closely eurroundecT; but whether occupied by the French and surrounded by tho Germans, -or occupied by the Germans and surrounded by tho French; was not indicated. But the cable was unofficial, so not very reliable. A good sign is that most of tho news now consists of word painting of Saturday's fighting and of guesses as to tho German strength and intentions. M. Marcel Hutin states that latest calculations are that 800,000 Germans are engaged in the offensive. 'This is the largest figure yet, but it must bo remembered that the attack has now spread right rovnd the eastern side of tho fortress, and so tho number suggested is not so improbable as the 750J000 given in the earlier cables as operating on a front of less than a halfi of that at present attacked. ' Colonel Repington declares that General Joffre never had larger reserves placed in better security, which is good news, and probably true; though when he suggests that the main French reserves have probably not yet teen moved it seems rather too much to hope fo:\ He adds: "Public opinion or political clamor will not force General Joffre to a premature counteroffensive." The question of whether or not a counter-offensive is expedient is purely one of whether or' not the French at Verdun are really hard pressed. If they have an abundance of artillery and ammunition and their main reserves are untouched, then a counteroffensive is neither necessary nor desirable. But if they are hard pressed to the point of yielding it would bo folly not to take off the pressure by a counteroffensive elsewhere. Foituiiately, everything at present suggests that a counteroffensive will be easily dispersed with. THE DISEASE AND THE, REMEDY. The Kaiser and Marshal Von Falkenhayn have adopted, a desperate remedy suiting their imperilled interests, according to Colonel Repington, while Sir J. L.' Garvin declares m the ' Observer' thab three-fifths of the Geiman fighting males have gone. The latter opinion looks rather like exaggeration, since it wouliS mean that the Germans have suffered permanent losses of about 5,000,000 men—a figure for which, there is no justification. Nor is it easy to agree with Colonel Repington as to the remedy adopted by the Kaiser and Marshal Von Falkenhayn. How can it suit their imperilled interests to attack that point of the allied line, which offers tho minimum chance of success and the minimum of results? In what way will the butt at Verdun remedy their ills'? Even if their attack were successful they wou'£ eain nothing but a moral advantage. The allied line would be substantially unimpaired. But an effort powerful enough) to capture Verdun would have sufficed to break tho allied line in the success which would have given Germany still greater moral advantage, coupled with vast material gains. The isecrct of the present German move probably iies in the Tivalry of prominent personalities behind the scenes. Yesterday a cable reported remarks by the ' Berliner Tageblatt' which indicate that Marshal Von Hindenburg has been practically shelved. Now, Hindenburg and Falkenhayn axe both strong men, but an old proverb says that when two men ride a horse one must tide behind. Both of these men will wish to handle the reins. But while Hindenburg is th e idol of the populace Falkenhayn is the Kaiser's favorite, and a courtier as well. And the Kaiser is a man who can take his fiatteiing neat and in its most concentrated form* Some months ago there was an attempt to shelve Hindenburg, for that warrior is burly and blunt, and much more apt to tread upon the Kaiser's toes by expressions of opinion too frankly and freely put than to insinuate ideas into his sovereign's' mind while persuading him that thev are his own. The first attempt to shelve the old warhorse failed because of an outburst of popular indignation in Germany; but much has happened since then. Many months have passed since Hindenburg gained any notable successes, and other men are now his rivals in the public eye—notablv Von Mackensen. It has become possible to shelve the veteraa because his hold upon the public imagination has lessened.

STRATEGIST v. ORGANISER, Hindenburg 16 primarily a strategist. Von Falkenhayn's abilities are chiefly those of the organiser. These two aptitudes are not mutually exclusive, yet it is but seldom that they are found united in thei same individual. When they are we get a Napoleon or a Cresar. Von Falkennayn has been supreme at the German War Office ever since Von Moltke wajb shelved, and his organising abilities are proved hy the results. He is undoubtedly Germany's greatest organiser; but his strategical abilities have yet to be proved The inner histpry of the causes which led Germany to abandon her attack upon Russia, her, one chance of success in this war. in order to pursue a minor issue in the Balkans; has not yet been- written. When it is it will probably bo found that there was a struggle between Hindenburg the strategist and Falkenhayn the organiser, in which the latter triumphed. The Verdun attack bears all the marks of the great administrator who is no strategist. It is marvellously organised, and the material is abundant and complete down to the minutest detail. Yet it is about the lowwater mark of strategical fatuity. But it would, be impossible to demonstrate, even with the most unanswerable logic, to a man - with no strategical sense that to attack-at'the point which, offers the greatest difficulty and tie smallest results is bad business. He would be unable to follow the demonstration, because bis view would be obscured by the dazzling vision of huge masses of mighty guns pounding the fortress to pieces. . Success in that would seem to him a wonderful triumph, and the demonstration that nothing substantial was gained' by it-would leavo him cold. The Kaiser, of course, dabbles in strategy.' But then he dabbles in everything, and, being a jack-of-011-trades, is master of none. His views on strategy are hot likely to prove a corrective to Von Falkenhayn's errors, and we may hope that the organiser will continue to prevail.

AEE THEY BEATEN? It begins ."to look as if the German at- / tack is practically broken. The later / cables leave little doubt that the French / hold Fort Douaumont and p-robally nearly / all the plateau on which it stands. N'/ further successes of the enemy are reported, save the capture of the villt.£o of Manheulles, the outskirts of which were recovered by the French in a counterattack. Manheulles lies about the east of Haudimont (which, may be seen in the plan published in Monday' issue), and about the same distance north west of Fresnes, a village which appeared in Saturday's map. It is too early still tc flatter ourselves that the victory is won) •ibut the force of the attack seems spentAll accounts agree, however, that while it lasted it was without precedent for violence and slaughter. More than 1,100 guns were massed by the Germans against one sector. But the French were able to matchthem, and the serried ranks of the attacking- infantry went down like ripened grain. The German losses are put at 150,000. Suppose we assume that this figure is exaggerated, and reduce it by a third. It" still leinains a staggering loss for one short week. What., have the Germans to show for it? What shall we say of the insane strategy which led to it ? MOVEMENT IN MESOPOTAMIA. I General Aylmer bombarded the Turks on the left bank of the Tigris on tho 22nd inst. Tho enemy, who were surprised, lost heavily. General Aylmer continued his operations next day, his object being to secure a forward position on the right, or west, bank of the river in order to bring a reverse fire upon the enemy's position at Hannah. Apparently Hannah "" is Um-el-Henna, which stands at the big angle of the Tigris to the north-east of Kut-el-Amara, and close to El Owasa. We may trust that this news heralds a forward movement for the relief of General Townshend, since the same cable states that on the 25th inst. two British aeroplanes flew up from Basra to General Aylmer with the information that the river was rising and a flood was expected. The floods usually hegin to come down in May as the result of the melting of tho 6now on the mountains to the north-west; but they are variable, and the above item of intelligence suggests that they are commencing unusually early. Evidently there is no time to lose if Kut-el-Amara is to he re- ■ lieved before the floods render movement almost impossible for months. 'General Aylmer is still operating on both sidca of tho river. The Turkish position at tho bend of the river is admittedly -strong; but it appears to lie mainly, if not entirely, on the left bank, and if wo can push far enough along the right bank (the inside of the bend, that is) we shall be able to enfilade it. TREBIZOND IN TROUBLE. A cable from Rome declares that a wire- ' less message, the origin of which is not given, states that an attack upon Trebizond is imminent. This is very probablo, since the Russians were reported at Bizeh, only 40 miles the coast, a week ago. If the place is to lie attacked, this would indicate that the enemy propose to defend it, and that there is a substantial Turkish force there. If so tho Russians may make a goodly haul of prisoners an-ct guns as well as capturing the city, since it is unlikely that the place can put up much of a defence. A good deal will depend upon whether a road runs westward along the coast from Trebizond. The maps indicate that the coast road from Batoum stops at Trebizond, but maps of that remote Tegion are nob very trustworthy. Tho mountains rim close down to the sea, and if they aro cut off short at the coast in tho form of 6teep cliffs there will probably be no road, ns the Turks are not great road makers. But the point is uncertain. A MYSTERIOUS LOSS. The French auxiliary cruiser Provence, evidently conveying troops x to tho Balkans, was sunk in the Mediterranean on tho 26th of February, with 1,800 men on board, of whom 695 have been landed and 1,100 are missing. No perLscopo appears to have been detected jud no track of a torpedo, so tho cause is at present a mystery, British and French trawlers and destroyers have taken 295 survivors to Malta, while 400 landed at Melos (or MiloK -which is one of tho Greek islands of the Cyclades group. This indicates that the loss occurred to the east of Malta and in the neighborhood of Greece. Upon present information the most probable explanation is that Turkish or Austrian submarines have been sowing mines in tho tra"ck of the transports.