WHO WILL WIN?

Evening Star, Issue 14689, 5 October 1911, Page 6

WHO WILL WIN?

THE TRIPOLI EFFORT.. A MAN WHO MIGHT HAVE DONE IT. WAD EITsENOUSSI. [By A. Spence.] Does any correspondent know definitely, from reading or otherwise, whether Wad el Senoussi is still alive? It is generally understood that he is dead. If he were alive and alert Italy would be as good as '•down and oat." But Wad el Senoussi apostle of holiness and right-doing (according to his lights), hits not been heard of for years, and if it had not been for German sources of information, which are ever the more reliable, wo should not have heard of his death at all. Wad el Senoussi was the one man who scared Kitchener—perhaps the only man in tho world who ever did so. From beginning to consummation, Kitchener's advance on Omdurman required a quarter of a lifetime to complete, and what held him back? Partly his lurking fear of the tactical unsteadiness of the troops which he might be called on to command, but. chiefly'that the leader of the vast Senoussi brotherhood might dawn in a hugely uncomfortable strategic position on his flank. If Wad el Senoussi had so appeared, it would have been necessary that Kitchener should have faced round to meet him—frontally to Senoussi, but divergent to his objective, and (as even tho small youths of ihe upper, middle, and higher classes of England who graduate for the army know) divergent operations never did any good yet. To put it as shortly as possible. Kitchener could not have advanced up the Nile had Wad el Senoussi menaced what may be (ailed his strategic flank. And why did not Senoussi, good Moslem as ho was. do that? Because, no nation outside of Germany has any rational theory of war. Some sociology, some religion, some bookishnoss. some dependence on the newspapers and magazines, debating societies, money, sentiment, a- mass of catchwords delivered to a. public greedy of such, and the colossal total of the humbug and affectation derived from all of these, nave made it .-'■<> difficult in the present, days to imp. alxwhite war, that, pro tern., we cannot get it. The London 'Times' .says delinitely that "we cannot have absolute war because so many other factors come in." This is merely utterance by design. We shall have absolute war by 1925, and a very sore war for us it, will be. Wad el iSt-nous.si's obstacle in holding otT from Kitchener was a matter of religion. He hated the Taiiiiiii section of ihe Bagg.-ira tribe--hated ike Khalifa Alxhillahi 'as a Churchman hates a Dissenter --because, both from the point- of view'of ortholoxy ■iuul doings, both from the point of view of faith and works, it seemed a smaller creed. The doings in Omdurm.'in, by way of " works," and as tangible evidence of " faith," wvrtr unspeakable, and Wad el Senoussi washed his hands of them. That is really why he sinpd out of the Nile war, winch ho could have altered no much. If lie had advanced into it. nothing; could have put Kitchener at Omdurman yet. 'ln this present article, 1 can only ronsider the old man Wad el Senoussi and the effect which he may have if he is still alive on the present war. The tactical uusteadine.ss of Italian soldicTs and sailors is probably at present no greater and no less than it was in the sombre days when Abyssinia made its onfall on poor Baratieri, and if Italy wishes to emerge from the conflict with a whole skin it. will be f,itirt.-]y nwesKin- ih.-it. that, great tactical | force, the, Senoussi brotherhood, does not fall pell raell on top of them. Their own somewhat powerful navy gives them tinon! ion of landing in Turkey, but if -they did land it seems quite sale to say that the venture would not, go very far. Both .".••mit'S are German-trained, but the Turkish Army is by temperament far more suitable to receive the impression of the German system than the Italian Army. The German system in its essence depends <>n tactical steadiness and recklessness of death in the rank and file, and that fine virtue, is not one of the things which Italy c.Hi claim. A century of war can show v.-ry conclusively that she has not got In endeavoring to forecast the trend of any war the obvious way is to strike out the things which are impossible, and then to look squarely at the rest. Manifestly the strength of the Italian Navy gives Italy the choice of waging out the issue in blood in any theatre of war that she pleases. Conversely, Turkey will have to tight in whichever theatre of war is imposed on her. The most direct and undoubtedly the most telling one. would bo for the Italian standing battle squadron to bombard Constantinople, which is easily accessible from the sea. Ajjainst this roust be put-— >l) the international difficulty as to taking a war ileet through the Dardanelles ; (2) the undesirability of having shot, and idiel] Hying about among a harbor full of valuable shipping belonging to certain outside Powers. These two considerations, no doubt, render Constantinople safe. The next, best operation, from a military point of view, would be an invasion of European Turkey by an Italian held force. There is no danger of Italy doing so. for the Turkish Army can indeed tight, and Italy has no wish to again exhibit her tactical weakness on a pitched held of that sort. This possibility may, therefore, be ruled out. The only oilier likely theatre of war. excepting small naval skirmishes, is Tripoli itself. Turkey cannot reinforce whatever detachments of ni/.um and redil" she may have there. Italy, on the other hand, may land troops as she pleases. Which, of course, is very pretty for the Kalian Gov eminent, as long as the situation remains that way. But what if the. formidable Senoussi should Ik- minded t-o take a band in the war? One way or the other, that will probably settle it, THK RIVAL NAVII-X i So far as naval power is concerned. Italy is in a dillerent (lass, altogether from Turkey. The eight, Italian battle- j ships and 22 cruisers would find little ' dirhculty in demolishing Turkey's three battleships and eight cruisers, many of the Turkish vessels being obsolete. The j Italian fleet in commission hits been organ- \ is.ed into a battleship squadron of six j battleships, from the Vitterio Emanuele j 11 J. typo and two of tho Benedetto Uriri ■type, and into a cruiser squadron of seven armored cruisers, with four scout/; and four destroyers. .In the reserve division are j included five battleships and three- armored ; cruisers. j The personnel of the Italian Navv con- I sists of 1,898 officers (comprising 1 admiral, 23 vice-admiral/; and rear-admirals, 2C4 I captains and commanders, 648 lieutenants and pub-lieutenants, 165 midshipmen, 92 , engineer-constructors, 262 engineers, 508 sanitary and commissariat officers, 141 officers of the Corpo Keale Equipaggij and 28.£00 men (sailors, gunners, mechanicians, etc.). The Turkish Navy hat, grown of late by the purchase of vessels, from Germany. The sister battleships Kurfucrst Friedrich Wilhehtt and YVeissenburg, which were I just, reaching the ago for suppression under I the German Navy law. were sold to Turkey I in August, 1910,' for £900,000. They were \ renamed Kheyr-ed-Din Barbaroasn, and '. 'l'urgut lleis respectively. Four destroyers wore also purchased from Germany last I year at- a cost of £450,000. In February of this year three, North Germany Lloyd liners, the. Darmstadt and Oldenburg (5,000 tons) and the Roland (5,600 tons) were purchased for the transport service. For the navy of Turkey the crews are raised in the. same manner as the land j forces—partly by conscription and partly by voluntaiv enlistment. The time of j .service in the navy is 12 yea re, five in active service, three in the reserve, and four in the Rcdif. The nominal strength of tho navy is 6 vice-admirals, 11 rearadmirals, 208 captains, 289 commanders, 228 lieutenants, 187 ensigns, a.nd 50,000 sailors, besides about 9.000 marines.