THE THIBET MISSION.

Evening Star, Issue 12162, 5 April 1904, Page 1

THE THIBET MISSION.

StMTTLTAKEOTJSIT with VISCOUnt CuTZOn's declaration before the Indian Council as to the Empire's policy in regard to the Indian frontier, news comes of the progress of Colonel Younghusband's mission to Lhassa. Regrettable as the engagement at Guru Is, it was inevitable in view of the opposition offered by the Dalai Lama's troops. A period had arrived in the history of the Indian Government's dealings with Thibet when to continue by moans of negotiations, conducted at long distances, to seek the establishment of satisfactory political relations would have been an admission of weakness detrimental to British, prestige and dangerous to the integrity of that frontier on which the safety of India depends. For years the Imperial Government, acting on the advice of Lord Curzcn, have sought to obtain, not an accession of territory, bnt a definite and authoritative agreement with Thibet, free from the mediation of either China or any other Power. This the Dalai Lama has persistently and consistently refused to grant. He has returned unopened the communications addressed to him by the Viceroy of India, but at the same time he has sent missions and entrusted them, with autograph letters to deliver to the Czar. It is obvious that this unsatisfactory (to use the mildest' term possible) condition of affairs could not continue if that policy oa which the Empire is agreed were to be maintained. Wo refer, of course, to the safeguarding of British India. Xo Government, no Viceroy, and no party dare take chances, and trust to luck in the matter of securing, and holding when we have secured, the gates through which it would be possible for an adversary to pour troops and swoop down on India. Britain, in the words of Lord Curzon, does not wish to occupy or annex the semi-civilised wastes and litileknown regions, but she will insist on their being in friendly hands. That is the duty of the British people, that is the obligation they are under to the native races of India, and "eternal vigilance" is the price that must be paid for the proud but onerous responsibility the Empire has there undertaken. A clear and unmistakeable black-and-white understanding with Thibet was therefore imperative, especially in the face of the more than vague rumors that were current as to Russian intrigue in the city of Lhassa. It is the acme of folly, though eminently characteristic of the Peace-at-any-price and Little England party, to talk in shocked tones about "the raid on Thibet." Every advance, every direct movement, every assertion of backbone on the part of Britain when speaking with her enemy in the gate has been similarly named. Scuttle and submission are the sole alternatives to firmness and modest emphasis. But scuttle and submission, and all that they connote, are seemingly preferable among that section who in all times and seasons are to be found ready to back the outsider as long as by doing so there is a chance to injure the Home Government. Fortunately the details leading up to Colonel Younghusband's mission are on record, and while these will not convince the unreasoning partisan, they will indicate to the unbiased that each step in the negotiations has been taken with the utmost regard to the Thibetans, consistent, of course, with the decision to cease the existing policy of do-nothing and equivocation, plus the announced intention not to be "bluffed," even though Russia bars the way.

On February 27, 1305, the then Secretary of India (Lord George Hamilton), in a despatch addressed to the Governor-General-in-Council, laid down the principles of the Imperial Government's policy in relation to Thibet. After stating that the question at issue had oeased to be one of trade and boundaries, bat involved the future political relations of India and Thibet, the Indian Secretary -went on to say that Has Majesty's Government regarded it as indispensable that British influence should be recognised at Lhassa in such a manner as to render it impossible for any other Power to exercise on the Government of Thibet pressure not consistent -with the interests of British India. The efforts of the Viceroy to establish by negotiation the objects of the Imperial Government did not succeed, while those of Russia, as we have previously remarked, were eagerly welcomed and responded to by the Thibetan ruler. In fact, so close did these latter become and so strong the influence exercised by the Ministers of the Czar that the Russian Embassy in London forwarded a communication to the British Foreign Office stating that Russia would consider a t British expedition into Thibet " as calculated to produce a situation "of considerable gravity, which might even"tually force the Russian Government to "take measures for the protection of their "interests in those regions." Thi« bold intimation was treated by v Lard Lansdowne in a spirit worthy of Lord Palmerston, In his answer he termed it " unusual," " almost minatory," and "gratuitous." Britain was acting within her undoubted rights, and he could not eoncefre why Russia was so particularly interested in regions a thousand miles from her frontiers, but which were in close touch with those of Britain's Indian Empire. The "bluff" having failed, Russia adopted her usual tone—of which tie world is getting somewhat weary—and protested that there was absolutely no t*v*\ whatever

in the cruel and -wicked stories abonfc seeret agreements. • Whatever she might do wouia always be for the advantage of Thibet and the integrity of China, although, as a matter of fact, Thibet was outside the scope of her policy. Russia even went farther. She assumed the role of the confidential friend. "You ought to have a definite understanding," said the Minister of the Czar"; "you insist on Thibet fulfilling her treaty "obligations with you." And Britain did so. Colonel Younghusband's mission is the direct result of the Imperial Government's attempt to secure the Dalai Lama's fulfilment of treaty obligations. Bat, naturally, Russia did not anticipate that Britain would have gone so far. It really was not right to thus literally interpret a friendly suggestion, and the Russian Ambassador in London reopened the question. Lord Lansdowne, however, handled it without beating about the bush or seeking refuge in words that darken understanding. His Lordship said-. "It seemed to me beyond "measure strange that these protests should "be made by the Government of a Power "which had all over the world never hesi- *| tnted to encroach upon its neighbors when "the circumstances seemed to jequire it. "If the Russian Government had & iigbfc " to complain of us for taking steps in <*4» "to obtain reparation from the Thibetans, "what kind of language should we not be

"entitled to use in regard to Russian encroachments in Manchuria, Turkestan, and Persia." It is not surprising, after so candid a retort, to find that a mission had been despatched from India for Thibet, and that its instructions were to avoid a conflict if possible, but certainly not to retreat •until its object had been accomplished. That .Colonel Younghusband, even at great risks, has loyally sought to obey his instructions, the general consensus of opinion on the Guru affair sufficiently indicates. His reluctance to employ force was misunderstood, however. The Oriental mind cannot appreciate the nice distinction v. cdraw between an exhibition of brute strength and the reluctance of a brave foe to draw the sword. The conclusion is reached,* per saltum, that he who does not strike is afraid to do so. The Thibetans know better now, and we job ourselves in the gener;-*" hope that the moral effect of the Guru lesson will have its reward—both in Lhassa and St. Petersburg. -