NOTES ON THE WAR.

Evening Star, Issue 12366, 2 December 1904, Page 6

NOTES ON THE WAR.

[By Kascba.] —The Halt at the Sha-ho.— By that which is sometimes referred to as “the second rule of strategy,” an army once committed to the offensive must keep the offensive. When an army, having been launched, progresses a certain distance, and then, without having sustained a positive defeat, adopts a passive attitude and “ sits down,” something is wrong somewhere. The cause of the suspension, of a strategic offensive may be serious, as was the case when Methuen “ eat dawn ” at Modder River, Gatacre in front of Stormberg, and Buller at the Tugela, all three suspensions of the offensive being simultaneous. On the other hand, it may be due to circumstances which, though serious in themselves, are not likely to be of permanent duration, as was the case when Lord Roberts, after having entered the Orange River Colony, “ sat down ” in Bloemfontein until he could reorganise his communications, and, to a large extent, remount his mobile arm. In the first instance the suspension of the offensive was serious, because it meant that the available British forces in South Africa could not go forward without farther assistance from a base which was many thousand miles away, this being evidence that we had grossly miscalculated the powers of resistance of an enemy with whom we had embarked on an offensive war, and that consequently, all strategic plans had been reduced to naught. In the case of the Boer War, however, the whole “deadweight” of the Boer Republic was a quantity which could not be added to however long the war lasted, although delays to us meant increased financial strain and loss of prestige. But the case of Japan is different. She entered on the war fully prepared, and delay is not to her advantage. It is to the advantage of her opponent, who can bring an immense “deadweight” to the East but requires time for transport. Estimations as to what the Trans-Siberian Railway is doing or is likely to do. are vague, and are likely to continue so. Practically no outriders know very much about it, for it was noticeable that papers each as the London 'Times’ were reduced to interviewing sailors belonging to vessels captured by the Yladivostock squadron as to whaff the TransSiberian fine was really doing. Information thus resting on inexpert testimony is not eo satisfactory as one coqld wish- To-day we are told on the authority of the ‘Standard’s’ Odessa correspondent that “since' the battle of the Sba-ho General KnropatIdn’s reinforcements amount to 54,000 men and seventy-two guns. A further 38,000 men and ninety-right guns -will reach the front at the end of December.” There is a prima facie appearance of truth about this, fo» both reinforcements correspond to the war totals, of the 7th and Bth Russian corps d’avmee, birth of which are from the Odessa military district, and both of which were ..T«norta»i rnnhiSrinff. some time tun,. It

will be noticed that these reinforcements are small when considered in. relation to Russia s requirements in the East. The first reinforcement will scarcely make good the loss® sustained at the battle of the Sha-ho, so. that, if the ‘Standard’s’ version of Hungs bo correct, the Trans-Siberian 'Railway is not doing anything very wonderful. *j, fc T or ?i s ’ , that does Dot the'fact tJl £ deadweight of Russia is coming to the East, that as time goes on the preponderance of force with which Japan diminiFl, > and that consequently all delays are against her. From considerations of this kind it is fair to asOTmo that the Japanese bait between the ini-tee and Hun rivers is a matter of compulsion, and that things are not so satisthe % StTategic P° i,lfc of view as J Ja P ;m ™nld have us believe that 5 Ja P a l ! ® S( -. commanders anticipated ° after tOD of „, ~ T h® Ladysmith of the East.— Jarwne«> d ? Ubt tbat of Japanese sit down” at Yen-tai is the of I tie which offered by the garrison at Port S aptain Ma han pointed it t wonhM ln Nat!ODal R<nw ’ that although it would be premature to say that the resistance of Port Arthur will exercise the wldch influence on the war which Lacysnuth did on the course of bos,n «?«th Africa, ncverthekS X and mnHr,' 110 ! 1 Ror t Arthur is exercising rf to eXerC ' !,e mUSt be acc °unted t £J . J . fc ma - v as WU he pointed out ttat this opinion is not infaJihle merely bek fr ° m C ' ,ptain Mahan, nor is of InT5w f lnore r Spect than the "Pi llsoll of any other competent student of war, since ° f in from which to us nil if* 3,11 diaws hi - conclusions are open [ Tf "’ e know where to look and know Captain Mahan fell into some wh .n at the. beginning of the present war he was said to have predicted that the Yah would bo the centre of the struggle. This l !ed & the nfWS Wies to mean that the whole war would be fought i _ n * be Yalu, although it could easily ne een that a. salient position such as the i.tlu could never be permanently held hv an inferior fore* such as that commanded by Sassehtcb—a fact which was pointed out iV T“ **** at the time- But when the full text of Captain Mahan’s opinion came n-i.ot'ri, the mail it could be seen that wnat Captain Mahan did say and what he was reported to have said were two verv different things. His opinion simply amounted to this: that the whole geometric tendency of the theatre of war was towards the Yalu. That must be apparent to anyone who has studied the major strategy of anvwar fought over an extensive area of country, and it is not improbable that events to come may give it very explicit rw.farmatioa. As regards Captain Mahan’s article about the effect of the prolonged resistance of Port Arthur, there can hard’v hi two opinions. The events up-country in Manchuria have borne it out, and for'the ti.r.s being Japan cannot adequately prosecute the main war—the war against Kuropatkm—because the exigencies of another war- the war against Port Arthur—mher back. For the moment tl-e . Coubls objective” seems not unlike ihe bci rrernng. It has a tendency to nit ba'rt Until it can be seen whether Japan can deploy a preponderance of force sifficieutlj great to warrant her taking up a seu i clary line of operations from a base on tha east coast of Manchuria or Siberia, and whether she will retain that free exercise of sea power which is necessary for such a plan, it is not worth while speculating as ti what strategic results are likely to Sliow from anything that may happen hetween Liao-yang and Mukden. The position now is very much as it was in South Africa during the month of January, 1900. A i that time a great deal of attention >v; s being attracted towards the operations of French at Colesberg and Buller at the, Tngcla, and meamvln’o Lord Roberts was mating preparations for the .man l.'.nr elsevnere. Now, to make anr 'astinr impression on Russia, Japan will require to bring another quarter of a million men into the fighting line by next March, and specula i ion as to where they will bo “ pm. in ’ must he tentative just now, since it yet remains to be seen whether submersihlea of long radias, such as the Fulton, will he able to interfere effectively with any intention which the Japanese may have with respect to the establishment of another base anywhere near Yladivostqck. If Japan is blocked on -such a plan, the fact remains that half a million men, placed on a single “ path of advance,” are an unwieldy force for any one commander to handle. The other possibility—that of Japan losing command of the sea owing to the joint action of the Baltic and Port Arthur squadrons—will ho entered into more fully in subsequent notes, and nothing more can be said just now except- that if the accumulated Russian naval strength proves strong enough to relieve Port Arthur, it will also be strong enough to win the war for Russia out-and-out. —The Distortion of- Perspective.— If Japan keeps the command of tho sea she will eventually get Port Arthur, and having got it, nothing short of the lose of predominant sea power will be sufficient to wrest it from her. It' is also possible that by a skilful use of field and permanent fortification she will be able to maintain her hold of the Liaotung Peninsula, and so block for ever the Russian approach on Corea, But she embarked on tlie war with the professed view of doing something more. That something was the stoppage of Russian expansion southward through Manchuria. To do this she requires Vladivcstock, which I have always taken to be the ultimate geographical objective, but about which all the military writers are still discreetly silent. The London ‘Times’ goes the length, of saying that Vladivostok; “possesses few strategic advantages.” How ridiculous such art assertion is may be seen bv considering bow New Zealand would have to set about the stopping of the expansion of a great Power southward through Australia from the Gulf of Carpentaria. Tho occupation of Melbourne would be, of ‘little use, hut Hanking, positions such as Brisbane or Sydney would be of the utmost importance. We have only to call New Zealand Japan, Australia Manchuria, Melbourne Port Arthur, and Brisbane Vladivostock, and the importance of Vladivostock is visible at a glance. But before next March the armies of General Oscar Gripcnhvrg and General Katilhars will be on the theatre of war, and if the way to Yladivostcck is difficult now, much more difficult will it he then. A. good deal of tho trouble which Japan has now to face is the direct consequence of the failure of the Japanese armies at Liao-yang. Soipe writ cm are now setting themselves to show that tho achievement of a Sedan was a task imposed by military critics, hut never aimed at by Field-marshal Oyama-- It is strange, however, that the idea of Sedan should have arisen simultaneously in the minds of independent and competent writers all over the world. The fact is that the resemblance was too great to bo mistaken, and the Japanese intention all too evident. In endeavoring to account for the failure at the time of the battle, I said that the J-panes© copy of-the German idea reminded one very forcibly of the story of the faithful Chinaman who, being set to make a plate, and given a pattern plate with a crack in it, produced his plate with a crack in it also. I notice that this same idea is now put forward by a writer in the current number of tho ‘Fortnightly Review,’ and I have no doubt, from what has been seen already, that it will he found correct, when everything is over. At present the correspondents have got the picture quite out of perspective. Everything which is Japanese is best. . Wo have been told of the superiority of the Shiinose explosive, tho Ijuin fuse, the Oda mine, and the Arisaka gun, and we have had to accept all that because- sufficient accounts have not yet been received to, show whether these encomiums are justified by fact. But when the correspondents went further and attempted to magnify the Japanese cavalry, “mounted on Australian horses,” into- a formidable arm, I could not help thinking that it was time to draw the line between belief and disbelief, and to wait for events j to show what was the truth. Few English officers who visited Japan prior to the war had a good word to' say • concerning the Japanese cavalry, and I expect-that any Japanese mounted brigade could . he easily ridden down by any ordinary English, German, or French regiment of “ heavies ” or I think that five general position is uat nanooat^y

simmed Tip by the writer in the ‘Fortnightly Review’ mentioned above. Hie says; “If we recognise that all speculation at the present stage must be balanced and. tentative, an examination of this kind can be. considered neither premature nor invidious, and it has indeed become a political necessity for all sane thinkers upon foreign affairs -to penetrate towards something like reality through the clouds of hyperbole and. prejudice in which most British discussion of the relative merits of the combatants tends to wrap the truth. The unmeasured panegyric of Japanese qualities can represent by itself nothing like the truth. As no man was ever so wise as Daniel Webster looked, no nation could ever be so great as Japan is painted When we choose to regard the war as a struggle between an Asiatic Ariel and a Slav Caliban we are profoundly unjust towards Russia-, and we must be superficial about Japan.' 0